Cited by

6, 2013); (describing section 609.185).

534 (Minn. 1989) (applying the substantial-factor test to second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter); -41 (Minn. 1986) (applying the “substantial causal factor” test to first-degree murder).

urder one victim transferred to the murder of a bystander who was shot and killed); 229 (Minn. 1995) (intent to murder one victim transferred to the attempted murder of a bystander who was accidentally shot and wounded); 323 (Minn. 1990) (intent to murder a pregnant woman transferred to her fetus); –40 (Minn. 1986) (intent to murder one victim transferred to the murder of a bystander who was accidentally shot and killed).

See, (applying the substantial-factor test in a criminal-vehicular-operation case); –41 (Minn. 1986) (explaining that a premeditated act must be a substantial causal factor in the death).

The concession is reasonable, because the “prosecutor has an obligation to caution his own witnesses to avoid testifying about the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence.”

(concluding that the defendant’s acts, while not the immediate cause of death, were a substantial causal factor leading to the death); (“To prove that a defendant is guilty of causing the death of another, the State must prove the defendant’s acts were a substantial causal factor leading to the death.” (quotation omitted)); (concluding that the defendant’s acts were a “substantial causal factor” because the defendant’s conduct “set in motion the events” leading to death); State v. Smith , 264 Mi

(explaining that language of Minn. Stat. § 609.185 incorporates the doctrine of transferred intent).

micide statute, prosecution must prove that defendant’s acts were a “substantial causal factor” resulting in death); 534 (Minn. 1989) (“To prove defendant guilty 9 of [second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter], the state must prove the defendant’s acts were a ‘substantial causal factor’ in causing the [victim’s] death.”); State v. Sutherlin , -41 (Minn. 1986 ) (sustaining first-degree murder conviction when state’s evidence established that defendant’s premeditated shooting “was a subs

Similarly, in State v. Sutherlin, the supreme court concluded that the district court did not err by not instructing the jury on intoxication because the defendant “did not offer his intoxication as an explanation of his actions nor did he request an instruction on intoxication.”

incorporate the doctrine of transferred intent.” (concluding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s intent to kill victim, reasoning in part that first-degree premeditated-murder statute “incorporate[d] the traditional doctrine of ‘transferred intent’”).

(explaining that language of Minn.Stat.

See, -10 (Minn.2006) (silence used as impeachment); (post-arrest failure to testify before grand jury); (post-arrest silence); (same); (post-arrest silence on advice of counsel); State v. Roberts, 296 Minn. 347, 349-53 , -48 (1973) (post-arrest silence).

Section 609.185 “incorporates the traditional doctrine of ‘transferred intent,’ ” under which “[premeditation will transfer with intent if the perpetrator premeditated the murder of an intended victim but accidentally, killed an unintended victim,”

1 (defining “attempt”); (noting that language in homicide statute requiring intent to effect death of the person “or another” incorporates the doctrine of transferred intent).

2408, 2418 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); (holding that state may not use coerced statement even for impeachment).

See, (upholding attempted murder conviction using transferred intent when the intended victim died but the unintended victim did not); (applying transferred intent to affirm conviction of defendant who intended to shoot at a bar patron, but missed and killed a member of the band playing in the bar).

The ultimate causation question at trial will be whether the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial causal factor.” (even if intervenor’s wrestling of gun caused gun to fire that killed victims, defendant could still be found guilty of premeditated murder because his premeditated conduct set in motion the events that caused intervenor to intervene and was a “substantial causal factor”).

1215, 1220-21 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975)

State v. Smith, 264 Minn. 307, 318-22 , -49 (1962).

-83 (Minn.1985); State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127