Cited by

As to the fifth requirement, we have explained that “prejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the 28 evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” n.2 (Minn. 1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, “a police officer testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of explaining how [the] investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.” (alteration in original) (); -25 (Minn. 1984) (“[E]ven a limited elicitation, for nonhearsay purposes, of general testimony that a tip had been received that led to defendant’s prints being compared with the latent print would have been unjustified in this case because the potentia

n.2 (Minn. 1985) (“‘[P]rejudice’ does not mean the damage to the opponent ’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence, rather it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quoting 22 Charles Wright and Kenneth

The supreme court has “said a number of tim es that a police officer testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of e xplaining how the investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.” Williams, d at 544 ().

“[T]he term ‘prejudice’ in Rule 403 ‘does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade [the jury] by illegitimate means.’ ” ( n.2 (Minn. 1985)).

“A police officer testifying in a criminal case generally may not, under the guise of explaining how an investigation fo cused on the defendant, relat e hearsay statements of others.” ().

" State v. Mosley , , 797 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Cermak , , 247 n.2 (Minn. 1985) ).

-48 (Minn. 1985) (upholding hearsay admission by state to explain delayed case filing where defense raised adequacy of investigation and insinuated that defendant was falsely accused).

Unfair prejudice “does not mean the damage to the opponent ’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” Mosley, d at 797 (quoting State v. Cermak , n.2 (Minn. 1985)).

- 48 (Minn. 1985); review denied (Minn. Sept.

State v. Cermak , remanded on other grounds

As a general rule, “evidence of a plea of guilty, conviction or acquittal of an accomplice of the accused is not admissible to prove the guilt or lack of guilt of the accused.”

This probative value is balanced against the “unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” , 247 n. 2 (Minn.1985) (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure — Evidence § 5215 (1978)); see also State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331 , 338 n. 3, , 53 n. 3 (1976) (“ ‘Unfair prejudice’ includes an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necess

We have said that “prejudice” “does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” n.2 (Minn. 1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Addressing the first prong, appellant correctly notes that “generally evidence of a plea of guilty, conviction or acquittal of an accomplice of the accused is not admissible to prove the guilt or lack of guilt of the accused.”

We have explained that the term “prejudice” in Rule 403 “does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate 10 probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” n.2 (Minn. 1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Schulz, d at 479 (concluding that incriminating voicemail message “had a devastating impact on the defendant’s case” but ther

We stated in State v. Cermak that “generally evidence of a plea of guilty, conviction or acquittal of an accomplice of the accused is not admissible to prove the guilt or lack of guilt of the accused.”

( , 247 n. 2 (Minn.1985)).

Unfair prejudice “refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” Bolte, d at 197 n. 3 ( , 247 n. 2 (Minn.1985)).

247 n. 2 (Minn.1985) (quoting 22 Charles A. Wright Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure-Evidence § 5215 at 274-75 (1978)); reh’g denied (Minn. Jan.

Nevertheless, “[w]e have said a number of times that ‘a police officer testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of explaining how [the] investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.’ ” Williams, d at 544 (); -25 (Minn.1984) (“[E]ven a limited elicitation, for nonhearsay purposes, of general testimony that a tip had been received that led to defendant’s prints being compared with the latent print would have been unjustified in this case because the potenti

We have explained that “[i]n Rule 403, ‘prejudice’ does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” , 247 n. 2 (Minn.1985) (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure — Evidence § 5215 (1978)).

We have observed however, that the risk in admitting prejudicial evidence is not “the damage to opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” n. 2 (Minn.1985) (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure — Evi dence § 5215 at 274-75 (1978)).