Cited by

( mentioning that appellant’s prosecutorial-vindictiveness claim raised in a self-represented brief is waived by appellant’s guilty plea).

The supreme court has stated that, “[g]enerally, the purposes of the sentencing guidelines will not be served unless the district court applies the presumptive sentences.” -17 (Minn. 1996).

However, the threatening statement “must be to commit a future crime of violence which would terrorize a victim.”

“ A threat may be communicated by 6 actions or words.” ( ).

See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2022); (“It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.”).

ant’s offense conduct was not mitigating, pointing to the following facts: (1) that the defendant “did not send one misguided tweet; he tweeted five separate times, including a threat to use a grenade to kill police officers”; (2) that he “threaten[ed] multiple police officers simultaneously, which made his conduct more severe than a threat against a single person[,]” which affirmed an upward departure in a terroristic threats case for several reasons, including the defendant’s “multiple victims

And within the context of the threats-of-violence statute, the supreme court has explained that “the threat[] must be to commit a future crime of violence which would terrorize a victim.”

His argument overlooks the fact that the statute is designed to deter and punish both “the future act threatened, as well as the underlying act constituting the threat.”

1 (2020), which the supreme court has held requires a threat “to commit a future crime of violence,” d 909, 916 (Minn. 1996), and that the threats- of-violence statute is the only statute that criminalizes his threat.

Importantly for this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “[i]t is the future act threatened, 5 as well as the underlying act constituting the threat, that the statute is designed to deter and punish.”

Rezac’s communication in its context “would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Id.; see 10 (holding statute criminalizes threats of “a future crime of violence which would terrorize a victim”).

5 “[T]he threats must be to commit a future crime of violence, which would terrorize a victim .” .

See McKee v. Likins , –70 n.1 (Minn. 1977); see also State v. Murphy , (explaining that a r ipe dispute presents “a substantial and real controversy between the parties” based on a “direct and imminent injury”).

2, 915-16 (Minn. 1996) (holding that slashing tires, throwing objects through windows, spray painting “I’ll be back” on house s, and leaving mutilated animals near homes were implicit threats to commit future acts of violence).

(“[A threat is a] communication .

(describing the act of “drawing a finger across one’s throat” 8 as an example of a “terroristic threat”).

But “on appeal there must be a substantial and real controversy between the parties before a case will be considered by this court.” (quotation omitted).

(d 478, 479 (Minn. 1981) , to hold that, when sentencing a defendant on the same day for multiple offenses not part of a single behavioral incident, occurring at different times, and involving different victims, a district court may assign one criminal history p

It is the future act threatened, as well as the underlying act constituting the threat, that the statute is designed to dete r and punish.”

19, 2013); (holding that physical acts alone may constitute terroristic threats).

“[O]n appeal there must be a substantial and real controversy between the parties before a 7 case will be considered by [an appellate] court.” State v. Brown, 216 Minn. 135, 138, (refusing to consider the constitutionality of an inmate’s probationary condition that required him to live outside of the Twin Cities area upon release from prison, because the inmate was not yet eligible for release and the issue was thus “speculative and not ripe for review”).2 Affirme

Conduct constitutes a threat when, in its context, it “would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” (quotation omitted).

(applying a de novo standard to the question of whether Murphy’s conduct constituted a threat to commit a crime of violence under the terroristic-threats statute).