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“There is a strong presumption that a counsel ’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

We apply a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the 5 wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation marks omitted).

Such trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellant court, which, unlike [trial] counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”

See Strobel, d at 573; -36 (Minn. 1986).

(noting that deciding which witnesses to call and which information to present at trial are strategic matters for trial counsel) .

See State v. Jones , d 224, 234-36 (Minn. 1986); aff’d, 3 In both Jones and Strobel, the appellate courts concluded that the first three factors weighed at least slightly in favor of the defendant, but nonetheless determined that the defendant’s right to a

“Such trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlik e the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”

“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”

when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Mi nn.

State v. Jones , (Mi nn.

See, -36 (Minn. 1986) ( concluding no speedy-trial violation after seven-month delay when first three Barker factors weighed against state but no unfair prejudice shown); Strobel, d at 573 ( concluding no violation when first thre e factors weighed against state but appellant showed no prejudice from 15 -

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” State v. 15 Jones

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance 9 falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” State v. Jones

evail on an ineffective-assi stance-of-counsel claim, an ap pellant must first show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, despite the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls wi thin the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 669, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)

What evidence to present to the jury, including which witnesses to call, is also a tactical decision that “lies within the proper discretion of trial counsel” that we “do not review for competency.” accord State v. Jones

ed on such a claim, an appellant must show that: (1) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonablenes s and (2) there is “a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (quotation omitted).

" State v. Jones , , 236 (Minn. 1986).

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” State v. Jones , .

Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).

3 below an objective standard of re asonableness, despite the “str ong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro fessional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984); see also State v. Jones

State v. Jones , , 234-36 (Minn. 1986).

A delay caused by an overburdened judicial system weighs against the state, but less so than “a deliberate attempt on the part of a prosecuting attorney to delay a trial.”

Such trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike [trial] counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”

“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2052).

Such trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlik e the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”

at 513-14 (d 224, 234-36 (Minn. 1986) (seven months); State v. Helenbolt , -06 (Minn. 1983) (14 months); (seven months); (six months)).

State v. Jones , -36 (Minn. 1986).

Appellate courts have rejected ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based on the failure to hire a private investigator, failing to interview prospective witnesses, Id.; failing to call prospective witnesses, Scruggs v. State , and failing to purs ue a theory of an a lternative perpetrator, Opsahl v. State

(stating that “delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which .

“There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Our supreme court has held trial strategy, which includes decisions as to which witnesses to interview or call and what exhibits to produce at trial, as well as the extent of investigation, “should not be readily second-guessed.” Id.; see, (in rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to hire an investigator and interview witnesses, stating that “trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counse l, has the benefit of