Cited by

Sheriff’s Off., (), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2018).

“Generally, if the employee is found to have immunity, the claim against the municipal employer has been dismissed without any explanation.”

This is because public officials who respond to emergencies often have “little time for reflection” and must act “on the basis of incomplete and confusing information.”

gave [grader] the discretion to decide, in the field, whether to operate against traffic”); d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992) (concluding that police officer was entitled to official immunity for decision to engage in car chase, which involved weighing many factors to exercise “significant, independent judgment and discretion”); Majeski, d at 463-64 (holding that police officer’s decision to proceed through inter

In contrast, the police department policy in Pletan v. Gaines imposed a duty on officers to “continually question whether the seriousness of the violation reasonably warrant[ed] continuation of [a] pursuit,” and stated that a pursuit “should be discontinued when there is a clear danger to the pursuing officers or the public.” n.3 (Minn. 1992) (emphasis added).

Wiederholt v. City of 6 Minneapolis, see also Vassallo ex rel.

at 282 (d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992)).

28, 2002) ; see also, -43 (Minn. 1992) (holding that official immunity extends vicariously to city in lawsuit concerning the acts of a police officer).

See, e.g. , Pletan v. Gaines , (determining that police officer was entitled to official immunity from suit for injurie s caused during a high-speed car chase because “[t]he decision to engage in a car chase and to continue the chase involves the weighing of many factors”); Elwood, d at 678 (concluding that official im

Cf. Vassallo, d at 463 (holding discretionary a police officer’s duty to drive through red lights safely when responding to emergency situation); Pletan v. Gaines , (holding discretionary a police officer’s duty to decide when and how to 9 engage in a high-speed car chase).

but sirens off was discretionary); Kari v. City of Maplewood , (holding that paramedic’s driving in response to emergency was discretionary); Watson v. Metro Transi t Comm’n , (holding that bus driver’s decision not to stop bus when gang members assaulted and threatened to kill passengers was discretionary); Pletan v. Gaines , 7 (Minn. 1992) (holding that police off icer’s decision to engage in high -speed chase was discretionary).

This is particularly true in “emergency conditions,” where “little time for reflection” and “incomplete and confusing information” require “ the exercise of significant, independent judg ment and discretion.” .

“The discretion involved in official immunity is different from the policymaking type of discretion involved in discretionary function immunity afforded governmental entities.” Pletan v. Gaines

” d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992) .

“Official immunity involves the kind of discretion which is exercised on an operational rather than a policymaking level, and it requires something more than the performance of ‘ministerial’ duties.”

Extension of vicarious official immunity, however, “is not [] automatic.” Id.; (explaining that vicarious immunity is (Footnote continued on next page.)

ed to official immunity when responding to home-security alarm call, proceeds against a traffic light with his emergency lights on, but sirens off, and 8 collides with a motorist); Kari, d at 925 (city-employed paramedic entitled to official immunity when driving to scene of a medical emergency and striking pedestrian); -41 (Minn. 1992) (police officer entitled to official immunity when engaging in a high-speed pursuit of a criminal suspect and suspect’s vehicle hits and kills child walking home

It is even more difficult to characterize an officer’s decision as willful or malicious when the officer is performing a discretionary act that requires the exercise of independent judgment and offers “little time for reflection.”

on but sirens off was discretionary); (holding that paramedic’s driving in response to emergency was discretionary); Watson v. Metro Transit Comm’n, (holding that bus driver’s decision not to stop bus when gang members assaulted and threatened to kill passengers was discretionary); (holding that police offer’s decision to engage in high-speed chase was discretionary).

Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to emergencies on the grounds that emergency conditions offer “little time for reflection” and often involve “incomplete and confusing information” so that the situation requires “the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.”

See, (explaining that “[t]ort liability seeks to compensate the injured and to deter wrongdoing”).

“Official immunity involves the kind of discretion which is exercised on an operational rather than a policymaking level, and it requires, something more than the performance of ‘ministerial’ duties.”

law enforcement officials to provide its citizens with security in person and property.”

925 (Minn.1998) (holding that the conduct of a city ambulance driver, who struck and killed a pedestrian after failing to yield in a crosswalk, was entitled to the “broad category of immunity granted to officials responding to emergencies,” des

When an official must make decisions with little time for reflection and on the basis of incomplete information, “[i]t is difficult to think of a situation where the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion would be more required.”

(holding that with respect to police pursuits, police officer’s official immunity extends to officer’s public employer).