Cited by

See California v. Greenwood , 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (concluding that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at the curb for collection and, therefore, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of such garbage ); see also State v. Krech , -38 (Minn. 1987) (holding that refuse left for collection outside the curtilage is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).

See, (explaining that boxes and bags placed in a garbage can behind a duplex were “abandoned property in which defendant no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy”); (affirming warrantless “search of garbage which had been placed on the curb fo

-37 (Minn. 1987) (citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139).

(identifying “incessant traffic of brief visits” as “very significant” when determining whether probable cause existed), aff’d as modified

at 799 (quoting State v. Krech , , 637 (Minn. 1987) ).

(concluding that shared stairway of duplex was common area and not curtilage); (concluding that defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the common hallway of apartment building); -38 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in backyard of duplex).

for the proposition that “police do not need a warrant or even probable cause to approach a dwelling in order to conduct an investigation if they restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g. walkways, driveways, porches)” and concluded that the officer had a legitimate ri

See, e.g., McMurray, d at 694–95 (finding no 5 reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out on the curb for collection); (finding no constitutional violation where garbage was left a few feet from an alley and seized and searched by police); (holding that police did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in seizing and searching three plastic bags full of garbage whic

The purpose of the curtilage determination is to aid the courts in deciding “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1140 (1987)).

(“[P]olice do not need a warrant or even probable cause to approach a dwelling in order to conduct an investigation if they restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches) .

(stating that illegally seized evidence cannot “be used to furnish probable cause” for a subsequent search warrant), aff’d on other grounds, (providing that “where the court held that if lawfully obtained information establishes probable cause and, by itself and apart from any tainted information, would have justified issuance of the search warrant, the evidence seized pursuant to

Oquist, d at 591 ; (stating that garbage placed in a dumpster at a duplex was “abandoned property in which defendant no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy”); -04 (Minn.App.2002).

(discussing the backyard of a duplex in a suburban neighborhood).

Analysis of this issue through application of the curtilage test, -37 (Minn.1987), is not necessary in light of Dreyer , as applied to the particular facts of this case.

As support for its argument, for the proposition that the common grounds of mul-ti-unit apartment complexes are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.

Factors used in determining whether an area is within the curti-lage include “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” (quoting U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 , 107 S.Ct.