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“by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s offenses were not part of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Bakken, 3 Although appellant did not raise this issue in the district court, “[a] defendant does not waive relief from multiple sentences or convictions arising from the same behavioral incident by failing to raise the issues at the time of sentencing.” d 166, 170 (Minn. App. 1992) ().

-71 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding that convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 violated section 609.04 because they arose under “different subsections of the same statute”).

(“Section 609.04 forbids multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident” (quotation omitted)).

(holding that “section 609.04 forbids multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident” (quotation omitted)).

7 driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with an alcohol content above the legal limit when the offenses stemmed from “one behavioral incident.” -71 (Minn. App. 1992) (quoting Jackson, d at 760) (vacating one conviction under such circumstances); see also Bonkowske, d at 443 (holding that district court’s entry of separate convictions for DWI and refusal to submit to chemical testing, offenses that arose from a single incident, was err

The supreme court has interpreted Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2018) to bar “multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” -71 (Minn. App. 1992) (citing State v. Jackson , ).

Because driving with an alcohol concentration above the legal limit and driving under the influe nce “do not necessarily rest upon the same proof,” State v. Clark , it is possible for a jury to return a guilty verdict for driving with an alcohol concentration above the legal limit but a not -guilty verdict for driving under the influence.

(holding that section 609.04 forbids “multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident” (quotations omitted)).

Loose cites State v. Clark , as controlling.

-71 (Minn. App. 1992), “a defendant may not receive two convictions for two different types of [driving while impaired] that are part of a single behavioral incident” and that either his driving-under-the-influence or test-refusal convict ion must be vacated because both convictions “were based on different s

See State v. Clark , -71 (Minn. App. 1992) (holding that the district court violated section 609.04 by entering a conviction for both driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 when they occurred during a single behavioral incident).

We have held that se ction 609.04 forbids “mu ltiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed durin g a single behavioral incident.” (quotations omitted).

12 also forbids “multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” State v. Clark , (quoting State v. Jackson , ).

State v. Williams , -42 (Minn. 2000)

But “[a] defendant does not waive relief from multiple sentences or convictions arising from the same behavioral incident by failing to raise the issues at the time of sentencing.” d 166, 170 (Minn. App. 1992).

d 166, 170-71 (Minn. App. 1992) (holding that Minn. Stat. § 609.04 prohibited convicting appellant of both a drivin g-while-under-the-influence charge and a blood-alcohol- concentration charge where the charges arose from one behavioral incident).

(concluding that prosecutor’s passing remarks about defendant’s criminal history did not warrant a new trial).

d 166, 170 (Minn. App. 1992) ().

a new trial is not warranted because it is extremely unlikely that the [challenged reference] played a significant role in persuading the jury to convict.” (quotations omitted).

-71 (Minn. App. 1992), we held that the district court erred by convicting the defendant of both driving while under the influence and driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10.

-71 (Minn. App. 1992) (holding that “[o]ne of the convictions must be vacated” where the appellant was convicted of both driving under the influence and driving with an alcohol concentration above the legal limit under two sections of the same statute).

Although appellant did not object to the sentences imposed, an offender “does not waive relief from multiple sentences or convictions arising from the same behavioral incident by failing to raise the issues at the time of sentencing.”

But the erroneous admission of such evidence generally does not warrant a new trial when it is “of a passing nature.” d 166, 170 (Minn. App. 1992) (quotation omitted).

a reference to a defendant’s prior record is of a passing nature, or the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, a new trial is not warranted because it is extremely unlikely that the evidence in question played a significant role in persuading the jury to convict.” (quotation omitted).

When “a reference to a defendant’s prior record is of a passing nature, or the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, a new trial is not warranted because it is extremely unlikely that the evidence in question played a significant role in persuading the jury to convict.” (quotations omitted).

Although appellant did not object, an offender “does not waive relief from multiple sentences or convictions arising from the same behavioral incident by failing to raise the issues at the time of sentencing.”

For example, this court concluded that an officer’s “passing reference” was “benign” and “did not necessarily suggest [the defendant] had a prior record.” Id.