Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739.

126 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
“Whether one party to a conspiracy to burgle could have reasonably foreseen that the other might commit an assault” in the event the burglary is somehow interrupted “is a question of fact.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
(“Common sense indicates that if two people plan a burglary[,] they usually discuss the matter in detail beforehand, including whether or not to carry weapons.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
State of Minnesota v. Larry Ray House Minn. Ct. App. 2023
State of Minnesota v. Larry Ray House Minn. Ct. App. 2023
15 Generally, for Spreigl evidence to be relevant, it must “be similar in some way— either in time, location, or modis operandi—to the charged offense.”
St. Louis County Thissen, J. Took no part, Moore, J. State of Minnesota, Minn. 2020
“Whe ther one party to a conspiracy to burgle could have reasonably foreseen that the other might commit an assault in the event of such an encounter or interruption is a question of fact for the jury.” The Minnesota accomplice corroboration in struction—the instruction not given in this case—requires the jury to answer two questions.
State v. Ness 707 N.W.2d 676 Minn. 2006
State v. Ness 707 N.W.2d 676 Minn. 2006
at 202-03 ; d at 242 & n. 3; -44 (Minn.1983).
State v. Vick 632 N.W.2d 676 Minn. 2001
State v. Jackson 615 N.W.2d 391 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
State v. Jackson 615 N.W.2d 391 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
See State v. Filippi (“In determining relevancy, we have generally required that the other crime be similar in some way — either in time, location, or modus operandi-— to the charged offense, although this of course is not an absolute necessity.”); Kennedy, d at 391 (Spreigl offense “need not be identical in ever
State v. Kennedy 585 N.W.2d 385 Minn. 1998
State v. Kennedy 585 N.W.2d 385 Minn. 1998
determining the relevance and materiality of Spreigl evidence, “the trial court should consider the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in time, place or modus oper-andi.” DeBaere, d at 305 ; see also Wermerskirchen, d at 240 ().
State v. Johnson 568 N.W.2d 426 Minn. 1997
State v. Johnson 568 N.W.2d 426 Minn. 1997
State v. Folkers 562 N.W.2d 5 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Folkers 562 N.W.2d 5 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Lewis 547 N.W.2d 360 Minn. 1996
State v. Lewis 547 N.W.2d 360 Minn. 1996
ns of this court setting forth in detail the settled case law controlling the admission of other-crime or so-called Spreigl 1
State v. Sebasky 547 N.W.2d 93 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Sebasky 547 N.W.2d 93 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Gorman 546 N.W.2d 5 Minn. 1996
State v. Gorman 546 N.W.2d 5 Minn. 1996
Even as to the burglary, we have said, "Whenever [a defendant] commits a burglary it is reasonably foreseeable that [he or she] might encounter some person or that the burglary might be interrupted by the police or someone else,” thus running the risk of personal violence, even where none actually occurs.
State v. Atkins 543 N.W.2d 642 Minn. 1996
State v. Atkins 543 N.W.2d 642 Minn. 1996
(citing State v. Filippi ).
State v. Cogshell 538 N.W.2d 120 Minn. 1995
State v. Cogshell 538 N.W.2d 120 Minn. 1995
The case law, which is well-settled, is set forth in detail in a number of decisions, including, State v. Frisinger, 484 M.W.2d 27 (Minn.1992); State v. Filippi
State v. Pierson 530 N.W.2d 784 Minn. 1995
State v. Pierson 530 N.W.2d 784 Minn. 1995
State v. Bolte 530 N.W.2d 191 Minn. 1995
State v. Bolte 530 N.W.2d 191 Minn. 1995
When deciding the relevance of other-crime evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) “the preferred approach is for the trial court to focus on the closeness of the relationship between the other crimes and the charged crimes in terms of time, place and modus operand!” Frisinger, d at 31 ().
State v. Buhl 520 N.W.2d 177 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
State v. Buhl 520 N.W.2d 177 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
See State v. Filippi , 743-44 *182 (Minn.1983) (holding that passage of time between offenses is insignificant if defendant was in prison and incapacitated during the intervening period).
State v. Moorman 505 N.W.2d 593 Minn. 1993
State v. Moorman 505 N.W.2d 593 Minn. 1993
-44 (Minn.1983), we held that a four and a half-year lag between a Spreigl offense and the charged offense did nothing to lessen the relevancy of the prior offenses because a good deal of that time the defendant was in prison.
State v. Russell 503 N.W.2d 110 Minn. 1993
State v. Russell 503 N.W.2d 110 Minn. 1993
State v. Poole 499 N.W.2d 31 Minn. 1993
State v. Poole 499 N.W.2d 31 Minn. 1993
(“[W]e have generally required that the other crime be similar in some way — either in time, location, or modus operandi — to the charged offense, although this, of course, is not an absolute necessity.”)
State v. Wermerskirchen 497 N.W.2d 235 Minn. 1993
State v. Wermerskirchen 497 N.W.2d 235 Minn. 1993
State v. Walsh 495 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 1993
State v. Walsh 495 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 1993
State v. Frisinger 484 N.W.2d 27 Minn. 1992
State v. Frisinger 484 N.W.2d 27 Minn. 1992
State v. Landin 472 N.W.2d 854 Minn. 1991
State v. Landin 472 N.W.2d 854 Minn. 1991
State v. DeWald 464 N.W.2d 500 Minn. 1991
State v. DeWald 464 N.W.2d 500 Minn. 1991
(admission of Spreigl evidence upheld though different offense occurred four and a half years prior to present offense in another state); (“While there were some dissimilarities in the manner of commission of the charged offense and the Spreigl offense, t
State v. Johnson 463 N.W.2d 527 Minn. 1990