Cited by

(quotation omitted); n.4 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that “a criminal statute does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides”).

A. Criminal Statutes Monahan challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss her claims under criminal statutes on the basis that “[n]one of the[] [cited] statutes create a direct, civil cause of action.” “[A] criminal statute does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides.” n.4 (Minn. 1990).

(stating that “whether a claim is time barred is an issue separate from the issue of personal jurisdiction” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Moreover, a criminal statute does not “give rise to a civil cause of action unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides.” n.4 (Minn. 1990).

he language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” (quotation omitted); see also Summers v. R & D Agency, Inc., (“A criminal statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the statute expressly or by clear implication so provides.” ( n.4 (Minn. 1990))).

at 207 ( n.4 (Minn. 1990)).

Generally, “[a] statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” ( , 47 n. 4 (Minn.1990)); see also Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Dep’t, (concluding that principles of judicial restraint preclude judicial creation of additional causes of action outside those evident in a statute’s express or implied terms).

See, (Popovich, J„ dissenting) (noting limitations on custody modification created by Minn.Stat.

1675, 1681 , 164 L.Ed.2d 376 ,-(2006) (stating that statute-of-limitations defense is not jurisdictional); (“[Wjhether a claim is time barred is an issue separate from the issue of personal jurisdiction.” (quotation omitted)).

“A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” ( , 47 n. 4 (Minn.1990)).

To satisfy due process requirements, the nonresident defendant must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct.

( , 47 n. 4 (Minn.1990)).

(citing Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 293 , ).

( (upholding trial judge’s requirement that a noncustodial parent post bond before taking a child overseas for extended visitation), cert.

(defendants' participation in abduction and concealment of plaintiff's daughter while Minnesota residents, and use of Minnesota post office in acting as go-between, was such that defendants could reasonably foresee being haled into Minnesota court).

Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., (Real Estate Brokers Act does not provide private cause of action); , 47 n. 4 (Minn.1990) (criminal statute generally does not give rise to civil cause of action); (no private cause of action for violation of statute requiring interstate motor carriers to comply with federal motor earner safety regulations).

“A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” ( , 47 n. 4 (Minn.1990)).

-47 (Minn.1990) (refusing to create a cause of action for the tort of “intentional interference with custodial rights”).