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It is “well-settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973) (“[W]e recognized that a search authorized by consent is wholly valid.”) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 88 S. Ct. 507, 515 (1967)); (stating that a search “conducted pursuant to consent” is a “well-settled” exception to the warrant requirement).

If an “out of court statement is being offered for some other purpose, such as to prove knowledge, notice, or for impeachment purposes, it is not hearsay.” (quotation omitted).

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If an “‘out of court statement is being offered for some other purpose, such as to p rove knowledge, notice or for impeachment purposes, it is not hearsay.’”

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043-44 (1973)

See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S. Ct. at 993; (finding that a girlfriend had common authority over an apartment to consent to a search when she was present at the time of the search, had her name on the mailbox, possessed a key, stored her clothing and jewelry there, had lived there on and off for over a year, and had paid rent); United Stat

See Harris, d at 103 (finding that a defendant consented to a search after police told him that “any questioning or searching would be voluntary”)

507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)

507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); (articulating this standard for Minnesota).

2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)

to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’ ” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct.

(search conducted without “a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se ’ unreasonable”).

Generally, “a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct.

613(b)); (holding that a statement to police officers was not hearsay when it was elicited to rebut defense counsel’s suggestion that police officers lied to defendant during his interview); (concluding declarants statement was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to show that he lied to the police).

Warrantless searches are only allowed in a “few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S.Ct.

With respect to naming accomplices in jury instructions, we have said that “[u]nless the facts are undisputed or compel but a single inference, whether a witness is an accomplice is a question for jury resolution.” (citing Tucker v. State, 309 Minn. 482, 485 , ).

(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct.

See, (finding declarant’s statement not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated but rather to show that he lied to the police).