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Our inquiry focuses on whether actions of law enforcement, together with circumstances surrounding the interrogation, “were so coercive, so manipulative, so overpowering that [the appellant] was deprived of [their] ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as [they] did.” d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991).

(alteration in original) ().

d 299, 303 (Minn. 1991) (stating that the question, “Shouldn’t I have an attorney so you don’t ask me any illegal questions?” was subject to a reasonable construction that the defendant was requesting an attorney); (concluding that the defendant made an equivocal request for counsel by asking whether the interrogating officer thought the defendant should have an attorney).

Defense counsel is ineffective if counsel “admits a defendant’s guilt without permission or acquiescence.” State v. Pilcher , d 327, 337 (Minn. 1991).

State v. Pilcher , , 334 (Minn. 1991).

We determine whether the actions of law enforcement officers, together with the circumstances surrounding the confession, “were so coercive, so manipulative, so overpowering that [the defendant] was deprived of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak.” d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991).

In determining whether a defendant’s statement was voluntary, we consider the nature of the interview, including its length, the adequacy of warnings, whether the defendant’s physical needs were met, and whether the defendant was denied access to friends., Farnsworth, d at 373

(stating that it was not improper for law enforcement officers to inform a defendant of the evidence against him).

“The decision whether or not to admit guilt at trial belongs to the defendant, and a new trial will be granted where defense counsel, explicitly or implicitly, admits a defendant’s guilt without permission or acquiescence.”

(holding that error in intoxication-defense instruction during grand-jury proceeding was not reversible error where defendant demonstrated no prejudice and the petit jury found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).

(holding that the defendant acquiesces when his counsel admits guilt when the defendant was present at the time of the admission and did not object).

We have upheld similar statements by officers in the past, see Miller, d at 672 ; and the facts of this case do not require us to reach a different conclusion here.

xpression of dissatisfaction might be grounds for a new trial.” We have held that a defendant acquiesces in counsel’s concession of guilt “when admitting guilt was an ‘understandable’ strategy, [defendant] was present at the time the concessions were made, [defendant] understood that his guilt was being conceded, and [defendant] did not object.” Prtine, d at 318 ().

(finding that the defendant made an equivocal request for counsel by asking whether the officer thought the defendant should have an attorney); -05 (Minn.2001) (“ ‘Can I have a drink of water and then lock me up-I think we really should have an attorney1 ” was a

law enforcement professionals [to] use those technological means at their disposal to fully preserve those conversations and events preceding the actual interrogation.”

917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); (“[0]ur inquiry examines whether [the police] actions, together with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation, were so coercive, so manipulative, so overpowering that [the defendant] was deprived of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as he did.”).

When deciding whether a defendant’s statement is involuntary, courts inquire whether police conduct, “together with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation, [was] so coercive, so manipulative, [and] so overpowering [as to] de-privet ] [a defendant] of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as he did.”

“The decision whether or not to admit guilt at trial belongs to the defendant, and a new trial will be granted [when] defense counsel, explicitly or implicitly, admits a defendant’s guilt without permission or acquiescence.”

“The test of voluntariness is whether the actions of the police, together with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation ‘were so coercive, so manipulative, so overpowering that [the defendant] was deprived of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as he did.’ ” Jones, d at 326 ( (alteration in original)).

In addition, we had previously urged law enforcement professionals to “use those technological means at their disposal to fully preserve those conversations and events preceding the actual interrogation.” Scales, d at 591 ().