Cited by

in support of his argument that the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant.

“The plain ;error standard re *454 quires that the defendant show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.”

See State v. Strommen , 89 (Minn. 2002)

“An error affects substantial rights if the error is prejudicial—that is, if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.”

Under that analysis, the defendant must show “(1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.”

“An error is plain if it was clear or obvious.” (quotations omitted).

“The plain error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” (citations omitted).

“An error affects substantial rights if the error is prejudicial —that is, if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002) .

9 The parties agree that no substantive objection was made to the admission of Exhibit 9 at trial and that the plain-error standard of review is therefore appropriate.4 Minn. R. Crim P. 31.02; State v. Strommen , (noting that the standard requires an error that is plain and that affected substantial rights, and that, if those three prongs are met, a reviewing court may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.)

d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002).

d 681, 689 (Minn. 2002).

-85, 689 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that prosecutor “misstate[d] .

State v. Strommen , 6 (Minn. 2002); see Minn. R. Crim.

“The plain[-]error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002).

If plain error is demonstrated , “we may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

“The plain error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.”

He argues that similar questioning constituted prosecutorial misconduct in State v. Strommen

d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002).

“An error is ‘plain’ if it was ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ ” (citation omitted), which requires that “the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct,” d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006).

“The plain error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.”

“The plain-error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected substantial rights.”

“The plain error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” (citing Griller, d at 740 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997))).

District courts must instruct juries on accomplice testimony when “it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.”

The cases therefore do not go far enough to support 11 Fleming’s argument challenging the admissible and clearly nonprejudicial answer here— “I didn’t get paid nothing.”

An error is “plain” if it is clear or obvious under current law, (quotation 5 omitted), and an error is clear or obvious if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct,”

District courts must instruct juries on accomplice testimony when “it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.”

It is true that, “[a]s a rule, trial courts have a duty to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.” 13 (Minn. 2002).

Based on this statutory prohibition, we have required district courts “to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.”