State of Minnesota v. Daniel John Wyatt

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0058

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel John Wyatt,
Appellant.

Filed December 18, 2023
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-22-4352, 27-CR-22-9299

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Worke,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

ROSS, Judge

Daniel Wyatt assaulted his fiancée, violated the resulting domestic-abuse no-contact

order two months later, and pleaded guilty to the charges arising from both offenses. Wyatt

argues on appeal that the district court failed to vindicate his constitutional right to
represent himself after he asserted during his plea hearing that he wanted to do so. He also

argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to depart downward from the

presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Because Wyatt did not clarify his

request for self-representation and waived his self-representation argument by pleading

guilty, and because he failed to identify any substantial and compelling circumstance

warranting a sentencing departure, we affirm.

FACTS

Hennepin County Sheriff’s deputies arrested Daniel Wyatt in March 2022, and the

state charged him with felony domestic assault for punching his fiancée in the arm and face

at the Hennepin County Medical Center. Wyatt pleaded guilty one month later, and the

district court deferred accepting his plea pending sentencing. The district court released

Wyatt after issuing a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) prohibiting Wyatt from

having any contact with his fiancée. One month after Wyatt’s release, police went to a

Minneapolis park on an assault report involving a man chasing a woman. They arrived and

found Wyatt and his fiancée, and the state charged Wyatt with violating the DANCO.

When Wyatt appeared at his bail hearing on the DANCO charge, he said that he was

appearing without legal counsel, that he did not need his public defender, and that he

wanted to plead guilty. The district court informed him that, because he had been appointed

counsel in the underlying domestic-assault case, he would continue to be represented by

counsel for the bail hearing and could decide later whether to represent himself at the

appropriate time.

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 Wyatt did not assert a request to represent himself at any later proceeding. He

eventually pleaded guilty to the DANCO violation while he was represented by counsel.

The district court deferred accepting Wyatt’s guilty pleas pending sentencing, and it

released him before sentencing on the condition that he participate in residential chemical

treatment. Wyatt left his treatment program unsuccessfully soon after he arrived.

Wyatt appeared for sentencing and asked the district court to depart downward

dispositionally from the 24-month prison sentence presumed under the sentencing

guidelines, contending that he was particularly amenable to probation. The district court

considered Wyatt’s request for a downward dispositional departure but did not find that

substantial and compelling circumstances justified departing from the presumptive

sentence. The district court sentenced Wyatt to serve concurrent prison terms of 18 months

on the domestic-assault conviction and 24 months on the DANCO-violation conviction.

Wyatt appeals.

DECISION

Wyatt challenges the district court’s decision denying his request to represent

himself during the DANCO bail hearing. We review a denial of a request for self-

representation for clear error. State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn. 2012). A

defendant has the right to waive counsel and represent himself. Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6;

Faretta v. United States, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Wyatt asserts that his request to

represent himself was unequivocal and timely, and, in any event, that the district court

should have questioned him to determine whether his request was knowing and intelligent

as required by caselaw. See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 1990). But

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after the district court indicated that Wyatt could assert a claim for self-representation at a

suitable time, Wyatt did not do so. And a valid guilty plea waives any nonjurisdictional

errors. Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. 2017). Wyatt does not contend that

his guilty plea was invalid, and he does not contend that his self-representation argument

presents a jurisdictional question. Because Wyatt failed to clearly request self-

representation and he then waived his opportunity to make the request by validly pleading

guilty while he was represented by counsel, we do not address his argument further.

Wyatt also challenges his sentence based on the district court’s decision denying his

request for a downward dispositional departure. We will afford the district court great

discretion when we review its decision not to depart from the presumptive guidelines

sentence. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014). A district court may depart

from a presumptive sentence only if it finds that “identifiable, substantial, and compelling

circumstances” justify departing. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021). One

circumstance that might justify departing is a defendant’s particular amenability to

probation. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982); see also Soto, 855 N.W.2d at

308. The Trog court identified factors the district court can consider when assessing

whether this circumstance exists. Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. The record satisfies us that the

district court carefully considered Wyatt’s departure request and that it correctly

determined that no substantial and compelling circumstance warranted departure. Wyatt

maintains that he “demonstrated that he was particularly amenable to treatment in a

probationary setting through his efforts to arrange inpatient treatment” and that he “spoke

to his newfound realization that his relationship with [his fiancée] was toxic.” We agree

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with the district court’s implicit decision that these circumstances fall short of establishing

that Wyatt is particularly amenable to probation. We therefore hold that the district court

sentenced Wyatt within its discretion.

Affirmed.

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