Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Seifert, 354 N.W.2d 432.

30 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Edin Gaspar Cruz Flores AKA Marcelino Rivera Rodriguez Minn. Ct. App. 2024
7 because “[the] detective misrepresented the scope of the questioning and [] Cruz Flores was totally unaware of the subject matter of the investigation.” Cruz Flores asserts that Beckman “addressed the validity of a Miranda waiver when a defendant had no knowledge of the subject matter of the polic
State of Minnesota v. Cody Logan Fohrenkam Minn. Ct. App. 2024
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.”
In the Matter of the Welfare of: N. B. M., Child. Minn. Ct. App. 2023
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.”
, A22-0103 Minn. Ct. App. 2023
“The ultimate test to be used in 11 determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
Reynolds challenges the district court’s ruling on the grounds that “a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstance s, that he was under arrest and not free to go.”
State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that an arrest has occurred if “a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under a rrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Brian John Blawat, et al., Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, tha t he was under arrest and not free to go.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have c oncluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman
Rodrigo Esparza, et al., Respondents, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983) (applying the “free to leave” test).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman , (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)).
State v. Thompson 929 N.W.2d 21 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State v. Beckman , , 436 (Minn. 1984).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
the overly intrusive actions of officers constituted an arrest, as opposed to an investigatory seizure, which required probable cause.” “The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman , 14 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
See Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497 -98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); State v. Beckman
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
ice diligentl y pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983) ; d 116, 119 (Minn. 1990); State v. Beckman
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
The test for whether a person is arrested is “whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” (emphasis added).
State of Minnesota v. Anthony James Cox 884 N.W.2d 400 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Sherman Peak Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In Minnesota, whether a law-enforcement officer has arrested (rather than stopped) a seized person depends on “whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was [both] under arrest and not free to go.” (emphasis added) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980)) (other citations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Thomas James Fox 868 N.W.2d 206 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Amanda Nicole Williams Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Arrest “The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)).
State v. Ortega 798 N.W.2d 59 Minn. 2011
The prophylactic warnings announced in Miranda and its progeny guarantee that “a defendant’s waiver of his right against compelled self-incrimination and his right to counsel during custodial interrogation [must] be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”
State v. Anderson 789 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 2010
State v. Clark 738 N.W.2d 316 Minn. 2007
(upholding the admission of a confession despite interrogator’s comment that defendant’s cooperation would be brought to the district court’s attention).
State v. Olson 634 N.W.2d 224 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Scott 584 N.W.2d 412 Minn. 1998
See, (holding that a 15-year-old was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive Miranda rights, specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney); -37 (Minn.1984) (adult defendant held to have validly waived Miranda rights even though the police originally told him that they wanted to question him about a driving revocation charge and later questioned him about a burglary charge).
State v. Carver 577 N.W.2d 245 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
*248 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. Thaggard 527 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 1995
In State v. (Howard) Anderson, remanding to trial court to make necessary findings of historical fact, we summarized some of our prior decisions dealing with the use of promises as follows: (the fact that defendant was told that any cooperation would be brought to the trial court’s attention did not render confession “involuntary”); (promise to release defendant pending formal charging and to summon him rather than arrest him on a warrant did not
Erickson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 415 N.W.2d 698 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)); , 436 (Minn.1984); 3 W. LaFave Search and Seizure, § 9.2(h)(2d ed. 1987).
State v. Anderson 396 N.W.2d 564 Minn. 1986
See, (the fact that defendant was told that any cooperation would be brought to the trial court’s attention did not render confession “involuntary”); (promise to release defendant pending formal charging and to summon him rather than arrest him on a warrant did not
State v. Friend 385 N.W.2d 313 Minn. Ct. App. 1986