Cited by

(impartial judge and finder of fact); -68 (Minn. 2004) (judge communicating with jury outside defendant’s presence); (denial of the defendant’s peremptory challenge); (improper closure of the courtroom violating right to public trial); (denial of defendant’s request for self-representation during a criminal trial); (denial of right to testify).

The state’s reliance on a reason that will result in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race is also a relevant circumstance bearing on whether a facially valid reason “is a pretextual explanation offered to mask a discriminatory inte nt.” .

Here, while there is a sufficient record for this court to determine if the state’s reason for striking juror 13 was a race-neutral, there is not an adequate record for this court to discern whether Pargo carried her burden of proving purposeful discrimination.3 that we should remand “to give the district court ‘a chance’ to complete its Batson analysis.” We agree.

Boyce relies on the supreme court’s to support his argument.

(reversing the closure of a courtroom in the absence of evidence of actual threat to a witness’s privacy or safety); (reversing the closure of a courtroom in the absence of “a showing that closure was necessary to protect the witness or ensure fairness in the trial”); see also Press-Enter.

The proffered explanation “does not, at this stage, have to be ‘valid’ in the sense of establishing a reasonable basis for a strike.” State v. Taylor , ().

The re medy for a violation “should be approp riate to the violation.” see also Waller, 467 U.S. at 50, 104 S. Ct. at 2217 (remanding to the district court to redo an unconstitutionally closed suppr ession hearing and to order a new trial if necessary based on the outcome of the suppression hearing).

In general, in a courtroom-closure case, if a remand to the district court for additional findings “on whether there was a specific basis for closure” could remedy the improper closure, “then the initial remedy is a remand, not a retrial.” see also Petersen , d at 553 (remanding for th e district court to make findings concerning whether a closure wa s justified).

at 552-53; (noting that the “remedy should be appropriate to the violation .

at 45, 104 S. Ct. at 2215; Fageroos, d at 200, 202-03

as support for that proposition.

In McRae , the State used a peremptory challenge to remove the only African American prospective juror from a panel of approximately 25 people.

e. With respect to Onyelobi’s second contention, it is true that if a question asked by a prosecutor would “elicit[] the same response[] from any fair-minded person,” only asking this question of jurors of a particular race and then striking them based on their reasonable answer would “not [be] race neutral.” ().

at 200 ; (ruling that “the appropriate initial remedy [for an inadequately supported decision to close the courtroom] is a remand for an evidentiary hearing, not retrial”); (“[T]he remedy should be appropriate to the violation.

See, -88 (Minn.2007); -84 (Minn.2006); Blanche, d at 364-65 ; Reiners, d at 831-32 ; -54 (Minn.1992).

d 717, 727 (Minn.2007) (stating that state’s peremptory challenge to veniremember based on possible sympathy to defendant’s case was “a permissible use of its challenges”); (upholding state’s peremptory challenge that was based on three race-neutral reasons involving “lack of education, demean- or, and reluctance to sit in judgment”); (stating that a juror’s demean- or and tone can be considered to determine whether the factors played a role in the peremptory challenge); (stating that concern ab

This court has made clear that the state has a "compelling interest” in " 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor [victim of a sex crime].’ ” (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 , 102 S.Ct.

“Any time a prosecutor desires to make an inquiry of doubtful propriety, the prosecutor should seek permission from the trial court in chambers before asking the question.”

“[(Considerable deference must be given by a reviewing court to the trial court’s finding on the issue of intent because the finding typically will turn largely on an evaluation by the trial court of credibility.”

to support the proposition that the district court has a duty to address step three of the Batson analysis.

(“Any time a prosecutor desires to make an inquiry of doubtful propriety, the prosecutor should seek permission from the trial court in chambers before asking the question.”).

(citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 , 111 S.Ct.

For example, -57 (Minn.1992), the state deviated from its normal pattern of questioning to ask an African-American prospective juror questions about the fairness of the jury system and then exaggerated the effect of the juror’s answers, stating: “[S]he thought that basically, the system is unfair to minorities, and the defenda