Cited by

(emphasis omitted); see also Schmitz, d at 704 (applying Zupetz and holding that, because domestic abuse murder is founded on general intent, not specific intent, a defendant cannot be prosecuted for attempted domestic abuse murder); -61 (Minn. App. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, (citing Zupetz and Schmitz and considering whether it is impossible to be guilty of attempted fifth- degree criminal sexual conduct based on appellant’s claim that fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct requires proof of

(holding that intent to be indecent may be inferred when conduct is performed in a place so public and open that it is likely to be observed).

1(c); d 235, 239 (Minn. 2003) (noting that “[t]he legislature was capable of narrowing the [statutory] requirement .

–55 (Minn. 1947) (involving a naked defendant who accidentally forgot to pull the shades to his dormitory window and reversing his conviction for indecent exposure), and State v. Stevenson , n.5 (Minn. 2003) (explaining that a person who swims nude in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area would not be guilty of indecent exposure because the likelihood that the conduct would be witnessed is small), (affirming a conviction for indecent exposure when t

(upholding a conviction based on the defendant’s location because both his vehicle and his conduct—namely parking and masturbating in a handicapped stall directly in front of the playground—was “reasonably capable of being viewe d by a minor”)

(explaining that the “relevant question” in determining intent to be indecent is whether the defendant’s conduct “was so likely to be observed ‘that it must be reasonably presumed that it was intended to be witnessed’” ()).

The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “in the presence of a minor” to mean “reasonably 5 capable of being viewed by a minor.”

A person engages in criminal sexual conduct “in the presence of a minor” when that conduct is “reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor.” State v. 10 Stevenson

*635 He further contends that we reaffirmed the existence of such an element in State v. Stevenson

State v. Stevenson , , 239 (Minn. 2003).

See State v. Stevenson , , 239 (Minn. 2003) ("[T]he term 'presence' may be used to mean different things in different statutes.").

See State v. Stevenson , , 240-41 (Minn. 2003) (the "intent to be indecent [or lewd] can be inferred from the fact that the charged conduct occurs in public or otherwise where it is certain to be observed" (quotation omitted) ).

acted “with the deliberate intent of being indecent or lewd.” d 235, 240 (Minn. 2003) (quoting State v. Peery , 224 Minn. 346, 351, ).

The supreme court has interpreted the present wording of the indecent-exposure statute to deem it a crime when the defendant’s conduct “was so likely to be observed ‘that it must be reasonably presumed that it was intended to be 4 witnessed.’” (quoting Peery, 224 Minn. at 352, d at 854).

To prevail in a prosecution for indecent exposure, the state must show that the charged conduct “was committed with the deliberate intent of being indecent or lewd.” (quoting State v. Peery, 224 Minn. 346, 351, ).

When interpreting a statute, we must first consider “whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” (quotation omitted).

See Leathers, d at 611 (applying the rule of lenity in similar circumstances to conclude that the phrase "full term of imprisonment” means two-thirds of a defendant’s executed sentence); (adopting the narrower of two reasonable interpretations of a statute using the rule of lenity); State v. Haas, 280 Minn. 197, 200 , (applying, among other things, the rule of lenity in concluding that "even though the offense charged might fall within the apparent policy of

1(2) (2000) reveals legislature’s desire to define crime as specific intent crime), aff'd on other grounds, (stating that specific intent requires person to have purpose or conscious desire to cause criminal result).

1081 , 1085, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983), aff'd on other grounds