Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704.

37 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
But many acts have not amounted to sufficient provocation, including: a victim “reaching for a gun ,” a victim “grabb[ing] a knife” after a defendant “smacked” her, -07 (Minn. 1990); a victim “reach[ing] for a weapon after [a defendant] assaulted him,” Eason, d at 262, 265; and a victim ’s physical gesture “challenging [a defendant] to a fight,”
State of Minnesota v. Christopher James Colgrove Minn. 2023
State of Minnesota v. Christopher James Colgrove Minn. 2023
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
See Pilcher, d at 332 (stating that “[b]oth sides agree that Pilcher made an equivocal request for counsel”); (concluding that a defendant’s fleeting, offhand, and midsentence comment during interrogation about a future need for an attorney was not an equivocal request for counsel).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
victim’s act of shooting the defendant in the head would provoke a person of ordinary self -control into a heat of passion) with two cases that concluded there was not sufficient provocation for heat-of- passion defense : Stiles v. State , (victim’s act o f reaching for a gun when defendant was aggressor did not provoke heat of passion) and State v. Hale , -07 (Minn. 1990) (victim’s grabbing a knife after 14 defendant smacked her did not provoke heat of passion).
Minn. 2020
State v. Hale , −07 (Minn. 1990); see also State v. Nystrom , (holding that a victim’s physical gesture challenging the defendant to fight as the defendant rode away on his bike was insufficient to provoke a person of ordinary self-control).
Ernesto Reyes-Alcazar, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
(“[N]ot every mention of the word ‘lawyer’ or ‘counsel’ or ‘att orney’ by a suspect ‘arguably’ suggests that the sus p e c t w a n t s a l a w y e r b e f o r e s u b mitting to further questioning.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Hale , (concluding that a defendant’s “ fleeting, off-hand comment in m id-sentence about his future need for a good attorney in defending himself” was not a rguably an invocation of his Miranda right to counsel).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
wyer; a nd her “demeanor during the interrogation established that her statement ‘I am a lawyer,’ could be construed as a request 6 for a lawyer.” But the supreme court has previo usly observed that “not every mention of the word ‘lawyer’ or ‘counsel ’ or ‘attorney’ by a suspect ‘a rguably’ suggests that the suspect wants a lawyer before submitting to furt her questioning.” State v. Hale
State of Minnesota v. Terry Lee West Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Terry Lee West Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Malcolm Todey Cooper Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Malcolm Todey Cooper Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Jodi Lynette Lacy Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Jodi Lynette Lacy Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Lacy’s statement about the baggie was therefore “a spontaneous, volunteered statement not made in response to ‘interrogation.’”
State of Minnesota v. Kristopher Lee Roybal Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Kristopher Lee Roybal Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State v. Pearson 775 N.W.2d 155 Minn. 2009
State v. Maldonado-Arreaga 772 N.W.2d 74 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Maldonado-Arreaga 772 N.W.2d 74 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
In support of its conclusion
State v. Risk 598 N.W.2d 642 Minn. 1999
State v. Risk 598 N.W.2d 642 Minn. 1999
Indeed, we have previously observed that “[o]ther courts following the Robinson approach have held that not every mention of the word ‘lawyer’ or ‘counsel’ or ‘attorney’ by a suspect ‘arguably’ suggests that the suspect wants a lawyer before submitting to further questioning.”
State v. Tibiatowski 590 N.W.2d 305 Minn. 1999
State v. Tibiatowski 590 N.W.2d 305 Minn. 1999
State v. Juarez 572 N.W.2d 286 Minn. 1997
State v. Juarez 572 N.W.2d 286 Minn. 1997
(Defendant's “fleeting, off-hand comment” about a future need for a good attorney was not enough to require the officers to either cease the interrogation or clarify the defendant’s desires).
Hale v. State 566 N.W.2d 923 Minn. 1997
Hale v. State 566 N.W.2d 923 Minn. 1997
State v. Cole 542 N.W.2d 43 Minn. 1996
State v. Cole 542 N.W.2d 43 Minn. 1996
State v. Williams 535 N.W.2d 277 Minn. 1995
State v. Williams 535 N.W.2d 277 Minn. 1995
See, (holding that defendant’s "fleeting, off-hand comment in mid-sentence about his future need for a good attorney * * * was not even arguably an invocation of his Miranda right to counsel”), reh'g denied (Minn., May 23, 1990); (evaluating whether defend
State v. Bowers 482 N.W.2d 774 Minn. 1992
State v. Bowers 482 N.W.2d 774 Minn. 1992
reh’g denied (Minn. May 23, 1990).
State v. Willey 480 N.W.2d 127 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Willey 480 N.W.2d 127 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Pilcher 472 N.W.2d 327 Minn. 1991
State v. Pilcher 472 N.W.2d 327 Minn. 1991
-23 (Minn.1988); (fleeting, off-hand comment about future need for attorney not an invocation of right to counsel).