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“Put another way, the issue is ‘whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer[’s] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)).

In determining whether consent was 18 voluntary, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances, “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.”

(noting “the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said” are relevant considerations).

(concluding that voluntary consent was given based, in part, on the fact that appellant responded to the request to search “promptly” and “unequivocally”); 880-81 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search of his wallet based , in part, on the officer’s official and persistent questioning).

(“[W]hen an encounter becomes coercive, when the right to say no to a search is compromised by a show of official authority .

(stating that consent to a search is not voluntary unless “‘a reasonable person woul d have felt free to 11 decline the officer[’s] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter’”) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991)).

The relevant circumstances include “the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the [suspect] is, and what was said and how it was said.”

“[I]nvoluntariness of a consent to a police request is not to be inferred simply because the circumstan ces of the encounter are uncomfortable for the person being questioned.” State v. Dezso

Examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Owens validly consented to providing a urine sample because his consent w as voluntarily and freely give n. See State v. Dezso , 0 (Minn. 1994) (stating that consent must be “received, not extracted”).

Voluntariness must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances including, “the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.”

“‘Voluntariness’ is a question of fact and it varies with the facts of each case.” d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994).

“Voluntariness” is a question of fact that depends on the totality of the circumstances, “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.”

“‘Voluntariness’ is a question of fact” that depends on the totality of the circumstances, “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.”

Generally, a warrantless search conducted without probable cause is per se unconstitutional, but a search warrant is not required “if the subject of the search consents.”

This consideration includes “the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.”

The relevant circumstances include “‘the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the [subject] is, and what was said and how it was said.’” Brooks, 838 d at 569 ().

The voluntariness "analysis requires that we consider the totality of the circumstances, 1 including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said."' ().

Voluntariness is a question of fact, and it depends on the totality of the circumstances, including “[1]the nature of the encounter, [2] the kind of person the defendant is, and [3] what was said and how it was said.”

(citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991)).

And “an encounter becomes coercive[] when the right to say no to a search is compromised by a show of official authority.” d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994).

But “involuntariness of a consent to a police request is not to be inferred simply because the circumstances of the encounter are uncomfortable for the person being questioned.”

We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent was voluntary, including “the nature of the 9 encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.”

see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26, 93 S. Ct. at 2047 (stating that consent is involuntary if the suspect’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired”).