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“A statute violates the Equal Protection Clause when it prescribes different punishments or different degrees of punishment for the same conduct committed under the same circumstances by persons similarly situated.” State v. Frazier, 14

the threshold sim ilarly situated inquiry does not apply in heightened rational basis scrutiny cases.

at 347–48; cf. Cox, d at 523–24 (holding that the two classes of defendants were not similarly situated because the statutes criminalizing theft by check and dishonored checks require different mens reas); 8–39 (Minn. 2002) (determining that the defendant was not similarly situated to an individual convicted under RICO because that conviction must be based on participation in at least three criminal acts).

(d 139, 140 (Minn. 1975)).

Id.; (Page, J., dissenting) (interpreting Russell to hold that “[u]nder Minnesota law .

“This procedural bar applies even in postconvictio n proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.” Ferguson v. State

“The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated individuals receive equal treatment.”

See, e.g., State v. Bauer , -27 (Minn. 2011) (multip le controlled buys through informants at staged storefront); ( three controlled sales to informant); 434 (Minn. App. 2001), aff’d on other grounds , ( sale of crack cocaine to confidential reliable informant on three occasions by defendant who was gang member).

-33 (Minn. 2002) (discussing an as-applied challenge to a facially neutral statute).

See State v. Frazier , , 830 (Minn. 2002).

McDonald next contends “that the racial disparity in drug case sentencing violates his right to equal protection.” To show that a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause based on race, an appellant must show “that the statute classifies individuals on the basis of some suspect trait.”

We do not reach this claim because Nelson forfeited it when he failed to raise it in district court.3

See 7 (stating that constitutional questions will generally not be considered for the first time on appeal).

-34 (Minn.2002) (explaining that to prevail on an equal-protection challenge where the challenged statute did not, on its face, classify on the basis of race, the challenger had to “demonstrate that the statute create[d] a racial classification in practice”); McCannel, 301 *d at 916 (stating that “the equ

Although he argued to the district court only that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him and issues generally may not be raised for the first time on appeal, we believe that the interests of justice would be furthered by our consideration of the issue, and so we will address the merits of his argument.

First, the “similarly situated” test states that a statute violates equal protection when it “prescribes different punishments or different degrees of punishment for the same conduct committed under the same circumstances by persons similarly situated.”

First, the “similarly situated” test states that a statute *38 violates equal protection when it “prescribes different punishments or different degrees of punishment for the same conduct committed under the same circumstances by persons similarly situated.”

It is well settled that in order “[t]o establish that [s]he has been denied equal protection of the laws, [Cox] must show that similarly situated persons have been treated differently.” (“The [E]qual [Protection [C]lause guarantees that similarly situated individuals receive equal treatment.”); (“The Equal Protection Clause requires that the state treat all similarly situated persons alike.”).

(refusing to consider a defendant's equal protection argument based on state constitution raised for the first time on appeal).

Thus, “[a]n individual challenging a statute on equal protection grounds must demonstrate that the statute classifies individuals [either on its face or in practice] on the basis of some suspect trait.” -34 (Minn.2002).