Cited by

Court in Powell v. Anderson to determine whether reversal is required to correct any error: “(1) the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, (2) the risk that denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and (3) the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.” ().

“Whether a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned is determined by an ‘objective examination into the circumstances surrounding the removal request.’” ().

See, d 107, 121 (Minn. 2003).

See, e.g., Howard v. Svoboda , (vacating a court of appeals decision for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order); (vacating a court of appeals decision because the judge was disqualified from hearing the appeal); –90 (Minn. 1992) (vacating a court of appeals decision when it was “immediately apparent .

reversal is not automatic.” (citing Powell v. Anderson , ).

see also Mouelle, d at 713 (“[W]e have never held that reversal is automatic when a party succeeds in raising a reasonable question about the judge’s impartiality.”).

On April 26, 2019, Daniels filed a motion in the district court “[t]o suspend the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure” to “fix an inadequate and ineffective appeal issue that was not properly addressed by this Court with post -conviction appeal and is permissible under this Court’s inherent authority as described in Powell v. Anderson , 4 ” Specifically, Daniels ’s motion requested relief because (1) the appellate courts failed to follow precedent in addressing his appeal, ( 2) his “tri

Powell v. Anderson , , 120-21 (Minn. 2003) (adopting the test announced in Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

(concluding that disqualified appellate judge’s participation in panel decision, which participation included his authorship of unanimous opinion explaining panel’s decision, “was not cured by the fact that two qualified judges joined his opinion”).

-21 (Minn. 2003) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

Second, Brackey’s to support his argument is misguided.

(determining that when pursuing an objective examination of an impartiality case where a judge has had an attorney-client relationship with an attorney appearing before the judge, a reviewing court can consider, among other factors, “the frequency, volume and quality of contacts”).

-21 (Minn. 2003) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

While disqualification under the rule uses the term “shall” and therefore is “not purely aspirational,” it leaves 4 “considerable room for interpretation in [its] application to any given set of circumstances.”

pated plea-withdrawal motion and suggested specific opposing arguments); -52 (Minn.2005) (involving a judge, who acted as finder-of-fact in the bench trial, questioned the veracity of a factual assertion made by a defense witness, independently investigated that fact, and announced the results of that investigation to counsel in open court); -19 (Minn.2003)(involving a court of appeals judge on the panel who maintained a concurrent attorney-client relationship with the law firm that represented

942 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted)

Whether a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned is determined by an “objective examination into the circumstances surrounding the removal request.” ().

(discussing the application of the interests of justice in exceptional cases to allow out-of-time appeals to proceed); (“We must continuously bear in mind that to perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864, 108 S.Ct.

s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 3 Canon 4F provides, “ ‘[impartiality’ or ‘impartial’ denotes absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the judge.” “Canon 3D(1) is not purely aspirational,” as indicated by use of the word “shall.”

A denial of a petition for further review “does not give the court of appeals decision any more or less precedential weight than a court of appeals decision from which no review was sought,” (quoting Murphy v. Milbank Mut.

A denial of a petition for further review "does not give the court of appeals decision any more or less precedential weight than a court of appeals decision from which no review was sought," (quoting Murphy v. Milbank Mut.

(reasoning that caselaw predating adoption of rule of general practice was superseded by rule); (noting that caselaw interpreting rule of civil procedure was superseded by subsequent enactment of statute on same subject).