In re the Marriage of: Kyle Ryan Johnson, A v. Danielle Marie Gilbert, B, Appellant....

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0699

In re the Marriage of:

Kyle Ryan Johnson, petitioner A,
Respondent,

vs.

Danielle Marie Gilbert, petitioner B,
Appellant.

Filed June 3, 2024
Affirmed; motion denied
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-21-5248

Laurie Mack-Wagner, Calen E. King, Mack & Santana Law Offices, P.C., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael P. Boulette, Abby N. Sunberg, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Larson,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

Appellant-wife challenges the district court’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing,

of her motion to reopen the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. We affirm. And
based on this ruling, we deny as moot respondent-husband’s motion to strike portions of

appellant’s reply brief.

FACTS

Appellant Danielle Gilbert (wife) and respondent Kyle Johnson (husband) were

married in October 2017. A few years later, in 2021, the parties purchased a home for

$966,050. Because the listing price of the home was more than the parties could afford,

wife’s father purchased the home for the parties in cash he obtained from a trust, giving

the parties a loan of $230,000 in May 2021, and another loan of $608,949 in June 2021.

Wife’s father also gifted the parties $130,000 to put toward the home.

The parties closed on their home in June 2021, and on September 5, 2021, husband

wrote his father-in-law a check for $70,000 as a partial repayment for the house. And after

the parties executed a mortgage in favor of Edgewater Title Group LLC, wife’s father

received a check on behalf of the parties for $725,000 from Edgewater Title Group dated

September 24, 2021. Consequently, by the end of September 2021, wife’s father had

received $795,000 of the $838,949 that he had loaned to the parties. The parties then

executed a promissory note on September 27, 2021, in favor of wife’s father for the

remaining $43,949.43, which represented the balance owed to wife’s father related to the

purchase of the parties’ home.1

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Husband claims that wife’s father told him “about a week prior to the execution of the
promissory note that it would never need to be repaid at all” and that the promissory note
was created solely for “tax purposes.”

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 In the meantime, in July or August 2021, wife informed husband that she was gay

and that she wanted a divorce. The parties subsequently filed a joint petition for dissolution

without children on October 11, 2021, and on November 19, 2021, the district court entered

judgment on the divorce decree without a hearing. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated

judgment, husband was awarded the marital home, including the equity and debt.

On November 11, 2022, wife moved to reopen the parties’ November 19, 2021,

judgment and decree “for fraud and misrepresentation as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.145,

subd. 2(3) [(2022)], or in the alternative, reopen the parties divorce decree for mistake as

set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1) [(2022)].” Wife claimed that the parties had

a verbal agreement to share in the equity of the marital home, and that husband committed

fraud with respect to the decree because he failed to abide by the parties’ agreement, and

instead awarded himself the home, including all of its equity.

In support of her motion, wife filed an affidavit alleging that husband was primarily

responsible for the parties’ finances during the marriage. Wife also claimed that, during

their discussions related to their marriage dissolution, they agreed that husband would

retain the home and reimburse wife for her marital equity in the homestead. According to

wife, husband told her that he would “handle” the petition for dissolution, and after she

moved out of the home, she went to the home and signed the “signatory page” of the decree

in the kitchen without seeing the “decree itself.” (Emphasis omitted.) Wife claimed that,

although husband asked her if she wanted to see the document, she told him that she

“trusted him” to put their agreement in the joint petition.

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 Wife alleged that, in September 2022, she began asking husband when she would

be paid for her equity in the home, and that after receiving evasive responses, she contacted

an attorney. According to wife, it was not until she consulted with an attorney that she

became aware that husband had awarded himself the full equity in the marital home in

contravention of what she alleged was their verbal agreement. Finally, wife submitted text-

message threads between her and husband, which she claims show that husband agreed to

split the equity in the home.

Husband opposed wife’s motion and filed an affidavit supporting his position. In

his affidavit, husband acknowledged that the parties “discussed various ways to deal with

the house and discussed a buy-out of [wife’s] equity (we did not discuss a buy-out amount

or any specific terms), but [he] could not afford to do so.” Husband also claimed that the

“final agreement was that [he] would be awarded the house outright.” According to

husband, he believed that wife “felt bad for the position she had put us in and realized too

that [they] stood to lose a lot of money in the house [they] had just purchased.” Husband

alleged that wife “was awarded more of other assets,” and that they “came to an agreement

that [they] both felt was fair.” Husband further claimed that the parties “discussed getting

attorneys,” but that wife was “concerned about the process being drawn out,” and that he

“understood that [wife] wanted to get divorced as fast as possible so she could move on

from [their] marriage and experience life as an out member of the LGBTQ community.”

Finally, husband claimed that, after filling out the divorce paperwork at wife’s request, he

left “all of it” on the kitchen counter for her to review and sign.

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 Following a hearing, the district court found that wife produced “no evidence, aside

from her assertion,” that the “parties agreed to split the equity in the home.” Although the

district court acknowledged the text messages submitted by wife, it found that these

messages “do not show an agreement to divide the equity in the home. They only show

that the parties discussed this possibility and do not show any details related to how the

equity would be divided.” The district court also found that wife “presents no evidence

that she did not have a full opportunity to review the contents of the Joint Petition before

signing it,” and that the parties “knew what they were doing when they submitted the Joint

Petition and that [wife] now wishes for the outcome to be different.” As such, the district

court concluded that there is “insufficient evidence” that (1) husband “took advantage of

[wife] or that he committed fraud against her or the Court”; and (2) “the parties made a

mutual mistake in not dividing the equity in the home.” Finally, the district court

determined that “an evidentiary hearing is not necessary in this matter, as the parties have

submitted all relevant affidavit and documentary evidence necessary for the Court to

engage in [its] analysis.” The district court, therefore, denied wife’s motion to reopen the

parties’ joint dissolution decree. This appeal follows.

DECISION

I.

Wife challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen the parties’

dissolution decree for fraud without an evidentiary hearing. This court reviews such a

decision for an abuse of discretion. See Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn.

App. 2009) (“A district court’s decision to reopen the judgment and decree based on fraud

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will be sustained absent an abuse of discretion.”). “A district court abuses its discretion by

making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or

delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey,

975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s

findings of fact for clear error. Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App.

2016). “The moving party bears the burden of establishing a basis to reopen the judgment

and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2007).

Dissolution judgments and decrees are final when entered. Id. But a district court

may relieve a party to a dissolution proceeding “from a judgment and decree, order, or

proceeding” for “fraud, whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or

other misconduct of an adverse party.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3) (2022). A motion

to reopen for fraud must be made within one year. Id.

When a party seeks to reopen a ruling in a dissolution case within the time limits of

Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2, the standard for reopening is ordinary fraud, not fraud on

the court.2 Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 129 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied

(Minn. Sept. 11, 2001). “Ordinary fraud, in a dissolution context, does not require an

affirmative misrepresentation or an intentional course of concealment because parties to a

marriage dissolution have a duty to disclose all assets and liabilities completely and

accurately.” Id. at 130. This duty to disclose is an affirmative duty. See id. at 131 (stating

that, “[b]ecause the confidential relationship between the parties [to a marriage] creates an

2
Wife does not challenge the district court’s denial of her request to reopen the judgment
and decree for mistake under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1).

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affirmative duty to disclose, nondisclosure is sufficient to establish a breach of that duty,

without evidence of intent,” and that, “because the duty to make full and fair disclosure is

an affirmative duty, there is no requirement that the moving party show that he requested

the information that was not disclosed; the duty to disclose exists in the absence of such a

request”).

However, although a motion to reopen a judgment and decree for ordinary fraud

must be brought within one year of entry of the judgment, no such time limit applies to

motions to reopen a judgment and decree for fraud upon the court. Minn. Stat. § 518.145,

subd. 2; see Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989) (“The significance

of a finding of fraud on the court is that it eliminates the time restriction for bringing a

motion to vacate a judgment.”). Generally, to establish fraud on the court, the moving

party must show “an intentional course of material misrepresentation or nondisclosure,

having the result of misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the property

settlement grossly unfair.” Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165. This standard for demonstrating

fraud on the court is more strenuous than the standard for ordinary fraud. Doering, 629

N.W.2d at 129.

Wife argues that she is entitled to a reversal because the district court “required her

to prove fraud on the court when ordinary fraud should have sufficed.” Husband disagrees,

arguing that “[f]raud on the court was the appropriate standard because [wife] requested

the district court apply that standard.”

We acknowledge that wife cited the fraud-on-the-court standard in her motion

papers below and argued that standard to the district court. But wife also cited the ordinary

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fraud standard to the district court. And the ordinary fraud standard articulated in Doering

is the applicable standard in this case because wife filed her motion to reopen the

dissolution decree within one year of entry of judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

2 (stating that a motion to reopen for fraud must be made within one year of entry of

judgment). Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred by applying the fraud-on-

the-court standard here.

Nevertheless, even under the ordinary-fraud standard, wife is unable to show that

the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to reopen the dissolution

decree without an evidentiary hearing. In general, family-court motions are decided

without oral testimony. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)(1). And, as a general rule, a party

in a family-law case is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he or she requests a hearing.

Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)(2). If no request is made, motions are submitted “on

affidavits, exhibits, documents subpoenaed to the hearing, memoranda, and arguments of

counsel.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)(1); see also Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 130 (“In

family cases, non-contempt motions are decided without an evidentiary hearing, ‘unless

otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.’” (quoting Minn. R. Gen. Prac.

303.03(d))).

Here, the record reflects that wife never requested an evidentiary hearing. But, even

if she had requested an evidentiary hearing, wife cannot show that the district court abused

its discretion in declining to hold one.

A motion to reopen under section 518.145, subdivision 2, is an alternative to an

independent action to relieve a party from judgment. Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 130. Thus,

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the motion is procedurally equivalent to a summary-judgment motion in which the court

does not weigh evidence but determines whether the movant has raised a material issue of

fact. Id. (stating that “[a] district court may summarily dispose of a fraud claim (i.e., grant

summary judgment) only when there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and

where a determination of the applicable law will resolve the controversy” (quotation

omitted)). Demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact likewise satisfies the good-cause

standard for an evidentiary hearing under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d). Id. (establishing

procedure on motion to reopen dissolution judgment for fraud under Minn. Stat. § 518.145,

subd. 2).

In Doering, this court reversed a district court’s refusal to reopen a dissolution

judgment without an evidentiary hearing on the issue of fraud. Id. This court concluded

that, “[b]ecause appellant’s affidavits are sufficient to present a fact question of fraud,

appellant established good cause for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to reopen the

judgment.” Id. at 132.

Doering is distinguishable from this case because wife’s affidavit is insufficient to

present a fact question of fraud. The crux of wife’s fraud claim is that, unbeknownst to

her, husband awarded all of the equity in the parties’ marital home to himself in

contravention to their oral agreement to split the equity in the house. To support her

position, wife submitted an affidavit alleging that she and husband purchased a home they

could not otherwise have afforded with the help of wife’s father. Wife also alleged that,

within weeks of closing on the new house, she informed husband that she is gay and that

she wanted a divorce. Moreover, wife alleged that the divorce discussions were amicable,

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that she and husband orally agreed that husband would “buy [her] out of the home as part

of [their] property settlement,” that she “stopped drafting the decree and trusted that

[husband] would do it,” and that she signed the signature page of the dissolution petition

in the kitchen of the parties’ house without reading it. In fact, wife acknowledged that

husband “asked [her] if [she] wanted to see the document, but [she] told him that [she]

trusted him and that [she] did not need to see it.” Wife further acknowledged signing the

dissolution petition without reading it, despite the signature page stating, “I declare under

penalty of perjury that everything I have stated in this document is true and correct.”

Although wife alleges that the dissolution decree awarded the house to husband in

contravention of their oral agreement, the only evidence she offers in support of her

position is some text messages between husband and wife in which the parties discussed

splitting the equity in the house. But these text messages do not adequately allege the

actual existence of an agreement to split the equity in the house; they simply demonstrate

that the parties discussed the issue. And wife’s bare allegations that she and husband

agreed to split the equity in the house are insufficient to create an issue of fact of fraud.

See McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 230 (Minn. 2019) (stating that a genuine

issue of material fact may not be established by “unverified and conclusory allegations”

(quotation omitted)); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1988) (stating

that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rely on the pleadings’ bare

allegations, but must specifically show there are genuine issues of fact). Therefore,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to wife, we conclude that wife is unable

to show that the district court abused its discretion in declining to hold the evidentiary

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hearing she did not request, and the underlying premise for which—the existence of an

agreement between the parties—she failed to adequately allege.

II.

Husband moved to strike “all references in [wife’s] reply brief . . . regarding the

darker signature page of the Stipulated Judgement and Decree3 because [wife] did not raise

this issue in her opening brief.” (Footnote added.) Because we affirm the district court’s

order, we deny husband’s motion to strike as moot.

Affirmed; motion denied.

3
The record reflects that the signature page of the parties’ dissolution petition is darker
than the other pages of the petition. Although wife alleged that the darker signature page
was indicative of husband’s fraud, the district court disagreed, finding logical husband’s
explanation that “he has a flat top scanner, that it is cumbersome to scan an entire
document, that the document was filled out electronically, and that he only scanned their
signature page after both parties signed.”

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