Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180.

78 citing documents.

Hennepin County State of Minnesota v. Tremaine Michael Bucholz Thissen, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Hudson, … Minn. 2026
d 161, 193– 97 (Minn. 2024) (stating that we have the “authority to regulate and supervise the rules that govern the admission of evidence in the lower courts”); (exercising authority over evidentiary rules to adopt a new rule in a court decision); (explaining that we have authority over the rules governing evidence admission).
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Respondent, vs. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, et al., Respondents, Astra Genstar ... Minn. 2025
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Respondent, vs. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, et al., Respondents, Astra Genstar ... Minn. 2025
(“[T]he judicial function constitutionally empowers the courts to make their 12 own rules of procedure.”); –54 (Minn. 1994) (recognizing that “since the 1956 amendment to the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Con
Brian Thomas Hughes v. Minnesota Department of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Similarly, in State v. Willis, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a sentence enhancement on an impaired-driving offense did not punish the past crime, but instead “increased the possibl e penalty for the latest crime.” d 180, 185 (Minn. 1983).
Mark Anthony Rehm v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“The use of prior convictions to increase punishment for an underlying substantive offense committed after the effective date of a statute providing for increased penalties does not violate the ex post facto provisions of either the state or federal constitutions.” d 180, 185 (Minn. 1983).
Melvin L. Allen v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994); (determining that an amendment to a DWI law that allowed past criminal convictions to enhance present crimes merely “increased the possible penalty for the latest crime” and does not punish the past crime).
State of Minnesota v. Lawrence John Mahoney A16-1765, Edwin James McCarthy A16-1766 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Michael Ray Whipple v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Michael Ray Whipple v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Our supreme court rejected this argument in State v. Willis, holding that “[t]he use of prior convictions to increase punishment for an underlying substantive offense committed after the effective date of a statute providing for increased penalties does not violate the ex post facto provisions of either the state or federal constitutions.”
Donald D. David v. Bartel Enterprises (Nitro Green), Relator, and SFM Mutual Insurance Company, Relator. 856 N.W.2d 271 Minn. 2014
Rita Ann Stevens v. Commissioner of Public Safety 850 N.W.2d 717 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Rita Ann Stevens v. Commissioner of Public Safety 850 N.W.2d 717 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
See, -90 (Minn.1996); (Peterson, J., concurring specially); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. Obeta 796 N.W.2d 282 Minn. 2011
State v. Obeta 796 N.W.2d 282 Minn. 2011
Courts’ Comp., 308 Minn. 172, 180
In re the Welfare of the Child of B.J.-M. 744 N.W.2d 669 Minn. 2008
In Re Bj-M. 744 N.W.2d 669 Minn. 2008
In re the Welfare of the Child of B.J.-M. 744 N.W.2d 669 Minn. 2008
In Re Bj-M. 744 N.W.2d 669 Minn. 2008
State v. Lemmer 736 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007
State v. Lemmer 736 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007
Respect for the coequal branches of government “requires the court to exercise great restraint before striking down a statute as unconstitutional, particularly when it involves a determination of what is a legislative and what is a judicial function.”
State v. Chauvin 723 N.W.2d 20 Minn. 2006
State v. Chauvin 723 N.W.2d 20 Minn. 2006
See, (enforcing a statute that allowed the admission of certain evidence where there was no court evidentiary rule to the contrary).
State v. Lemmer 716 N.W.2d 657 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
State v. Lemmer 716 N.W.2d 657 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
“Due respect for the coequal branches of government requires the court to exercise great restraint before striking down a statute as unconstitutional, particularly when it involves a determination of what is a legislative and what is a judicial function.”
State v. Hartmann 700 N.W.2d 449 Minn. 2005
State v. McCoy 682 N.W.2d 153 Minn. 2004
State v. McCoy 682 N.W.2d 153 Minn. 2004
State v. Ali 679 N.W.2d 359 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State v. Ali 679 N.W.2d 359 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
While the power to establish rules of evidence lies within the inherent authority of the judiciary, courts have nevertheless enforced “reasonable statutory rules of evidence as a matter of comity where the rules were not in conflict with the Minnesota Rules of Evidence.” , 46 n. 3 (Minn.1990).
State v. McCoy 668 N.W.2d 425 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
State v. McCoy 668 N.W.2d 425 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Santiago v. State 644 N.W.2d 425 Minn. 2002
State v. Gianakos 644 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 2002
State v. Gianakos 644 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 2002
See, -54 (Minn.1994) (stating that "[djetermi-nation of procedural matters is a judicial function.”); .(noting that the court has inherent authority to establish the rules of evidence); , 46 n. 3 (Minn. 1990) (opposing the lower courts' characterization of the legislature as the "primary regulator of evidentiary matters”), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 801
Santiago v. State 644 N.W.2d 425 Minn. 2002
State v. Pearson 633 N.W.2d 81 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Pearson 633 N.W.2d 81 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Breaux 620 N.W.2d 326 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Breaux 620 N.W.2d 326 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Windish 590 N.W.2d 311 Minn. 1999
State v. Windish 590 N.W.2d 311 Minn. 1999
The authority to regulate procedural matters arises from our inherent judicial powers, which has been acknowledged by the legislature.
State v. Dumas 587 N.W.2d 299 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
State v. Dumas 587 N.W.2d 299 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
142, 143 (1913) (finding that the increased punishment for the subsequent offense is not a punishment of the person for the first offense a second time, but a severer punishment for the second offense); (holding that 1982 amendment to DWI law, which allowed past criminal convictions to enhance present crimes, did not punish the past crime, but “increased the possible penalty for the latest crime * * *.”).
State v. Nerz 587 N.W.2d 23 Minn. 1998
State v. Nerz 587 N.W.2d 23 Minn. 1998
This authority arises from the court’s inherent judicial powers, and has been acknowledged by the legislature.
Silva v. Maplewood Care Center 582 N.W.2d 566 Minn. 1998
State v. Johnson 514 N.W.2d 551 Minn. 1994
State v. Johnson 514 N.W.2d 551 Minn. 1994
State v. Harrington 504 N.W.2d 500 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Harrington 504 N.W.2d 500 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
568 (1925) (no ex post facto violation where defendant convicted for possessing liquor which he had obtained before and held continuously through enactment of prohibition law); (use of prior convictions to increase punishment for offense committed after statutory effective date does not violate ex post facto clause); (no ex post facto violation where defendant prosecuted for post-enactment conduct even though conduct began before en