In re the Marriage of: Robert Thomas Nord, A v. Katherine Elizabeth Bowers, B, ...

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1644

In re the Marriage of:

Robert Thomas Nord, petitioner A,
Respondent,

vs.

Katherine Elizabeth Bowers, petitioner B,
Appellant.

Filed May 6, 2024
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge *

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-22-1752

William D. Siegel, Tarshish Cody, PLC, Richfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

William L.H. Lubov, Lubov Law, LLC, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and

Reilly, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REILLY, Judge

Appellant-wife challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen the

parties’ stipulated dissolution judgment and decree (stipulated J&D) under Minnesota

Statutes section 518.145 (2022) for excusable neglect and fraud. See Minn.

Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), (3). Wife also challenges the district court’s denial of her

motion for attorney fees. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

wife’s motions, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Katherine Elizabeth Bowers (wife) and respondent Robert Thomas Nord

(husband) were married in July 2002. On October 28, 2022, the parties submitted a joint

petition to dissolve their marriage. Neither party was represented by legal counsel at the

time or throughout the dissolution proceedings. The district court rejected the parties’ joint

petition because it contained confidential financial information. The parties resubmitted

the joint petition without the confidential financial information on November 18, 2022.

Apart from omitting the confidential financial information, the resubmitted joint petition

was identical to the original joint petition.

The joint petition provided details about the parties’ financial status and indicated

that each party wished to waive spousal maintenance. When the joint petition was

executed, husband was employed and earned a salary of $82,000 per year—about

$5,344.13 per month. During this same time, wife was not employed but received about

$770 per month in social-security-disability benefits. Despite this discrepancy in monthly

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incomes, husband and wife claimed that they were “fully capable of self-support” and did

not require spousal maintenance. Accordingly, wife and husband waived spousal

maintenance pursuant to the following provision:

Neither party is awarded spousal maintenance. Both
[p]etitioners have waived any claims to spousal maintenance
for the past, present, or future, and expressly waive all rights to
modify their waivers of maintenance. This court is divested of
jurisdiction to award or modify maintenance in the future
pursuant to Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989).

Husband and wife asserted that their waiver of spousal maintenance was “fair and

equitable,” “supported by the above consideration,” and “signed by both parties after full

financial disclosure to each other.”

The joint petition also divided the parties’ marital assets. The joint petition provided

that the parties would sell their largest asset, their homestead, and equally divide the net

proceeds. The joint petition also divided the parties’ other assets: husband’s and wife’s

individual bank accounts, husband’s 401(k) retirement plan, the parties’ shared vehicle,

and a few small material possessions. The joint petition indicated that neither party owned

any nonmarital property.

On November 29, 2022, the district court granted the parties’ joint petition and filed

an order to dissolve the parties’ marriage by stipulated judgment and decree (J&D). The

district court entered judgment on the J&D on December 1, 2022.

On December 5, 2022, husband brought wife to a hospital emergency department

after she threatened to shoot herself. Wife’s family members told hospital personnel that

wife had recently traveled to Las Vegas and had been using THC products and exhibiting

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paranoid, delusional, and aggressive behavior since she returned. According to wife’s

hospital records, wife has a history of obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress

disorder, and borderline personality disorder, as well as a family history of schizophrenia.

Based on this information, the county petitioned for judicial commitment of wife as a

person who poses a risk of harm because of mental illness and recommended that she be

held at a local hospital, pending a hearing.

On December 20, 2022, the district court found that wife posed a risk of harm based

on “Substance (Delta-9) - Induced Psychotic Disorder” and determined that she satisfied

the statutory criteria for civil commitment. But the district court stayed civil-commitment

proceedings for six months, pursuant to several stipulated conditions.

On April 26, 2023, wife moved to reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D under section

518.145 and filed a motion for attorney fees under Minnesota Statutes section 518.14,

subdivision 1 (2022). In a supporting affidavit, wife argued that the parties’ stipulated J&D

should be reopened because husband committed fraud by failing to disclose her “severe

mental health problems” to the district court, which in turn deprived her of spousal

maintenance, her alleged nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead, and her alleged

marital share of any “workers’-compensation and personal-injury claims” that husband

may have. Wife asked the district court to award her permanent spousal maintenance, her

marital share of husband’s alleged legal claims, and attorney fees of $2,000.

Husband opposed wife’s motions. Husband argued that wife was fully competent

throughout the dissolution proceedings and that her mental-health issues did not arise until

after the parties executed the joint petition. To support his argument, husband submitted a

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personal affidavit along with affidavits from wife’s two adult children and husband’s

stepfather.

In husband’s affidavit, husband stated that the parties “had detailed discussions

regarding the division of [their] assets and liabilities” and that wife “made intelligent

contributions to these conversations.” Husband explained that, while the parties were

drafting the joint petition, wife went to the county courthouse and worked with a family-

law clinic on multiple occasions to ensure that the petition “was drafted correctly and

provided all necessary information.” Husband also stated that wife intended to move to

Las Vegas after the divorce was finalized and planned to supplement her income by

working as a bartender. Husband explained that wife had “[run] the numbers related to her

income and estimated budget” and determined that she did not “need or want any spousal

maintenance” given her plans. Husband stated that wife “was logical, coherent, and

levelheaded” throughout the dissolution proceedings and while she was planning her move

to Las Vegas. Husband explained that wife left for Las Vegas on October 29, 2022, and

returned in mid-November 2022, when she began “exhibiting bizarre behavior, including

delusions and signs of paranoia.” Husband attributed wife’s erratic behavior to her

increased intake of THC products, which she had acquired in Las Vegas.

Wife’s children and husband’s stepfather corroborated husband’s statements.

Wife’s son stated that wife “was coherent, competent and able bodied” during dissolution

proceedings and did not start exhibiting bizarre behavior until she returned from

Las Vegas. Likewise, wife’s daughter stated that wife “was fully aware of what was going

on” during dissolution proceedings and did not show signs of “serious mental health issues”

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until after she returned from Las Vegas. Finally, husband’s stepfather described wife as

“sharp” and “competent” and stated that her “psychotic break” occurred after the parties’

divorce was finalized.

The district court denied wife’s motion to reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D.

Crediting the affidavits of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather, and

discrediting the affidavit of wife, the district court found that wife actively participated in

preparing the joint petition and competently planned her move to Las Vegas. The district

court likewise found that wife “was fully aware of what she was doing [during dissolution

proceedings], made informed decisions relating to the dissolution of marriage, and

indicated that she was satisfied with the decisions that had been made.” And the district

court found that wife showed no signs of paranoia or psychosis before the parties executed

the joint petition or at the time of execution. Based on these findings, the district court

concluded that wife had not shown that husband “committed fraud upon the [c]ourt” or that

there was a “reasonable excuse for her failure . . . to act.” Accordingly, the district court

determined that wife was not entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D under

section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), (3). The district court also determined that wife was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing or attorney fees.

Wife appeals.

DECISION

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to

reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D and her motion for attorney fees. We address each

issue in turn.

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 I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion to
reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D.

Wife first challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen the stipulated

J&D. The use of stipulations in dissolution proceedings is a judicially favored “means of

simplifying and expediting litigation.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997).

“Stipulations are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contracts” and “cannot be

repudiated or withdrawn from one party without the consent of the other, except by leave

of the court for cause shown.” Id. at 521-22 (quotation omitted). A party may seek to

reopen a stipulated J&D under section 518.145, subdivision 2, however, for five statutorily

prescribed reasons, including “excusable neglect” and “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or

other misconduct of an adverse party.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), (3); see also

Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 (“The sole relief from [a stipulated J&D] lies in meeting the

requirements of [section] 518.145, [subdivision] 2.”). The party seeking to reopen a

stipulated J&D bears the burden of proving at least one statutory ground by a

preponderance of the evidence. Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2016).

We will not disturb a district court’s denial of a motion to reopen a stipulated J&D

under section 518.145, subdivision 2, absent an abuse of discretion. Kornberg v. Kornberg,

542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996). “A district court abuses its discretion by making

findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or rendering a

decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835

(quotation omitted).

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 Likewise, we will not set aside a district court’s finding of fact unless it is clearly

erroneous. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d at 386. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly

contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a

whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation

omitted). “In applying the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable

to the findings.” Id. We also defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow

v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988); see also Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607

N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). “That the record might support findings other than

those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”

Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to

reopen the stipulated J&D because (1) husband committed fraud and misrepresentation by

failing to inform the district court of wife’s “psychological condition” and neglecting to

disclose certain assets; (2) wife’s failure to correct the joint petition before it was entered

into judgment constituted excusable neglect because wife’s mental-health issues prevented

her from understanding its terms; (3) the district court should have held an evidentiary

hearing before deciding wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D; (4) the district court

failed to consider whether the parties’ waiver of spousal maintenance was fair and

equitable; and (5) the district court failed to order an equitable division of the parties’

marital and nonmarital property because certain assets were omitted from the marital estate.

We consider each argument in turn.

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 A. Fraud or Misrepresentation

A district court may relieve a party from a dissolution judgment and “order a new

trial or grant other relief as may be just” if the other party committed fraud. Minn.

Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3). Where, as here, a party requests relief under section 518.145,

subdivision 2(3), within one year of entry of judgment, the moving party need only show

ordinary fraud, not fraud upon the court. Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 129-30

(Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001). “Ordinary fraud, in a dissolution

context, does not require an affirmative misrepresentation or an intentional course of

concealment because parties to a marriage dissolution have a duty to disclose all assets and

liabilities completely and accurately.” Id. at 130.

We review a district court’s decision on whether to reopen a dissolution judgment

based on fraud for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428

(Minn. App. 2007). But we review the factual findings that support a district court’s

decision on this issue for clear error. Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn.

App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). “Where evidence relevant to a factual issue

consists of conflicting testimony, the district court’s decision is necessarily based on the

credibility of the witnesses.” Id. In these situations, we afford district courts broad

discretion “because they are in the best position to determine which witnesses are credible

and to weigh the evidence.” Id. This deference extends to district court credibility

determinations that are based on conflicting affidavits. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 837. “If

there is evidence to support the district court’s decision, an abuse of discretion will not be

found.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 428.

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 1. Husband’s alleged nondisclosure of wife’s mental-health issues

Wife first contends that husband committed fraud or misrepresentation by failing to

inform the district court about wife’s mental-health issues. In making this argument, wife

appears to assert that the district court clearly erred by finding that she “did not begin

exhibiting mental health issues until several weeks after the [j]oint [p]etition was executed”

and by crediting the statements of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather as

stated in their affidavits. We are not persuaded.

We first address wife’s argument that the district court clearly erred by finding that

wife did not begin exhibiting signs of mental illness until several weeks after the parties

executed the joint petition. Based on our review of the record, this finding is not clearly

erroneous. In making this finding, the district court credited the affidavits of husband,

wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather. In these affidavits, wife’s family members

consistently described wife as being aware of her actions, involved in preparing the joint

petition, and capable of making plans for the future. Wife’s family members also

consistently explained that wife did not begin exhibiting signs of mental illness until after

she returned from Las Vegas, several weeks after the parties executed the joint petition.

This evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s finding about wife’s metal illness.

See id.

We next address wife’s argument that the district court clearly erred by crediting the

statements of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather, as set forth in their

affidavits. Wife argues that the district court clearly erred by crediting these statements

because they are not admissible as expert testimony under Minnesota Rule of

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Evidence 702. Husband agrees that the family-member statements are not admissible

under rule 702 but contends that they are admissible as opinion testimony under Minnesota

Rule of Evidence 701. We agree with husband.

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by crediting the statements of

husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather because these statements fall within the

scope of rule 701. Rule 701 authorizes lay witnesses to provide testimony on opinions

“which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a clear

understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not

based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of

[r]ule 702.” Minn. R. Evid. 701; see also In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76,

93 (Minn. App. 2012). “The key question is whether the witness personally knows what

he or she is talking about and whether the testimony will be helpful to the [fact-finder].”

J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). As husband correctly

notes, the statements of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather were not based

on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Instead, these statements were

based on the family members’ direct observations of wife before, during, and after the

parties executed the joint petition. Accordingly, the family members’ statements constitute

lay testimony under rule 701, not expert testimony under rule 702. See Minn. R.

Evid. 701-702; J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93. Wife’s argument that the district court clearly

erred by crediting these statements because they are inadmissible under rule 702 is

therefore unavailing.

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 2. Husband’s alleged nondisclosure of certain assets

Wife next contends that husband committed fraud or misrepresentation by violating

his duty to disclose the parties’ assets to the district court. To facilitate the equitable

division of property during a dissolution proceeding, the parties to the proceeding “must

make a full and accurate disclosure of their assets and liabilities.” Bollenbach v.

Bollenbach, 175 N.W.2d 148, 155 (Minn. 1970). Failure to do so constitutes fraud and is

grounds for reopening a dissolution judgment. Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764,

766 (Minn. 1983); see also Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 129 (explaining that caselaw indicates

“that the failure of a party to a dissolution to make a full and complete disclosure constitutes

sufficient reason to reopen the dissolution judgment for fraud”).

Wife asserts that husband violated his duty to disclose the parties’ assets by failing

to inform the district court about (1) wife’s purported nonmarital interest in the parties’

homestead, (2) husband’s purported worker’s-compensation and personal-injury claims,

and (3) husband’s 401(k) plan. 1 We are not persuaded.

We conclude that wife has not met her burden of proving that she is entitled to

reversal based on husband’s nondisclosure of the assets she identifies. As for wife’s

1 Wife also appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by not reopening

the stipulated J&D based on fraud because wife did not consult counsel and therefore “did
not understand the concept of waiver as it related to spousal maintenance.” As husband
notes, wife does not provide any authority to support this argument. We therefore decline
to consider it. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n
appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can
be reversal. . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”);
Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quoting Waters); Luthen v. Luthen, 596
N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (applying Loth).

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purported nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead, wife has presented no evidence to

support this alleged interest. Additionally, wife cites no authority to support her apparent

assertion that husband was required either to disclose this alleged interest during the

proceedings or to anticipate and preemptively defend against it. Regarding husband’s

purported workers’-compensation and personal-injury claims, wife again has presented no

evidence to show that these legal claims exist or to support her stake in them. Finally, as

for husband’s 401(k), the stipulated J&D lists this asset and explains how it should be

divided among the parties. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that husband’s 401(k)

was excluded from the marital estate. For these reasons, wife has not met her burden of

proving that she is entitled to relief based on husband’s alleged nondisclosure of wife’s

purported nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead, husband’s purported legal claims,

or husband’s 401(k). See Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65; Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 283.

In sum, wife has not established that she is entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D

based on husband’s alleged nondisclosure of her mental-health issues or husband’s alleged

nondisclosure of certain assets. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion by denying wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D based on fraud. See

Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835.

B. Excusable Neglect

Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion

to reopen the stipulated J&D based on excusable neglect.

Under section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), a district court may relieve a party from a

dissolution judgment and order a new trial or other just relief for “excusable neglect.”

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Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1). The language in section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), is

identical to the language in Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a), and this court has “addressed both

the statute and the rule in appeals from district court orders denying motions to vacate

dissolution judgments.” Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 836. As a result, a district court may

analyze a party’s motion to reopen a dissolution judgment for excusable neglect under

rule 60.02. See id. at 836-37.

To be entitled to relief under rule 60.02, the moving party “must establish (1) a

reasonable case on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the failure to act; (3) action with

due diligence after entry of judgment; and (4) lack of prejudice to the opposing party.”

Reid v. Strodtman, 631 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Finden v. Klaas, 128

N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964)). While the moving party must satisfy all four of these

factors, “a weak showing on one factor may be offset by a strong showing on the others.”

Id.

In denying wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D for excusable neglect, the

district court found that wife did not satisfy the first and second factors under rule 60.02

because wife “failed to demonstrate that her mental or emotional condition at the time she

signed the [j]oint [p]etition prevented her from fairly and reasonably understanding what

she was agreeing to.” The district court also found that wife did not satisfy the fourth rule

60.02 factor because reopening the stipulated J&D would “substantial[ly] prejudice”

husband, “given that the parties’ divorce has been finalized for approximately ten (10)

months.”

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 Wife asserts that the district court’s findings on these factors are clearly erroneous

because (1) she established a reasonable case on the merits by showing “more than a

reasonable likelihood that she should be awarded permanent spousal maintenance,” a share

of the assets she alleges husband failed to disclose, and attorney fees; (2) she was

reasonably excused from failing to challenge the joint petition because she did not

understand it because of her mental illness; and (3) reopening the stipulated J&D would

not substantially prejudice husband. We disagree.

At a minimum, the record shows that wife has not satisfied the second rule

60.02 factor and is thus not entitled to relief for excusable neglect. See Reid, 631 N.W.2d

at 419. As discussed above, the district court did not clearly err by finding that wife did

not show any signs of mental illness until several weeks after she executed the joint

petition. For these reasons, the district court did not clearly err by finding that wife failed

to establish “a reasonable excuse for [her] failure to act” under rule 60.02. See id. Because

wife has not satisfied the second rule 60.02 factor, she is not entitled to relief under rule

60.02(a) or its statutory corollary, section 518.145, subdivision 2(1). See id. We therefore

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion to

reopen the stipulated J&D based on excusable neglect. See Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835.

C. Denial Without a Hearing

Wife next contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her

motion to reopen the stipulated J&D because the district court “failed to adequately

consider” whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted under Minnesota Statutes section

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518.13, subdivision 5 (2022). 2 Under section 518.13, subdivision 5(1), a dissolution

judgment and decree “must be submitted to the court for approval and filing without a final

hearing” when “there are no minor children of the marriage” and “the parties have entered

into a written stipulation.” (Emphasis added.) But a district court “shall schedule the

matter for hearing in any case where the proposed judgment and decree . . . is contrary to

the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 518.13, subd. 5. Wife asserts that the stipulated J&D

“is contrary to the interest[s] of justice” because it was executed while wife was suffering

from mental illness and because it is not fair and equitable. Wife argues that the district

court should have held an evidentiary hearing, given these circumstances.

Motions in family-law cases generally “are decided without an evidentiary hearing,

unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.” Doering, 629 N.W.2d at

130 (quoting Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)). Minnesota courts have not yet defined “good

cause” in the context of motions to reopen dissolution judgments. See id.; see also

Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430. But this court has held that a district court may not resolve

a motion to reopen a dissolution judgment without an evidentiary hearing unless “there is

no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and . . . a determination of the applicable law

will resolve the controversy.” Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 130 (quotation omitted). When

determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required in this context, “the district court

may not weigh the evidence.” Id. “Instead, the district court must view the evidence in

2 Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion by “not schedul[ing] a hearing

before approving the [stipulated J&D].” Wife cites no authority to support this argument.
Accordingly, we decline to consider it. See Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65; Luthen, 596
N.W.2d at 283.

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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. “Whether to hold an evidentiary

hearing on a motion generally is a discretionary decision of the district court, which we

review for an abuse of discretion.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430. “But whether the

district court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law, which we review de

novo.” Id.

In denying wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D, the district court found that

“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [wife], . . . [wife]’s affidavit is

insufficient to present a fact question of fraud and/or excusable neglect.” Accordingly, the

district court found that there was “not good cause for an evidentiary hearing” on wife’s

motion to reopen the stipulated J&D. We agree with the district court.

Wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D was insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact about whether wife was entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D

based on fraud or excusable neglect. To support her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D,

wife submitted a brief affidavit; a county civil-commitment screening report, dated

December 7, 2022; and a civil-commitment order, dated December 20, 2022. The county

report stated that wife was placed on a 72-hour medical hold because of mental-health

issues exhibited on December 5, 2022. And wife’s affidavit stated that she “did not

understand the terms of the [j]oint [p]etition,” including her waiver of spousal maintenance,

because she “was having severe mental health problems” when the parties executed the

petition. At most, this evidence establishes that wife experienced mental-health issues

more than one month after the parties executed the joint petition. Without more, wife’s

bare assertion that she experienced these mental-health issues earlier is insufficient to

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create a genuine issue of material fact on the issues of fraud or excusable neglect. See

Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 132 (concluding that appellant’s detailed affidavits were

“sufficient to present a fact question of fraud” and that appellant therefore “established

good cause for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to reopen the judgment”). We thus

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife an evidentiary

hearing on her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D. See Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430.

D. Waiver of Spousal Maintenance

Wife next argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion

to reopen the stipulated J&D because the district court failed to consider whether the

parties’ waiver of spousal maintenance was fair and equitable considering the discrepancy

between the parties’ incomes. Wife also contends that the district court failed to make

necessary findings under Minnesota Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 5 (2022), which

governs “[p]rivate agreements” related to the waiver or restriction of spousal maintenance.

These arguments are unavailing.

Wife’s assertion that the district court failed to adequately consider the parties’

waiver of spousal maintenance fails because it is not properly before us. In making this

argument, wife challenges the district court’s entry of judgment on the parties’

stipulation—not the district court’s denial of wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D.

In Shirk, the supreme court held that a stipulation “merge[s]” into a judgment and decree

when the judgment and decree is based on the stipulation and “cannot thereafter be the

target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree.” 561 N.W.2d at

522. The supreme court then clarified that “[t]he sole relief from the judgment and decree

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lies in meeting the requirements of [section] 518.145, [subdivision] 2.” Id. As discussed

above, wife has not met the requirements of section 518.145, subdivision 2. Wife therefore

has not established that she is entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D and may not

challenge the district court’s decision to enter judgment on the parties’ stipulation.

E. Equitable Division of Assets

Lastly, wife contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her

motion to reopen the stipulated J&D because the district court did not fairly and equitably

divide the parties’ assets due to husband’s alleged failure to disclose wife’s purported

nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead and wife’s purported marital interest in

husband’s purported worker’s-compensation claims, husband’s purported personal-injury

claims, and husband’s 401(k) account. To support her argument, wife cites Minnesota

Statutes section 518.58 (2022), which requires the district court to “make a just and

equitable division of the marital property of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.

Wife also cites Pooley v. Pooley, where the supreme court held that a party could bring a

motion to reopen a dissolution judgment outside the one-year statute of limitations set forth

in section 518.145, subdivision 2, if the motion sought the equitable division of “major

assets” that were omitted from the dissolution judgment. 979 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn.

2022). Wife therefore appears to argue that her purported nonmarital interest in the parties’

homestead, and purported marital interest in certain assets of husband were “omitted” from

the stipulated J&D and the district court should have reopened the stipulated J&D to ensure

that these assets are equitably divided.

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 Once again, wife has not established that she is entitled to relief. As discussed

above, wife has presented no evidence to substantiate her purported nonmarital interest in

the parties’ homestead or her purported marital interest in husband’s purported legal claims

or husband’s 401(k). And the stipulated J&D expressly lists husband’s 401(k) as an asset

and explains how it should be divided between the parties. Thus, there is no basis for

concluding that the listed assets were “omitted” from the stipulated J&D or that the

stipulated J&D should be reopened to allow for their equitable division. See id. at 878-79

(reversing and remanding to allow district court to equitably divide parties’ assets that were

undisputedly omitted from dissolution judgment); Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65; Luthen,

596 N.W.2d at 283. We therefore decline to reverse the district court’s decision on this

basis.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion for
attorney fees.

Wife also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for attorney fees under

section 518.14, subdivision 1. We review a district court’s decision regarding attorney fees

for an abuse of discretion. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d at 767.

“Generally, attorney fees in dissolution cases are governed by [section] 518.14,

[subdivision] 1, which allows both need-based and conduct-based fee awards.” Geske v.

Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. App. 2001). A district court “shall” award need-

based attorney fees to a party if the district court finds that (1) the fees are necessary for

the recipient to make a good-faith assertion of their rights, (2) the payor has the means to

pay the fees, and (3) the recipient does not have the means to pay the fees. Minn.

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Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1; see also Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 816. A district court may award

conduct-based attorney fees “against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or

expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1; see also Geske, 624 N.W.2d at

818. The party seeking attorney fees under section 518.14, subdivision 1, bears the burden

of showing the propriety of the requested award. Phillips v. LaPlante, 823 N.W.2d 903,

907 (Minn. App. 2012) (need-based attorney fees); Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 819 (conduct-

based attorney fees).

The district court denied wife’s motion for attorney fees under section 518.14,

subdivision 1, because her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D “[had to] be denied.” Wife

argues that she was entitled to attorney fees under section 518.14, subdivision 1, because

she “satisfie[d] all statutory criteria for such an award.” We are not persuaded.

The record shows that wife has not met her burden under section 518.14,

subdivision 1. As for her request for need-based attorney fees, wife failed to prove that she

satisfied any of the statutory criteria for such an award, let alone all three criteria. See

Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1; see also Phillips, 823 N.W.2d at 907 (explaining that “[t]he

party seeking need-based attorney fees must prove” the three criteria set forth in section

518.14, subdivision 1). Regarding her request for conduct-based attorney fees, wife

similarly failed to establish that husband’s conduct during litigation “unreasonably

contribute[d] to the length or expense of the proceeding.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd.

1; see also Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 818-19. Because wife has not met her burden of proving

that she was entitled to need-based or conduct-based attorney fees under section 518.14,

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subdivision 1, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion for

attorney fees.

Affirmed.

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