State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0880

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jordan William Carter,
Appellant.

Filed August 12, 2024
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-20-3788

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree murder, arguing that the
evidence leaves grave doubts about his guilt and that the district court abused its discretion
2
by admitting hearsay evidence. Appellant also challenges the district court’s decision to
withhold confidential documents following a data request. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2020, respondent State of Minnesota alleged that appellant Jordan
William Carter caused the death of three-year-old C.J.G. (the child). The state charged
Carter with second -degree murder while committing felony malicious punishment of a
child. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 2(1), .377, subd. 4 (2020). Carter waived his right
to a jury trial and the matter proceeded to court trial.
Carter and the child’s mother (mother) began a relationship in 2019. In early 2020,
mother and the child moved in with Carter. Carter was laid off during the pandemic and
he became the child’s caregiver.
On September 3, 2020, Carter cared for the child while mother went to work.
Around noon, according to Carter, the child fell down the stairs to the basement; Carter did
not witness the fall. Carter reported that the child “bounced back up” and said he was okay.
The child vomited a few hours later. Carter asked his mother, a registered nurse, to
examine the child. She noticed several bruises on the child and advised Carter to watch
for signs of a concussion. The child threw up again before mother arrived home. Carter
did not tell mother about the child’s fall until around 4:00 p.m.
The next day, the child seemed recovered and responsive. That evening, Carter
came up the stairs from the basement where the child’s room was located, carrying the
child and saying his name. The child was unresponsive and struggling to breathe. The
child was transported to the hospital. A doctor diagnosed him with bilateral acute subdural
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hematomas and cerebral edema from injury which caused loss of blood flow and oxygen.
The child was examined by four doctors, who each testified at trial. The doctors noted
slightly different injuries, but each concluded that the child’s injuries were consistent with
child abuse and not a fall or pneumonia. While at the hospital, both Carter and mother
provided statements to investigators.
The child was declared dead by neurologic criteria on September 6, 2020. The
doctor who conducted the autopsy testified that the manner of death was homicide and the
child’s cause of death was complications from blunt force head and neck injuries. A doctor
testified for the defense that the child’s injuries and death could be explained by the
respiratory virus RSV or pneumonia.
The district court found Carter guilty, concluding that the state proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Carter caused the child’s death while maliciously punishing him. It
found the state’s medical witnesses credible and the defense’s witness not credible. The
district court specifically determined that the child’s death was caused by abusive head
trauma that likely took place prior to Carter carrying the child up the stairs.
The district court sentenced Carter to 180 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Sufficiency of the evidence
Carter first argues that the evidence leaves “grave doubts” about his guilt, requiring
reversal or a new trial. See State v. Kallestad, 206 N.W.2d 557, 557 (Minn. 1973) (stating
that when we “entertain grave doubts as to defendant’s guilt, it is our duty to grant a new
trial”). However, in making this argument, Carter does not contend that the evidence was
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insufficient to sustain the conviction. In fact, Carter specifically recognizes that the
evidence was “technically sufficient,” that a conviction can be based on the testimony of a
single credible witness, State v. Hill, 172 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Minn. 1969), and that witness
credibility is an issue for the fact-finder, State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn.
2004). However, he contends that in cases with additional reasons to question a witness’s
testimony, appellate courts will reverse convictions. We are unpersuaded that we are
presented with such a case.
Here, after hearing testimony from five medical experts for the state and one medical
expert for Carter, the district court found that Carter caused the child’s death. The district
court found the state’s experts to be credible and Carter’s expert to not be credible.
Carter relies on caselaw in which the supreme court reversed convictions based on
concerns about the credibility or reliability of a single testifying witness. See State v. Huss,
506 N.W.2d 290, 292-93 (Minn. 1993) (holding that testimony of alleged victim of child
abuse was insufficient because there was expert testimony that the child had been exposed
to highly suggestive material); State v. Langteau, 268 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978)
(reversing conviction that was based solely on uncorroborated testimony of victim); State
v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Minn. 1977) (affirming conviction but recognizing that in
some cases, lack of corroboration may lead to conclusion that evidence of guilt is
insufficient). But here, Carter does not provide any reasons or evidence to impeach the
credibility of the state’s expert witnesses. As a result, Carter has not shown that we should
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depart from our well-settled precedent under which we defer to the credibility
determinations of the fact-finder.1
In sum, “grave doubts” about Carter’s conviction do not exist; thus, neither reversal
nor a new trial is warranted.
Admission of evidence
Carter next argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting, over his
hearsay objection, a recorded interview of mother by police as a prior consistent statement
under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Such statements are inadmissible unless they fall within an
enumerated exception. Minn. R. Evid. 802. But “[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he
declarant testifies at the trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testimony and helpful to
the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness . . . .” Minn. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B). A prior consistent statement may be admitted as non-hearsay if the district

1 We also note that this court has previously cautioned against relying on the analysis from
these cases as they are inconsistent with our current sufficiency analysis. See State v.
Phillips, No. A19-0863, 2020 WL 2312506, at *3 (Minn. App. May 11, 2020) (“The
Langteau and Ani opinions reflect a form of appellate review that was more common in
the early 20th century. . . . But in recent decades, the supreme court consistently has applied
a form of review that is more deferential to the fact-finder’s evaluation of the evidence.”),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2020); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating
that nonprecedential opinions are not binding but may be cited as persuasive authority).
Thus, because this caselaw does not supersede our well -established sufficiency analysis
and because Carter does not raise a sufficiency argument, we do not review the sufficiency
of the evidence on appeal.
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court makes a threshold determination that the witness’s credibility has been challenged,
the statement would bolster the witness’s credibility, and the statement is consistent with
the witness’s trial testimony. State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 2000).
Carter argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence
when mother’s credibility was not challenged. As a preliminary matter, Carter argues that
this court should review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion ; however,
as the state correctly points out, Carter did not raise this specific theory in district court.
See State v. Rodriguez , 505 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 19, 1993). Accordingly, we review only for plain error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02.
Under the plain-error test, an appellant is entitled to relief on an issue to which no
objection was made at trial only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the
error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998). If these three requirements are satisfied, the appellant also must satisfy a fourth
requirement, that the error “seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial
proceedings.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2014).
Here, mother’s credibility was sufficiently challenged to satisfy rule 801(d)(1)(B).
During cross-examination and re-cross, Carter’s attorney challenged mother’s credibility
in several ways, including questioning specifically about the statements she made to police,
the child’s past injuries and accidents, the text messages and phone calls she exchanged
with Carter, and her observations about Carter’s interactions with the child. See State v.
Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 288 (Minn. 2003) (reasoning that credibility of two child
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witnesses was challenged by cross-examination regarding whether children were confused
or no longer recalled events).
In sum, Carter has not shown error; thus, we need not reach the other plain-error
prongs.
Confidential records
Finally, Carter requests that we review the district court’s decision to not disclose
confidential law-enforcement records.
Prior to trial, Carter made a generic discovery request to the state, including an
inquiry for personal data. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (establishing
that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). In response, the state sought
certain records from the police department that had been withheld as private data pursuant
to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. See Minn. Stat. §§ 13.43, .02, .03
(2022). As a result, the state filed a motion to compel pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 13.03,
subd. 6, and for disclosure to the district court for in-camera review. The district court
granted the state’s motion to compel, and the police department sent the requested
documents directly to the district court and it completed an in-camera review. The district
court then determined that the benefit of disclosing the private personal data did not
outweigh the harm to those with an interest in its confidentiality. Accordingly, the district
court did not disclose the documents to either party.
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Even if we assume that the district court should have disclosed the confidential
documents to Carter, to obtain a new trial, Carter must show that the failure to disclose the
documents prejudiced him. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (requiring harmless error to be
disregarded). An error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it “substantially
influence[d] the [fact-finder]’s decision.” State v. DeShay, 669 N.W.2d 878, 888 (Minn.
2003).
Here, any error was harmless. The documents include the professional records of
the police officers who testified. However, we note that Carter did not articulate what
specific information he sought from the se documents or how he would use that
information. In any case, our review of the documents indicates that they would not have
substantially influenced the verdict. First, the testimony of the police officers established
the factual background of the allegations but was not central to the district court’s
determination of guilt. The district court’s order does not highlight the officer’s testimony
and instead focuses almost entirely on the experts who testified to the child’s injuries and
his cause of death. In making this credibility determination, the district court does not rely
on the officers’ testimony. Thus, our careful review of the record here indicates that the
central issue before the district court was a matter of expert credibility, to which the
officers’ testimony had little relevance. Any error in refusing to disclose the confidential
documents is harmless.
Affirmed.