Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Kolton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403.

70 citing documents.

State of Minnesota ex rel. Ken Elder v. U.S. Bank N. A. Minn. Ct. App. 2023
State of Minnesota ex rel. Ken Elder v. U.S. Bank N. A. Minn. Ct. App. 2023
(explaining that reliance on interpretations of federal antidiscrimination statutes is appropriate when interpreting the Minnesota Human Rights Act if the provisions at issue are similar to federal provisions).
James Johanning, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
Robert Louis Bellanger Fohrenkam, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
N.H., Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
See Kolton v. County o f Anoka, , 410 (Minn. 2002) (concluding similarity of purpose and language of Minn. Stat. § 363A.03 and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) allows ADA to be used to analyze MHRA); n.5 (Minn. 1997) (“[W]e have looked in the past to federal cases interpreting Tit
Kristopher Lee Roybal, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Kolton v. County of Anoka
Stacey Marable, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
An equal-protection analysis “begin[s] with the mandate that all similarly situated individ uals shall be treated alike, but only invidious discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” Kolton v. County of Anoka , (quotatio ns omitted).
Minn. 2019
are similar to provisions of the federal statutes.”
McBee v. Team Indus., Inc. 925 N.W.2d 222 Minn. 2019
McBee v. Team Indus., Inc. 925 N.W.2d 222 Minn. 2019
Kolton v. County of Anoka , , 407 (Minn. 2002).
Forslund v. State 924 N.W.2d 25 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Forslund v. State 924 N.W.2d 25 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Kolton v. County of Anoka , , 411 (Minn. 2002) ; see also City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick , , 157 (Minn. 2017) ("We favor uniformity with the federal constitution because of the primacy of the federal constitution in matters affecting individual liberties and to encourage consistency in constitutional law in state and federal c
Dwayne Eugene Jackson, Relator, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Harstad v. City of Woodbury 902 N.W.2d 64 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Harstad v. City of Woodbury 902 N.W.2d 64 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
(relying on caselaw interpreting a similar, but “not.
Robert Atkinson, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
James Edward Boutto v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
James Edward Boutto v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“Both clauses have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only invidious discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” (quotation omitted).
Eric Wong v. Chatterbox Pub Enterprises, Inc., Tyrone Sharpe Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Eric Wong v. Chatterbox Pub Enterprises, Inc., Tyrone Sharpe Minn. Ct. App. 2016
rel Rodenberg- Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 846 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) (assuming that analysis of ADA claim applies equally to MHRA claim); (finding federal court ADA interpretations “useful” in resolving MHRA claim where relevant language of ADA and MHRA was “similar”).
Randy Lee Oulman v. Wade Setter, Superintendent, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, in his official capacity Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Randy Lee Oulman v. Wade Setter, Superintendent, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, in his official capacity Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Schuette v. City of Hutchinson 843 N.W.2d 233 Minn. 2014
Schuette v. City of Hutchinson 843 N.W.2d 233 Minn. 2014
of Anoka, (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In re the Welfare of B.A.H. 829 N.W.2d 431 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
In re the Welfare of B.A.H. 829 N.W.2d 431 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
of Anoka, (quotations omitted).
Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc. 828 N.W.2d 470 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
Weir v. ACCRA Care, Inc. 828 N.W.2d 470 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
of Anoka, (holding that strict scrutiny is only applied when a legislatively created classification involves a suspect classification or a fundamental right).
Healthstar Home Health, Inc. v. Jesson 827 N.W.2d 444 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Healthstar Home Health, Inc. v. Jesson 827 N.W.2d 444 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center 811 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2012
Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center 811 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2012
of Anoka, (stating that rational basis applies unless the statute implicates a fundamental right or a suspect classification).
In re the Welfare of M.L.M. 813 N.W.2d 26 Minn. 2012
State v. Johnson 813 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2012
In re the Welfare of M.L.M. 813 N.W.2d 26 Minn. 2012
State v. Cox 798 N.W.2d 517 Minn. 2011
Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Department 783 N.W.2d 182 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Department 783 N.W.2d 182 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
See, 410 (Minn.2002) (concluding that because the purposes and language of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are similar, analysis of the ADA can be used to construe the MHRA).
Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 758 N.W.2d 881 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Greene v. Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services 755 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2008
Greene v. Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services 755 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2008
We have observed that “[b]oth clauses have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only invidious discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” (internal quotation marks omitted).
Gluba Ex Rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry 735 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2007
Gluba Ex Rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry 735 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2007
We have stated that “[b]oth clauses have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only ‘invidious discrimination’ is deemed constitutionally offensive.” (quoting Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, ).
Granville v. Minneapolis School District 716 N.W.2d 387 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Granville v. Minneapolis School District 716 N.W.2d 387 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
The federal formulation requires that a court determine (1) “whether the challenged classification has a legitimate purpose” and (2) “whether it was reasonable to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose.” (citing W. & S. Life Ins.
State v. Barnes 713 N.W.2d 325 Minn. 2006
State v. Barnes 713 N.W.2d 325 Minn. 2006
Thus domestic abuse murder is presumed to be constitutional “if the classification drawn by [the statute] is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”
Wenigar v. Johnson 712 N.W.2d 190 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Wenigar v. Johnson 712 N.W.2d 190 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Doe v. Lutheran High School of Greater Minneapolis 702 N.W.2d 322 Minn. Ct. App. 2005