Cited by

“[A] plaintiff may not recover duplicative money damages.”

In Minnesota the right to a jury trial extends “to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 4

United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, (concluding contractual claim for recovery of attorney fees was legal, rather than equitable, remedy and thus appellants had constitutional right to jury trial because “the nature of the claim is contractual and the remedy sought is legal”); (analyzing de novo whether constitutional right to jury trial existed in action seeking money damages).

1(3).2 To state a valid claim for relief under the act, “the alleged facts, if proven, [must] constitute a violation of [a] law or rule adopted pursuant to law.”

6 Hennepin, (analyzing de novo whether constitutional right to jury trial existed in action seeking money damages).

In evaluating whether a claim is legal or equitable, courts evaluate the substance of the claim and “the nature of the relief sought.”

United Prairie Bank -Mountain Lake , d at 63

whether those facts ‘constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law.’” Kratzer, d at 22 (d 342, 355 (Minn. 2002)).

of Hennepin , , 346-47 (Minn. 2002).

d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002).

MPS warns that any determination that an MWA claim brought under subdivision 1(1) has no counterpart at common law would undermine a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.

of Hennepin, (stating that “the common law protects those fired for their refusal to violate the law”); Anderson-Johanningmeier, d at 273 (same).

The supreme court continues to recognize “the right to a jury trial as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our constitution was adopted in 1857.”

See Kratzer, d at 19; -55 (Minn.2002).

This provision recognizes and is intended to continue the right of a trial by jury “as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our constitution was adopted in 1857.”

“Ordinarily, unless a statute provides that its remedy is exclusive, a party should not be prevented from bringing concurrent claims.” -47 (Minn.2002) (holding that plaintiff could concurrently pursue claims under Minnesota whistleblower act and Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act based on same underlying facts).

-55 (Minn.2002) (“A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law or rule that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as there is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that is implicated by the employee’s complaint, the employee reported the violation or suspected violation in g

-47 (Minn.2002) (“Ordinarily, unless a statute provides that its remedy is exclusive, a party should not be prevented from bringing concurrent claims.”); City of Rochester, d at 480 (“The [primary jurisdiction] doctrine is inapplicable if the issues raised are ‘inherently judicial,’ unless the legislature

The report must include “facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law.”

Further, the plain language of both Phipps’s indicate that the Phipps cause of action is not merely a pre-Whistleblower Act cause of action, but a cause of action with continuing viability in the common law.

trial under Minn. Const, art. I, § 4, which states, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy.” “This provision is intended to continue, unimpaired and inviolate, the right to trial by jury as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our constitution was adopted in 1857.”

and the employee alleges facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law.” -55 (Minn.2002).

This conclusion conforms to recent opinions of the supreme court