Cited by

(discussing how law-enforcement presence can reduce the likelihood that a suspect will escape while a warrant is being secured), aff’d sub nom.

25 (Minn. 1992) (recognizing that felony-level possession of two pounds of marijuana was not a “grave and violent offense” in the same sense as a suspected “execution-type murder” (quotations omitted)); (determining that a first-degree murder suspect did not commit a “grave or violent offense” because he was the getaway driver); B.R.K., d at 579 (“While a serious offense, underage drinking is not a ‘grave or violent’ offense like robbery or assault.”).

This analysis of the totality of circumstance is “fact- specific.” see also Wiley, d at 269 (noting that police corroboration of a CRI’s statement that a woman named Clare resided at the address in question and parked a 1973 Mercedes in front of that address “len[t] credence” to the tip); McCloskey, d at 701, 703 (determining that a CRI’s tip w

aff’d, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) ().5 Here, the details in the affidavit supplied by Sergeant Suchta, who was investigating the crimes, described facts that were consistent with a “paid hit.” The affidavit states that: (1) Baugh was kidnapped; (2

See Lieberg, d at 56 (stating that a defendant’s criminal history may be properly considered as “one factor in the totality of relevant circumstances”); (stating that probable cause depends on “the particular circumstances, conditioned by [officers’] own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police experience”), aff’d sub nom.

Traditionally, we have applied the exigent-circumstances exception in situations where police have "reason to believe a crime ha[s] been committed," State v. Othoudt , , 223 (Minn. 1992), coupled with an "urgent need" to conduct a search or seizure, State v. Olson , , 97 (Minn. 1989).

aff’d, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).

(quoting State v. Olson , aff’d sub nom.

“On appeal from a district court[’]s finding that a police officer had probable cause to arrest, we make ‘an independent review of the facts to determine the reasonableness of the police officer[’]s actions.’” ( aff’d, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).

Probable cause exists when “officers in the particular circumstances, conditioned by their own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police experience, reasonably could have believed that a crime had been committed by the person to be arrested.”

“The right to be secure in the place which is one’s home, to be protected from warrantless, nonconsensual intrusion into the privacy of one’s dwelling, is an important [F]ourth [A]mendment right.”

10 Reliability Whether information from an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause “depends on the totality of the circumstances of the particular case, including the credibility and veracity of the informant.” (stating that “[i]n evaluating an informant’s tip, [an appellate] court looks at the commonsense totality of the circumstances, including the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)))

“The right to be secure in the place which is one’s home, to be protected from warrantless, nonconsensual intrusion into the privacy of one’s dwelling, is an important fourth amendment right.”

2254 (suppressing statement made less than two hours after illegal arrest); (suppressing a statement made within an hour of the illegal arrest).

The existence of probable cause depends on “the particular circumstances, conditioned by [officers’] own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police experience.” aff'd sub nom.

aff'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

ANALYSIS I. On appeal from a district courts finding that a police officer had probable cause to arrest, we make “an independent review of the facts to determine the reasonableness of the police officers actions.” ajfd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

26, 1992); (stating, in considering whether police had probable cause to make arrest, reasonableness of officer’s actions is reviewed independently on appeal), aff'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

aff'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

aff 'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

For purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, “[a] warrantless, nonconsensual intrusion of one's dwelling * * * is considered presumptively unreasonable.” aff'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

Probable cause is based on “whether the officers in the particular circumstances, conditioned by their own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police experience, reasonably could have believed that a crime had been committed by the person to be arrested.” aff 'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

In order to establish probable cause, the police must show that they “reasonably could have believed that a crime has been committed by the person to be arrested.” (), aff'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.

aff'd, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct.