State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0863

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cordero Jarrod Phillips,
Appellant.

Filed May 11, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-5580

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
After a court trial, a Ramsey County D istrict Court judge found Cordero Jarrod
Phillips guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. On appeal,

2
Phillips argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude that
the state’s direct evidence is sufficient to prove Phillips’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Phillips’s conviction arises from an incident at a gas station and convenience store
in St. Paul on the evening of July 26, 2017. An employee of the store called 911 to report
that a man had pointed a handgun at another man during a confrontation near the gas
pumps. Two police officers responded and found a handgun on a car seat where Phillips
had been sitting when the officers arrived . The state charged Phillips with unlawful
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and unlawful possession of ammunition by
an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016).
In November 2018, Phillips waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to
the court. At the beginning of trial, Phillips stipulated that he was prohibited from
possessing a firearm or ammunition because of a prior drug conviction.
The state called six witnesses. The state’s first witness was the store employee who
called 911. She testified as follows: S he saw a man who was a passenger in a white car
point a gun at the driver of another vehicle. She watched the altercation until the second
car drove away and the man with the gun returned to the passenger seat of the white car.
She called 911. She later saw the police arrest the man with the gun, although she did not
see the man’s face. She did not dispute that , on the evening of the incident, she told a
police officer that the gun was pointed toward the ground during the altercation rather than
toward the driver of the other vehicle.

3
Officer Franklin testified that he responded to a report of a weapon at the gas station.
After he arrived, he saw a white Chevrolet Monte Carlo parked near the gas pumps. He
and his partner , Offi cer Buckley, ordered the passenger out of the vehicle and then the
driver. Officer Franklin identified the passenger in the vehicle as Phillips and the driver as
Byron Ramsey. After Phillips and Ramsey were placed in the back seat of the squad car,
Officer Franklin approached the passenger side of the Monte Carlo, looked into the vehicle,
and saw a handgun on the passenger seat in plain view.
Officer Buckley testified about the same events. He testified that he was not able
to see Ramsey’s hands until Ramsey raised them, approximately 10 to 15 seconds after the
officers arrived at the scene. Officer Buckley testified that he did not see any furtive
movements when he first observed Phillips and Ramsey in the white Monte Carlo and that
he was able to see Ramsey’s hands as Phillips was ordered out of the vehicle.
The state also introduced evidence concerning DNA testing of the handgun,
although the test results were inconclusive. Phillips did not testify and did not introduce
any evidence.
The prosecutor and Phillips’s trial attorney presented oral closing arguments to the
district court. The prosecutor argued that Phillips was in actual possession of the handgun
during the confrontation with the driver of the other vehicle . The prosecutor relied on the
store employee’s testimony, her 911 call, and the surveillance video-recording. Phillips’s
attorney argued that Phillips did not have either actual possession or constructive
possession of the handgun. Phillips’s attorney argued that the store employee’s testimony
was not credible. Phillips’s attorney also argued that Phillips ’s mere proximity to the

4
handgun was insufficient to prove that he exercised dominion or control over it and that
the evidence is consistent with Ramsey’s possessing the handgu n and dropping it on the
passenger seat.
Two days after trial, the district court filed an order in which it found Phillips guilty
of both of the alleged offenses . The district court sentenced Phillips to 60 months of
imprisonment on count 1 , which concerned his possession of the handgun . The district
court did not impose a sentence on count 2, which concerned his possession of the
ammunition. Phillips appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Phillips argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. If
a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we
“carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that th e defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted. ” State v.
Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted) . “The evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder
disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict. ” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016). This analysis applies in the same manner after a jury trial and after
a court trial. State v. Lopez, 908 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Minn. 2018).
To prove the offense of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the state
must prove that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm while prohibited by law from
doing so. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2); State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn.

5
2017). The parties stipulated that Phillips was ineligible to possess a firearm in July 2018.
Thus, the question on appea l is whether he possessed the handgun that was found on the
passenger seat of the vehicle from which he was removed.
The state may establish a violation of section 624.713 by proving either actual
possession or constructive possession of a firearm. See State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156,
159 (Minn. 2015). Actual possession means that the defendant had “actual or physical
possession [of the firearm] at the time of arrest. ” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610
(Minn. 1975). “The mere fact that an item is not in a defendant ’s physical possession at
the time of apprehension does not preclude prosecution f or actual possession. ” State v.
Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Minn. App. 2016). To establish constructive possession,
the state must prove “either (1 ) that the prohibited item was f ound in a place under
defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not normally have access, ” or
“(2) if the prohibited item was found in a place to which others had access, there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant was at the time consciously
exercising dominion and control over it.” Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159 (quotation omitted).
In finding Phillips guilty, the district court credited the employee’s testimony that
she saw Phillips holding a handgun. The district court noted that the employee’s testimony
was “imperfect” but nonetheless determined that “her testimony and prior statements were
consistent and her testimony was certain. ” The district court reviewed the surveillance
video-recording of the incident and concluded that “the lack of clarity on the video [did]
not refute or conflict with [the employee’s] testimony.” The district court reasoned that
the DNA evidence neither supported a finding of guilt nor created a reasonable doubt.

6
Phillips contends that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient on the
grounds that the circumstantial evidence is incapable of proving constructive possession
and that there are “grave doubts” about the direct evidence that he was in actual possession
of the handgun. In response, the state contends that the direct evidence i s sufficient to
prove Phillips’s actual possession of the handgun and that it is unnecessary to consider
whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove constructive possession.
We begin by considering the state ’s direct evidence, which was the focus of its
closing argument to the district court and is the focus of its appellate argument . The state
relies on the employee’s testimony and argues that it was corroborated by other evidence,
such as the employee’s 911 call and the surveillance video-recording. This evidence, when
considered in a light most favorable to the evidence and the district court’s findings of fact,
is sufficient to support the district court’s ultimate finding that Phillips actually possessed
the handgun that was later found in the vehicle. Barker, 888 N.W.2d at 354.
Phillips acknowledges the testimony of the store employee, the evidence of her 911
call, and the surveillance video -recording. But he argues that, for various reasons, there
are “grave doubts” that he actually possessed the handgun. In support, Phillips cites two
supreme court opinions, State v. Langteau, 268 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1978), and State v. Ani,
257 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1977). In Langteau, the appellant was convicted of aggravated
robbery based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim . 268 N.W.2d at 77 .
The supreme court reversed the conviction because certain details in the victim’s story
were unexplained, the appellant’s motive was unexplained, and there was no evidence
linking the appellant to the crime or supporting the state’s suggestion that the appellant was

7
under the influence of drugs. Id. In Ani, the appellant was convicted of criminal sexual
conduct based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim . 257 N.W.2d at
699-700. The supreme court stated, “Even though corroboration is not a requirement under
the statute or the constitution, ‘the absence of corroboration in an individual case . . . may
well call for a holding that there is insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Note,
The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform , 81 Yale L.J. 1365, 1391
(1972)). But the supreme court affirmed the appellant’s conviction on the ground that the
uncontradicted testimony of the victim was sufficient, by itself, to support the conviction.
Id. Moreover, the supreme court later declined an opportunity to apply the corroboration
rule suggested by the Ani opinion and instead reaffirmed that “a conviction can rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” State v. F oreman, 680 N.W.2d
536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
The Langteau and Ani opinions reflect a form of appellate review that was more
common in the early 20th century . See, e.g., State v. Wulff , 260 N.W. 515, 516 ( Minn.
1935); State v. Jacobson, 153 N.W. 845, 847 ( Minn. 1915); State v. McLarne, 150 N.W.
787, 789 (Minn. 1915); State v. Cowing, 108 N.W. 851, 855 ( Minn. 1906). But in recent
decades, the supreme court consistently has applied a form of review that is more
deferential to the fact-finder’s evaluation of the evidence. This is reflected in State v. Kline,
124 N.W.2d 416 ( Minn. 1963), in which the court stated, “Our responsibility ext ends no
further than to make a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence,
direct and circumstantial, viewed most favorably to support a finding of guilt, was

8
sufficient to permit the jury to reach that conclusion.” Id. at 418; see also State v. Carufel,
783 N.W.2d 539, 546 (Minn. 2010); State v. Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. App.
2017), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017). As stated above, applying the contemporary
form of review leads to the conclusion that the state’s direct evidence is sufficient.
Even if we were to apply the caselaw cited by Phillips, we would find those cases
distinguishable. In this case, there is no reason for this court to question the credibility of
the store employee in light of the surveillance video -recording and the district court ’s
express statement that her testimony was credible despite imperfections. The district court
noted that the employee’s testimony that she saw a gun in Phillips ’s hand was consistent
with the statement that she gave to police. The district court also stated, “From her position
inside the cashier booth, [she] was in a position to see directly toward the pumps where the
incident occurred, the area was well lit, [and] her attention was focused on the outside
incident after her customer alerted her to the conflict outside.” The district court expressly
rejected Phillips’s argument that the employee mistakenly believed that Phillips’s
cellphone was a handgun, noting that she described the item in Phillip s’s hand as “L-
shaped.” Thus, even if we were to re-examine the record in a search for “grave doubts”
about Phillips’s guilt, we would conclude that there are no such doubts in this case in light
of the evidentiary record and the district court’s detailed findings of fact.
Thus, the state ’s direct evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Phillips actually possessed a handgun. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider

9
Phillips’s argument that the state’s circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Phillips constructively possessed a handgun.
Affirmed.