Cited by

Because “any” is all-encompassing, we give the word broad application, “regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, (statute barring seat belt evidence in “any litigation involving personal injuries or property damage” barred evidence in an action 9 alleging that the seat belt was defective (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reynolds v. Stat

Because “any” is all-encompassing, we give the word broad application, “regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, (statute barring seat belt evidence in “any litigation involving personal injuries or property damage” barred evidence in an action 10 alleging that the seat belt was defective (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); –34 (Minn. 2016) (the two

App. 2009) (citing Olson v. Ford Motor Co. , ).

See, 6 (concluding that statute barring evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse in “any litigation” barred the plaintiff’s products-liability claim against a car manufacturer); In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.

The parties’ arguments focus on a statute commonly known as the “seat belt gag rule.” See Olson v. Ford Motor Co. , , 494 (Minn. 1997).

Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2016); see Wegener v. Comm’r of Revenue, (noting courts are obliged to reject a construction that leads to unreasonable results, which “utterly depart from the purpose of the statute”).

Olson v. Ford Motor Co. , Wegener v. Comm’r of Revenue

(“Our role, in any case, is not to challenge the wisdom of the legislature’s act from a distance, but rather to give effect to its will as expressed in the ...

1 , 6) (1862), we have subsequently held that the Remedies Clause “does not guarantee redress for every wrong, but instead enjoins the [government] from eliminating those remedies that have vested at common law.” (citing Hickman v. Grp.

(“If the statute is free from all ambiguity, we look only to its plain language.

A stray pet is one that is “wandering or lost.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1776 (3d ed. 1992); (“The word ‘any’ is broadly applied in statutes.”) ().

See, (interpreting phrase “any litigation ...

Trust, -62 (Minn.2003); -96 (Minn.1997).

(interpreting phrase “any litigation” in Minn. Stat. § 169.685 , subd.

Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “the Remedies Clause does not guarantee redress for every wrong, but instead enjoins the legislature from eliminating those remedies that have vested at common law without a legitimate legislative purpose.”

“If the statute is free from all ambiguity, we look only to its plain language.”

Toth is correct to note that we have, in the past, “look[ed] .beyond the statutory *442 language to other indicia of legislative intent” when “the literal meaning of the words of a statute would produce an absurd result.”

§ 645.17(1) (2004); (noting that courts will look beyond the literal meaning of a statute’s words if the plain meaning will produce an absurd result).

“If the statute is free from all ambiguity, we look only to its plain language.”

§ 645.17(1) (2004); (discussing need to avoid absurd result); Wegener v. Comm’r of Revenue, (discussing need to avoid unreasonable result at variance with statute’s purpose).

Wegener v. *207 Comm’r of Revenue

for the second and third propositions noted above.

which states that “[w]hen, however, the literal meaning of the words of a statute would produce an absurd result, we have recognized our obligation to look beyond the statutory language to other indicia of legislative intent.” Id.