Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Welsh v. Johnson, 508 N.W.2d 212.

20 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Andrew Josef Brenner Minn. Ct. App. 2026
Moreover, “[t]here is no constitutional privilege to assault or harass an individual or to invade another’s personal space.” (quoting New York State Nat’l Org.
City of Blaine Police Department v. John Mark Luedtke Minn. Ct. App. 2026
In the Matter of: Michael Patrick Rainville v. Michael Anthony Forcia Minn. Ct. App. 2024
(explaining that an HRO order prohibiting appellant from personally addressing respondent but allowing him to picket outside an abortion clinic did not impede his ability to express his beliefs on abortion).
Thomas Anthony Greshowak, et al v. Adam Paul Greshowak, et al Minn. Ct. App. 2023
n.1 (Minn. App. 1993) (providing that the appellant’s lack of notice to the attorney general of a facial constitutional challenge limited him to “arguing the constitutionality of the statute on an ‘as applied’ basis”)
Kristen M. Egan v. Victor Wright Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Derik John Grittner, et al v. Mark Steven Buhr Minn. Ct. App. 2020
See, e.g., Davidson v. Webb , (considering the restrained party’s ability to work from his office rather th an at the site of the victim’s business); Welsh v. Johnson , (Mi nn.
State of Minnesota v. Eric Walter Braunig Minn. Ct. App. 2020
App. P. 144 (requiring notice to the Minnesota Attorney General in appellate proceedings where neither the state nor any of its agencies, officers, or employees is a party in an official capacity”); n.1 (Minn. App. 1993) (notice to the attorney general not required for as-applied constitutional challenges).
In re the Matter of: Sharon K. Fostervold v. Robert Monson Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Grace Elizabeth Miller v. Brock Fredin Minn. Ct. App. 2019
d 538, 545 (Minn. 1974) (holding that lack of notice to at torney general does not absolutely bar reviewing court from considering constitutional issue); d 212, 21 5 n.1 (Minn. App. 1993) (stating that failure to notify attorney general limits constitutional challenge to “as applied challenge”).
David Rucki, et al v. Deirdre Elise Evavold Minn. Ct. App. 2019
n.1 (Minn. App. 1993) (providing that appellant’s lack of notice to the attorney general of a facial constitutional challenge limited him to “arguing the constitutionality of the statute on an ‘as applied’ basis”); see generally Altendorfer v. Jandric, Inc., (noting that an as
Rebecca Anderson v. Benjamin Busse Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Carly Jaye Nelson v. Oscar Ivan Garcia Medina Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Cathie J. Pascavage v. Donald Mackay Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Cathie J. Pascavage v. Donald Mackay Minn. Ct. App. 2016
4 which is a case that reviewed a restriction in the context of targeted residential picketing.
Vickie Williams and o/b/o M. W v. Phillip A. Rimmer Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Vickie Williams and o/b/o M. W v. Phillip A. Rimmer Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(concluding, in the context of a First Amendment challenge, that a provision in an HRO that prohibited the harassing party from coming within two blocks of the petitioner’s residence was a “permissible” restriction).
Dunham v. Roer 708 N.W.2d 552 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Dunham v. Roer 708 N.W.2d 552 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
See, e.g., Castellano, d at 645 (upholding an ordinance prohibiting targeted residential picketing); -17 (Minn. App.1993) (upholding the application of section 609.748 against person who engaged in targeted residential picketing).
Kush v. Mathison 683 N.W.2d 841 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Kush v. Mathison 683 N.W.2d 841 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
1031 (1942) (concluding that fighting words are not protected speech); (stating that free speech is subject to “reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.”).