State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1580

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cory Clifford Morris,
Appellant.

Filed October 29, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-21659

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief App ellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of second-degree intentional murder, appellant Cory
Clifford Morris argues that the evidence presented during the second phase of a bifurcated

2
trial was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty by
reason of mental illness. Because we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
determining that appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proof, we affirm.
FACTS
On August 13, 2016, appellant was arrested for killing his four-month-old daughter.
Three days later, the state charged him with second-degree intentional murder in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1 (1) (2016). Based on his behavior while in custody, the
district court ordered a Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01 competency
examination to consider appellant’s competency t o proceed to trial. 1 The district court
appointed Dr. Lawrence Panciera, a court psychologist, to conduct the examination. On
August 23, Dr. Panciera concluded that appellant was not c ompetent to proceed . The
district court found that appellant was not competent to proceed to trial on the basis of this
report. The Hennepin County Medical Center initiated a petition for civil commitment and
began emergency treatment . On September 15, appellant was civi lly committed as
mentally ill. The district court held a review hearing on September 20 and determined that
appellant was responding to the treatment and was competent to proceed.
On October 31, Dr. Panciera filed a Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.02
mental-examination report opining that appellant was suffering from schizoaffective

1 A district court may order a competency examination under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 20.01 to ensure that only competent defendants are tried or sentenced for a
crime. Under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.02, the district court also may
order a mental examination of defendant if the defendant offers evidence of mental illness
at the time of the commission of the offense or asserts a mental-illness defense at trial.

3
disorder at the time of the offense and was “laboring under such a defect of reason as not
to know the nature of the act constituting the offense or that it was wrong because of mental
illness.” Appellant was also examined by Dr. Shane Wernsing, a forensic psychiatrist, who
diagnosed appellant with schizoaffective disorder and agreed that appellant had a mental
illness that was “likely active (or symptomatic)” when he killed his daughter. However,
Dr. Wernsing did not agree that appellant failed to understand the wrongfulness of his act
at the time he killed his daughter.
On April 3, 2017, appellant waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded
to a bifurcated trial, with the first phase considering appellant’s guilt and the second phase
considering whether appellant was not legally responsible for his criminal actions due to
mental illness. During the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the district court found that
the state proved each element of second -degree intentional murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. During the second phase of the trial, appellant presented a defense of not guilty by
reason of mental illness . T he district court heard testimony from Drs. Panciera and
Wernsing. The experts agreed that appellant suffered from active symptoms of a mental
illness at the time of the crime, but offered conflicting opinions concerning whether
appellant knew that his actions were wrong. The district court weighed the evidence and
the conflicting expert testim ony and determined that appellant failed to establish the
mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The court determined that
appellant knew the nature of his act —that is, he knew that he was striking his daughter,
and he knew that striking her could cause her harm . The court further determined that

4
appellant knew his act ions were morally wrong. The district court imposed the
presumptive sentence of 306 months in prison, and this appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court clearly erred by rejecting his mental -illness
defense during the second phase of his bifurcated court trial for second -degree intentional
murder. “A criminal defendant is presumed sane and responsible for his acts,” and “bears
the burden of proving a mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” State
v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. 2016) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 611.025 (2016);
State v. Linder , 304 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. 1981). The mental -illness defense is a
question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder and “a finding that a defendant failed to
meet his or her burden to prove a mental -illness defense should not be disturbed unless it
is clearly erroneous.” Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868. “A factual finding is clearly erroneous
if it does not have evidentiary support in the record or if it was induced by an erroneous
view of the law.” Id.
Minnesota follows the test articulated in Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843), and codified in statute as follows:
No person having a mental illness or cognitive impairment so
as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making
a defense shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime;
but the person shall not be excused from criminal liability
except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged
criminal act the person was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of
the act, or that it was wrong.

5
Minn. Stat. § 611.026 (2016). The word “wrong” mean s that a criminal defendant “must
know that his act was wrong in a moral sense and not merely know that he has violated a
statute.” Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
On review , this court conducts “a rigorous review of the record to determi ne
whether the evidence, direct and circumstantial, viewed most favorably to support a finding
of guilt, was sufficient to permit the [district] court to reach its conclusion.” State v. Odell,
676 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). The issue of mental illness is one
for the factfinder to resolve, State v. Brom , 463 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. 1990), and a
reviewing court therefore giv es “broad deference” to the fact finder’s determination as to
the appropriate weight assigned to various testimony , State v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816,
822-23 (Minn. 2009). In particular, w e afford broad deference “to the fact -finder in
determining the appropriate weight to assign expert psychiatric testimony” and, moreover,
“the factfinder is not bound by expert psychiatric testimony and may reject it entirely, even
when the only experts who testif y support the defendant’s assertion of a mental -illness
defense.” Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
Appellant does not challenge the district court’s determination that appellant knew
the nature of the act constituting the offense. Thus, t he only issue raised in this appeal is
whether the greater weight of the evidence established that, at the time of the offense,
appellant knew his actions were wrong. The district court found that appellant failed to
establish his mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Sufficient evidence in the record supports the district court’s decision. During the
second phase of the bifurcated trial, t he district court heard testimony from two expert

6
witnesses, Dr. Panciera and Dr. Wernsing. The district court acknowledged that there were
conflicting expert opinions concerning whether appellant knew that his actions were wrong
when he killed his daughter. Dr. Panciera appeared for the defense and testified that he
believed appellant was “very c onfused and psychotic” when he killed his daughter.
However, the doctor agreed that a person who is suffering from mental illness may retain
the ability to know right from wrong. Dr. Wernsing appeared as a witness for the state and
testified that, in his opinion, appellant’s delusions did not impact his ability to think
rationally. The doctor noted that appellant appeared to be “doing most of the regular day-
to-day events in his life without great impairment” leading up to August 13, and further
testified that it’s possible for an individual experiencing auditory hallucinations to still
engage in rational thought and decision-making. Dr. Wernsing testified that, in his opinion,
appellant understood what he was doing when he killed his daughter and unders tood the
wrongfulness of his act. The prosecutor asked, “[W]as [appellant] laboring under such a
defective reasoning from his mental illness that he didn’t know that his act was wrong?”
Dr. Wernsing, replied, “Again, no.”
Roberts provides that the distr ict court is “free to reject” aspects of an expert’s
testimony, particularly when the expert’s testimony is contradicted by other competent
evidence. 876 N.W.2d at 870 -71; see also DeMars v. State , 352 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn.
1984) (recognizing that a factfinder is not bound by expert testimony that defendant was
mentally ill because evidence of defendant’s conduct supported a determination that he
knew his conduct was wrong). In addition to the experts’ testimony, the district court also
considered testimony from the child’s mother, appellant’s neighbors, the 911 operator, and

7
responding paramedics . After killing his daughter, appellant began walking around his
neighborhood. His neighbor testified that appellant stated he had “a lot of sh_t to deal
with.” The baby’s mother testified that she spoke on the phone with appellant around the
same time and appellant stated that he would have to “live with what [he] did” and was
“going to jail.” Appellant later returned home, called 911, and told the dispatcher that he
killed his daughter by punching her “repeatedly.” When the first responders arrived at the
home, appellant told one of the paramedics that he beat his daughter “too many times.”
Viewing the evidence as a whole, the district court determined that this evidence
“indicate[s] [he] knew his act was wrong, understood he had options and made the choice
to hit and ultimately kill his daughter.”
The district court also considered appellant’s conduct before and after the murder.
“A district court may reject a mental-illness defense based on evidence of a defendant’s
behavior before and after crimes, including evidence that the defendant was aware of the
consequences of her actions.” State v. Hall , 915 N.W.2d 528, 538 (Minn. App. 2018)
(citing Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 869); see also Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Minn.
1999) (“[T]he trial court can look to events surrounding the crime in making a
determination about appellant’s sanity.”); State v. Wilson , 539 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn.
1995) (“[C]ircumstances surrounding the crime may shed light on defendant’s mental state
at the time of the murders.”) . Here, the court found that appellant’s “first recorded
statements” after killing his daughter are captured in his 911 call and his interview with the
police. During his 911 call, appellant stated, “I did something very horrible . . . I killed
my daughter.” During the police interview several hours later, appellant told the officers

8
that, “I was doing things that I wouldn’t and that I don’t think I should ever do.” Appellant
stated that he would carry the memory of killing his daughter “for the rest of [his] life,”
and felt he should “probably go to jail.”
The district court determined that it could infer from appellant’s “conduct
surrounding the attack”—such as attempting to clean up the splattered blood in the child’s
bedroom, calling 911 to report that he killed his daughter, and stating that he believed he
should go to jail for killing her—that he “knew his act was morally wrong.” See Hall, 915
N.W.2d at 539 (noting that court properly considered circumstantial evidence in its
decision that appellant understood “moral wrongness” of actions). Based on this evidence,
the district court determined that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was not responsible for his actions. We discern no clear error in the district
court’s decision. The record reveals that the district court thoughtfully , thoroughly, and
carefully weighed the testimony provided by both expert witnesses and lay witnesses and
considered evidence of appellant’s behavior before and aft er the murder . Further, the
district court made specific credibility findings.
Appellant argues that the greater weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that
his cognitive impairment prevented him from understanding that his actions were wrong.
We decline to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.
We afford “substantial deference to the district court’s evaluation of the evidence of mental
illness and the weight to assign to expert psychiatric testimony.” Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at
871. Here, the district court carefully and thoroughly considered the testimony and
evidence presented by the expert witnesses, as well as the testimony presented through the

9
lay witnesses regarding appellant’s conduct before and after the murder. See id. We defer
to the district court’s informed credibility determinations.
Given the record as a whole and the instruction to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, Peterson, 764 N.W.2d at 823, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in determining that appellant failed to meet his burden of
establishing a mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and we affirm.
Affirmed.