Cited by

(reversing and remanding for a new trial where it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant would have been convicted without the erroneous jury instruction).

Here we borrow the sentiment expressed by the supreme court in its jury-instruction opinion in State v. Olson: “Although defendant probably would have been convicted in any event, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he would have been convicted in any event.”

We apply an objective standard when determining whether police had probable cause to believe that a crime had been 12 committed, and if the objective standard is met, we will not suppress evidence or invalidate an arrest “even if the officer making the arrest or conducting the search based his or her action on the wrong ground or had an improper motive.”

We apply an objective standard when determining whether police had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, and if the objective standard is met, we will not suppress evidence or invalidate an arrest “even if the officer making the arrest or conducting the search based his or her 10 action on the wrong ground or had an improper motive.”

y do not balance the various relevant factors bearing on a jury’s determination of the disputed possession issue, but rather “single[ ] out and unfairly emphasize[ ] one factor, one piece of the circumstantial evidence, bearing on that determination, thereby suggesting to the jury that in the court’s opinion that factor was of greater importance than other relevant factors.” State v. Olson

(recommending that district courts avoid giving instructions that point the jury toward particular evidentiary inferences).

matters of trial and appellate procedure.’ ” (d 212, 215 (Minn. 1992))).

( (holding that an instruction was improper where it failed to present the various relevant factors for determining constructive possession in a balanced fashion)).

(stating that the supreme court has consistently held “that if there is an objective basis for it, an arrest or search is lawful even if the officer .

Porte argues that this instruction “violated the supreme court’s express disapproval of permissive-inference instructions.” He relies on three supreme court opinions:

A properly objected-to instructional error regarding an element of an offense requires a new trial only “ ‘if it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.’ ” ().

provided the prosecutor with “notice that it is not appropriate to read the jury a statute or inform [the jury] of law unless the issue is properly decided by the district court.” Second, Cao argues that the prosecutor misstated the law, .relying for support on a published court of appeals’ decision

2450, 2454 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); (dicta).

1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); see also Shriner, d at 540, 548 (“[R]apid dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates a single-factor exigent circumstance,” notwithstanding the fact that the officer “admitted that he was not worried that [the defendant] was ‘about to slip under the legal limit.’”).

1943 (holding that whether exigent circumstances existed because the police needed to render emergency aid was an objective determination where the subjective motivation of the officer was irrelevant); (holding that “if there is an objective legal basis” for a search, it will be upheld, “even if the officer * * * conducting the search based his or her action on the wrong ground or had an improper motive”).

“Erroneous jury instructions merit a new trial ‘if it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.’ ” ().

(indicating that the prosecutor’s closing argument will be considered in determining the impact of an erroneous instruction on the verdict).

“This court has ‘primary responsibility under the separation of powers doctrine for the regulation of evidentiary matters and matters of trial and appellate procedure.’ ” ().

Although we approved of this instruction in State v. McLaughlin, 250 Minn. 309, 319 , -72 (1957), in Val-tierra we concluded: Flight instructions are a species of permissive-inference instruction, and the factors leading us to reject such instructions in [State v.] Litzau, ] and [State v.] Olson[, ] apply with full force to flight instructions.

ict courts to avoid “jury instructions advising that a particular fact may be inferred from other particular facts, if proved.” -86 (Minn.2002) (holding reversal warranted where a permissive inference instruction on possession of a controlled substance contributed to the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in defendant’s trial); -16 (Minn.1992) (holding it was reversible error to give the jury a permissive inference instruction on possession of a controlled substance).

ng that a particular fact may be inferred from other particular facts, if proved.” -87 (Minn.2002) (holding that the trial court erred by giving an instruction that the jury could infer that the driver of a vehicle possessed a drug found in his vehicle, and holding that the “cumulative effect” of this error and others merited reversal); -16 (Minn.1992) (holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that possession could be inferred from close proximity to illegal drugs, and that thi