Cited by

“First Amendment protections are not limitless.”

(“An action is done ‘repeatedly’ when it is done ‘again and again.’”); (defining “repeatedly” in Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 2(6) (1996), as “more than once”), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

(holding that stalking-by-mail provision in Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd.

1, that “the defendant must know or have reason to know that the communication would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated,” is a “negligence mens rea.” 864 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted) (reversing stalking-by- mail conviction as facially overbroad in violation of First Amendment).

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).2 Acknowledging that our statutory severance test is partially grounded in Minn. Stat. § 645.20 (2022), 3 I see no reason that the same test— which strongly echoes the test adopted by the court in this case—should not apply when assessing whether portions of

see Minn. Stat. § 645.20 (2022); Back v. State , (invalidating the statute when severance was not possible with the consequence that we proceed as if the statute had never been enacted at all).

d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019).

and this court’s constitute new legal authority that was not available at the time of his direct appeal.

Additionally, it “appl[ies] with equal force to speech or expressive conduct on the Internet.”

6 of A.J.B., –48, 856, 863 (Minn. 2019) (holding that a stalking-by-mail statute was overbroad but that a mail-harassment statute was not); Hensel, d at 170, 181 (holding that the disturbance-of-assembly statute was facially unconstitutional); State v. Muccio , –29 (Minn. 2017) (holding that a st

-48 (Minn. 2019); -76 (Minn. 2017) (providing the same general framework).