Cited by

vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).

vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).

16; (Linehan II) (“[T]he statute’s term ‘likely’ requires future misconduct to be ‘highly likely.’”), aff’d, vacated and remanded sub nom., Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d on remand, (affirming appellant’s civil commitment under SDP statute).

(holding “future harmful sexual conduct must be highly likely to commit a proposed patient under the [Sexually Dangerous Person] Act” despite the applicable statute only requiring “likely” future harmful contact (emphasis added)), cert.

4 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (addressing substantive due process in the context of indefinite psychiatric confinement); Carrillo v. Fabian , –74 (Minn. 2005) (a procedural due process case holding that an inmate serving his prison sentence had a protected liberty interest in his supervised release date); In re Blodgett , –15 (Minn. 1994) (same); In re Linehan , cert.

Lake George Park, 1 See In re Linehan (Linehan III), 78, 189 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff’d on remand, (providing six factors for district courts to consider in analyzing whether a person meets the criteria to be committed as an SDP).

predominantly remedial, not punitive.” cert.

In re Linehan , 189 (Minn. 1996) (Linehan III) (affirming a district court’s commitment order when the court examined case specific facts in relation to statistical data), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

27, 2013), and we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal, (Linehan III), vacated sub nom.

(Linehan III), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff’d on remand

See, e.g., Linehan IV, d at 872–76 (concluding that commitment under the statute requires a finding of volitional impairment and is therefore sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy substantive due process standards); In re Linehan (Linehan III), –88 (Minn. 1996) (finding a prior version of the commitment 7 statute remedial in the context of an ex post facto law challenge); –20 (Minn. 1995) (holding that a prior version of the statute was not punitive as was required to su

d at 916–17 (holding that SPP statute did not violate equal protection); (Linehan III) (reaching same result with respect to SDP statute), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff’d on remand

(Linehan III), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff'd on remand

2 Ince urges us to refine our previous construction of this provision, which requires the petitioner to show by clear and convincing evidence that future harmful conduct is “highly likely.” In re Linehan (Linehan III), vacated sub nom.

See In re Linchan (Linehan IV), -72 (Minn.1999) (hold *140 ing that the .civil commitment statutes are civil for ex post facto and double jeopardy-purposes and noting that “the SDP Act was adjudged a civil and not a criminal law” in In re Linehan (Linehan III), -89 (Minn.1996)).

In (Linehan III), vacated & remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 , 118 S.Ct.

(stating that “[u]nder its police powers, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual assault”).

-92 (Minn.1996) (stating that the district court has an affirmative duty to protect the rights of defendants).

aff'd vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011 , 118 S.Ct.

vacated, 522 U.S. 1011 , 118 S.Ct.

vacated remanded on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011 , 118 S.Ct.

we held that civil commitment is remedial because it is for treatment purposes, not for preventive detention and in -89 (Minn.1996), we held that the purpose of Minn.Stat.

vacated & remanded, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct.