Cited by

2, 1997); -901 (Minn. 1992) (reviewing the district court’s denial of Lee’s proposed mental-illness defense for abuse of discretion); WL 2431978, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug.

(describing the jury empanelment process).

–900 (1992) (excluding a mental-illness defense was not an abuse of discretion when defendant failed to give prosecution notice of that defense).

d 895, 902 (Minn. 1992).

“Disclosure of defenses is a discovery function under the rules.”

In the first case, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 10 denial of the defendant’s mental-illness defense because it was untimely raised.

1(5)(c); (“[I]f an accused intends to raise any defense besides not guilty, s/he must notify the prosecution.”).

To support a downward departure on the basis of me ntal impairment, the impairment must be “extreme” and deprive the defendant “of control over his actions.” State v. McLaughlin , State v. Lee , .

1980) (same); (same); (same); (same); (same); (same), abrogated on other grounds, (same); d 315, 321–22 (Minn. 2003) (same); State v. Harris , , 850 (Minn. 2006) (same); Zumberge, d at 698 (same).

Caselaw also provides that mental illness justifies mitigating a sentence if the defendant can show the illness deprived him of control over his actions, , or caused him to not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions

A reviewing court “looks to the imposition of sentences in other cases to determine whether sentencing exaggerates the criminality of conduct.” (d 895, 902 (Minn. 1992)).

See, (stating that “we have upheld similar 4 sentences” and then concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing multiple sentences); (“Whether consecutive sentencing over exaggerates criminality is determined by this court, based on our observations of sentences in similar cases.”); State v. Brom , (affirming multiple consecutive life sentences for multiple counts of premeditated murder, base

Hodge argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing three consecutive sentences because a cumula tive 390-month sentence exaggerates his culpability based on his “extre me mental impairment.” “Extreme mental impairment has been held to mitig ate against an upward departure.” State v. Lee

- 49 (Minn. 2004); (providing that “[i]t is solely the function of the jury to determine the ultimate question as to whether or not the appropriate [mental] capacity exists ” (quotation omitted)).

(finding that defendant, who suffered from depression, anger, and impulsivity, did not suffer from extreme mental impairment when “experts overwhelmingly concluded that [his] mental condition did not deprive him of control over his actions”); (con

(affirming district court’s sentence departure for attempted murder where defendant broke knife off in victim’s spine and attacked victim while she was huddled over her child); (affirming district court’s sentence departure for first-degree criminal-se

In the case of State v. Lee, we affirmed a trial court’s decision to deny the defendant a bifurcated trial because there was “little or no support in the record for a mental illness defense.”

(affirming consecutive life sentences where appellant killed one victim with a knife and attempted to kill two others); Brom, d at 765 (affirming consecutive life terms where appellant murdered his parents and siblings in their home with an axe); Bangert, d at 547 (affirming consecut