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filling in that gap is a job for the Legislature.”); (determining that a gap in the relevant statute was a “public policy concern [that] should be directed to the Legislature because [the supreme court] must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be” (quotation omitted)); McReynolds, d at 320 (“A bad policy outcom

“We do not examine the statutory language in isolation, but rather we interpret the language in context of the statute as a whole.” Schneider, d at 202

See Juntunen, d at 743 (“The Legislature determined that employees suffering from PTSD need timely access to medical care, and the PTSD presumption puts the onus on employers to quickly resolve such claims.”); Chrz, d at 487 (stating that “we ‘must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be’ ” ()); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 176.011, subd.

(“[P]ublic policy concern[s] should be directed to the Legislature because we must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be.” (quotation omitted)).

But this policy concern “should be directed to the Legislature,” for we “must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In interpreting a particular statutory provision, we read the provision ‘in context with other provisions of the same statute.’ ” (quoting ILHC of Eagan, ).

While we are sensitive to these concerns and to the well-being of Minnesota workers experiencing mental illness, these public policy concerns “should be directed to the Legislature,” for we “must read this 12 state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be.” d 441, 446 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 “In interpreting a particular statutory provision, [appellate courts] read the provision in context with other provisions of the same statute.” (quotation omitted).

(explaining that public policy concerns “should be directed to the Legislature because we must read this state’s laws as they are, 18 not as some argue they should be” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).11 As mentioned previously, the court of appeals applied, in part, a tr

Partners III- Lofts, LLC, (stating that we must follow the plain and unambiguous language of a statute); 6 (Minn. 2017) (rejecting the argument that the Legislature could not have intended what the words of the statute plainly said); Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, (stating that a court cannot add meaning or words to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently left out).

See State v. Carson , (determining meaning of “to be listed” in Minnesot a’s impaired-driving statute).