Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224.

295 citing documents.

  • State of Minnesota v. Roxanne Kay DeFlorin Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    “The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
  • State of Minnesota v. Amir Abd El Malak Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    See, n.10 (Minn. 2012) (stating that “decisions about which witnesses to interview are typically matters of trial strategy that we will not review”); d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (stating that decisions about “[w]hich witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury are questions that lie within the proper discretion of the trial counsel”).
  • State of Minnesota v. George Howland Jackson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • State of Minnesota v. George Howland Jackson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    Length of the Delay We calculate a speedy-trial delay “from the point at which the sixth amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or 7 when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
  • State of Minnesota v. Gerard McNeal, and Gerard McNeal v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • State of Minnesota v. Gerard McNeal, and Gerard McNeal v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    Opsahl, d at 421 (“We are in no position to second-guess counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on other defenses instead of investigating [other] suspects.”); (finding that the extent of counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy).
  • Michael Frederick Schmidt v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Michael Frederick Schmidt v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    sion, “[counsel] informed him that an expert [was] available, but that the cost would be prohibitive” and that “[counsel] discouraged him from even attempting to secure funds from the court to help defray some of the costs of an expert.” These alleged statements by Schmidt’s trial counsel do not “concern errors in professional performance but instead relate to trial strategy.”
  • State of Minnesota v. Ron Wesley Epps Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • State of Minnesota v. Ron Wesley Epps Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    This right attaches “when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.”
  • State v. Bahtuoh 840 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 2013
  • State v. Bahtuoh 840 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 2013
    See, (stating that “trial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight”).
  • Dereje v. State 837 N.W.2d 714 Minn. 2013
  • State v. Nicks 831 N.W.2d 493 Minn. 2013
  • State v. Nicks 831 N.W.2d 493 Minn. 2013
    We have rejected claims that trial counsel was ineffective for: failing to hire a private investigator, -37 (Minn.1986); failing to interview prospective witnesses, Id.; failing to call prospective witnesses, Scruggs, d at 26-27 ; and failing to pursue alternative-perpetrator theories, Opsahl, d at 421 .
  • State v. Davis 820 N.W.2d 525 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Davis 820 N.W.2d 525 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Beecroft 813 N.W.2d 814 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Beecroft 813 N.W.2d 814 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Rhoads 802 N.W.2d 794 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • State v. Rhoads 802 N.W.2d 794 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
    5 (), review denied (Minn. Jul.
  • Francis v. State 781 N.W.2d 892 Minn. 2010
  • Francis v. State 781 N.W.2d 892 Minn. 2010
    There is “a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ”
  • State v. Loving 775 N.W.2d 872 Minn. 2009
  • State v. Loving 775 N.W.2d 872 Minn. 2009
  • State v. Bobo 770 N.W.2d 129 Minn. 2009
  • State v. Bobo 770 N.W.2d 129 Minn. 2009
  • State v. Griffin 760 N.W.2d 336 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
  • State v. Griffin 760 N.W.2d 336 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
    Griffin aptly notes that “overcrowding in the court system is not a valid reason for denying a defendant a speedy trial.” Windish, d at 316 ().
  • State v. Williams 757 N.W.2d 504 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
  • State v. Williams 757 N.W.2d 504 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
    Although the responsibility for an overburdened judicial system cannot rest with the defendant, “when the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”
  • Jama v. State 756 N.W.2d 107 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
  • Jama v. State 756 N.W.2d 107 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
    A strong presumption exists “that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ”
  • State v. Miller 754 N.W.2d 686 Minn. 2008
  • State v. Miller 754 N.W.2d 686 Minn. 2008
    “There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ” Fields, d at 468 ().
  • State v. Smith 749 N.W.2d 88 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
  • State v. Smith 749 N.W.2d 88 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
    (finding seven-month delay sufficient to trigger further analysis).
  • Cooper v. State 745 N.W.2d 188 Minn. 2008
  • Cooper v. State 745 N.W.2d 188 Minn. 2008
    “There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ” Fields, d at 468 ().
  • Pippitt v. State 737 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 2007
  • Pippitt v. State 737 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 2007
  • Fields v. State 733 N.W.2d 465 Minn. 2007
  • Fields v. State 733 N.W.2d 465 Minn. 2007
    “There is a strong presumption that a counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct.
  • State v. Cram 718 N.W.2d 898 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Cram 718 N.W.2d 898 Minn. 2006
    A reasonable probability is “ ⅛ probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct.
  • Schleicher v. State 718 N.W.2d 440 Minn. 2006
  • Schleicher v. State 718 N.W.2d 440 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Jackson 714 N.W.2d 681 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Barnes 713 N.W.2d 325 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Barnes 713 N.W.2d 325 Minn. 2006
    “[Tjhere is a strong presumption that a counsels’ performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ().