Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224.

295 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
These trial decisions “should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counsel, has the benefit of 7 hindsight.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Decisions of “[w]hich witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury are questions that lie within the proper discretion of the trial counsel.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
(noting that the probative value of evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect when the prior crimes would not likely inflame the jury, as they were not more serious crimes than the current offense).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
This court applies “a strong presumption that a counsel’ s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“The delay in speedy -trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
Brooks v. State 897 N.W.2d 811 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Brooks v. State 897 N.W.2d 811 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct.
A16-1713 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
The delay is calcul ated based on “when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
State v. Osorio 891 N.W.2d 620 Minn. 2017
State v. Osorio 891 N.W.2d 620 Minn. 2017
455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (“So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.”)
Steven Lynn Oppel v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Steven Lynn Oppel v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” (quoting Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 466 U.S. at 690).
State of Minnesota v. Ricky Donell Holifield Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Timothy Ayman Bakdash v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Timothy Ayman Bakdash v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
A strong presumption exists that an attorney’s performance “falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
State of Minnesota v. Ricky Donell Holifield Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(“We are in no position to second-guess counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on other defenses instead of investigating other suspects.”); (considering the extent of counsel’s investigation as trial strategy).
State of Minnesota v. Yachin Kadimel Scott Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Yachin Kadimel Scott Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Length of delay For purposes of a speedy-trial challenge, the delay is calculated based on the date “when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
State of Minnesota v. Quentin Todd Chute 887 N.W.2d 834 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Quentin Todd Chute 887 N.W.2d 834 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
James Donald Dahl v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
James Donald Dahl v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Such trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”
Jonathan Nicholas Turner v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Jonathan Nicholas Turner v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(interviewing and calling witnesses); Brown v. State, 292 Minn. 174, 177, (plea bargain).
State of Minnesota v. Jeremiah James Shefelbine Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Jeremiah James Shefelbine Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Length of delay “The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
State of Minnesota v. Larry Lee Hough Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Larry Lee Hough Minn. Ct. App. 2016
See, (stating that decisions about “[w]hich witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury are questions that lie within the proper discretion of the trial counsel”).
State of Minnesota v. Trevon Fuller Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Trevon Fuller Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Length of delay As to the first factor, “[t]he delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.” 4
State of Minnesota v. Derrick Lee Riddle Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Derrick Lee Riddle Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Marlow Shelton McDonald Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Marlow Shelton McDonald Minn. Ct. App. 2016
As to the first factor, “[t]he delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
State of Minnesota v. Kevin Charles Owens Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Kevin Charles Owens Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches.”
State of Minnesota v. David Ernest Osorio 872 N.W.2d 547 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. David Ernest Osorio 872 N.W.2d 547 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches.” d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986).
State of Minnesota v. Keith Terrell Bland Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Keith Terrell Bland Minn. Ct. App. 2015
–36 (Minn. 1986) (concluding that defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated, despite seven-month delay attributable to state, because “[n]o unfair prejudice [wa]s evident”).
State of Minnesota v. Bradley Scott Junker Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Bradley Scott Junker Minn. Ct. App. 2015
See, (stating that decisions about “[w]hich witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury are questions that lie within the proper discretion of the trial counsel”).
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
On the first prong, the delay from the date of indictment, to the first day of trial was 1 year and 4 months.
State of Minnesota v. Nazar Taher Mohammed Alfahed Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Nazar Taher Mohammed Alfahed Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Amir Abd El Malak Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Roxanne Kay DeFlorin Minn. Ct. App. 2015