Cited by

See, -47 (Minn. 1994) (determining that the “highly unusual” facts of the case justified plea withdrawal when defense counsel only asked leading questions, the district court failed to ask follow-up questions, and police officers were prepared to testify that the investigation was incomplete and there had been a po

First, arguing that the supreme court in that case “revers[ed] the defendant’s plea where several procedural irregularities, in addition to a leading factual basis, rendered the defendant’s plea suspect.” Randall is correct that the supreme court permitted Shorter to withdraw his plea, but it did so for man

Id.; 7 d 743, 744–45, 747 (Minn. 1994); Ecker, d at 717; d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016).

We are not otherwise persuaded by Becklund’s in which the supreme court ordered the district court to grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw their guilty plea when there were a “number of procedural irregularities present,” including the use of leading questions.

Davis did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea, to support his assertion that this new information creates a manifest injustice warranting plea withdrawal.

6 Cuffy argues that his pleas are inaccurate because , although they included admissions regarding each and every essential element of the offense, they lacked “sufficient detail” to permit the district court to determine guilt.1 Cuffy relies on two cases for this argument: State v. Hoaglund , and Shorter v. State

See Shorter v. State , 746 (Minn. 1994) (reversing postconviction court and remanding where factual basis was established solely on leading questions and the police department found exculpatory evidence after the plea, admitting that the original investigation was incomplete ); State v. Hoaglund , -5 (Minn. 1976) (c

(reversing and remanding for trial because of “procedural irregularities” under the supreme court’s supervisory powers as necessary to ensure the appearance of justice).

8 First, in arguing that leading qu estions rendered his plea inac curate

The supreme court’s decision in Shorter v. State , , guides our analysis .

746 (Minn. 1994) (emphasis added).

When a district court grants a defendant’s plea-withdrawal motion, the court “remove[s] the barrier of his plea and allow[s] him a tr ial.” d 743, 747 (Minn. 1994).

6 “[T]he trial court bears the primary responsibility to advise and interrogate the defendant in sufficient detail to establish an adequate factual basis for the plea.”

He maintains that his plea is therefore invalid

Raleigh, d at 94-95; -45, 747 (Minn. 1994); State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 326

We are guided by the supreme court’s

And our concern over convicting an innocent defendant has led us to say that “a prosecutor may not seek a conviction at any price.” Ramey, d at 300 (-63 (Minn.1995)); (“ ‘[Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 , 75 S.Ct.

” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 , 75 S.Ct.

3 In considering Pederson’s due process claim, we are mindful that “ ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 , 75 S.Ct.

See, -46 (Minn.1994) (explaining that defense attorney made proffer as to the testimony of witnesses and court refused to hear testimony and permitted only argument from counsel); (holding that defense counsel’s memorandum summarizing expected testimony of a witness was