Cited by

S (declining to extend rights under the Education Clause in Minnesota’s Constitution); n.9 (Minn. App. 2017) (rejecting invitation to interpret the state constitution as having a more stringent standard because such a holding “would be beyond the purvi

Where, as here, the issue of standing arises in the context of a motion to dismiss, we “must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted).

We add that a district court acts within its discretion by not addressing a plaintiff’s request to amend a complaint when the plaintiff does not properly bring a motion for leave to amend, and that Zook brought no such motion here.

“We review de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., d 25, 30 (Minn. App. 2019) (reviewing dismissals under both rule 12.02(a) and rule 12.02(e) de novo).

“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

-36 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted).

At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, “ for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general 10 allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” (quoting Lujan v. Defs.

To meet this requirement, relators generally must “demonstrate that they are part of an ‘objectively identifiable’ class that is treated differently than a similarly situated class.” Brown, 2025 WL 2901740, at *11 (-36 (Minn. App. 2019)).

(Minn. 3 Because the district court construed the complaint not to allege CFA claims against MULDA and MULDA -RC, there is no standing ruling for us to review on those claims.

(addressing both types of dismissals).

When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, both the district and appellate courts must “accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted).

“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); see also Lujan v. Defs.

“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

(interpreting Education Clause); d 186, 196 n.9 (Minn. App. 2017) (interpreting article III of state constitution).

Compare Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe , (applying summary -judgment standard to standing issue), (applying motion-to- dismiss standard to standing issue).

d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2019).

“[T]o establish a violation o f the Education Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the legislature has failed or is failing to provide an adequate education.” Forslund v. State

“A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” (quotation omitted).