In the Marriage of: Jarrid Daniel DeGolier v. Jessica Jean DeGolier Baron, ...

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0309

In the Marriage of:

Jarrid Daniel DeGolier, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jessica Jean DeGolier Baron,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-22-427

Whitney K. Sevilla, Tressler Law, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jessica Jean Baron, Anoka, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and

Schmidt, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

This appeal challenges the district court’s denial of appellant’s postdissolution

motions. Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying her motions as untimely

under Minnesota Statutes section 518.145 (2024) based on the district court’s conclusion
that appellant filed the motions more than one year after the judgment and decree. We

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Appellant Jessica Jean DeGolier Baron and respondent Jarrid Daniel DeGolier were

married in 1997. DeGolier filed for dissolution of their marriage in March 2022. Baron and

DeGolier had one child who was still a minor at the time of dissolution (daughter).

Daughter turned 18 years old in 2024.

In August 2023, the district court held a trial over disputed issues—legal and

physical custody, child support, parenting time, division of marital property, and spousal

maintenance. In a written decision, the district court awarded the parties joint legal custody

over daughter and awarded Baron sole physical custody. DeGolier was obligated to pay

$470 per month in child support, the marital property was divided, and both parties were

denied spousal maintenance. On November 16, 2023, the district court entered its judgment

and decree.

Baron moved for amended findings and order and sought increased child support;

one-half of DeGolier’s retirement account; amendments to the district court’s findings on

the parties’ assets, expenses, income, and budget; an award of spousal maintenance; an

offset to the equalizer payment Baron owed DeGolier; and a name change. After a hearing

in February 2024, the district court filed an amended-findings order on March 13, 2024,

granting Baron’s motion to change her name and denying all other motions.

On November 22, 2024, Baron’s attorney withdrew from representation, and Baron

represented herself in subsequent proceedings. On November 27, 2024, Baron moved the

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district court to “[e]nforce established child support to be paid in full and include 2022 and

2023, adjust[ed] to reflect [DeGolier’s] income” from 2022 through 2024 including

“medical and extra-curricular payments that have not been paid.” Baron’s motion also

sought to “[e]stablish spousal maintenance” and “address back child support owed from

2022 and 2023.” On the same day, Baron separately moved to modify child support and

award spousal maintenance.

On December 9, 2024, Baron again moved to modify child support and award

spousal maintenance. Along with this motion, Baron submitted an affidavit and eight

handwritten pages, each titled “Decree Flaws Supporting in Motion to Modify Child

Support and Spousal Maintenance.” That same day, Baron separately moved to use

DeGolier’s “bank statements provided to support and set child support income along with

pay stubs.” Baron alleged that DeGolier’s “taxes are incorrect and do not reflect deposits,”

and she repeated requests made in her November 27 motion. Also on December 9, Baron

moved for contempt proceedings against DeGolier for failure to pay child support.

On January 17, 2025, Baron moved the district court for discovery, requesting that

DeGolier “show the court evidence of schedule C write offs of self-employment on 2023

taxes” and include “proof of claimed vehicle ownership,” “proofs of vehicle expenses,”

and “proof of where and who continuous direct electronic deposits to [DeGolier’s] bank

account are from and what they are for.”

On the same day, Baron filed a response to a motion for attorney fees and costs

made by DeGolier, citing section 518.145, subdivision 2, and alleging, among other things,

that DeGolier provided false information to the district court regarding his income during

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the dissolution proceedings. Baron also asserted that daughter’s “disability certification

from the state . . . was not officially finalized” and her own spinal-stenosis diagnosis “was

not verified via MRI and Orthopedic” doctor until after the final dissolution hearing.

Baron filed another motion on January 21, 2025, again citing section 518.145,

subdivision 2, “requesting relief and justice” in her favor based on “proofs of [DeGolier]

lying in court [about] his income and assets” and alleging that DeGolier and his attorney

“created fraud and hid [DeGolier’s] income.” Baron also requested “some spousal

maintenance or benefit . . . due to [a] new finding of severe spinal stenosis.” And Baron

asked the district court to “grant [her] a true and correct real address for” DeGolier.

On January 23, 2025, Baron filed in district court a summary of all of her

outstanding motions, stating that she was seeking (1) payment of DeGolier’s past-due child

support; (2) payment of DeGolier’s past-due share of medical and hockey expenses related

to daughter; (3) modification of child support based on DeGolier’s income as documented

by deposits to his bank account; (4) payment for damage to the home security system

installed in the Duluth home awarded to DeGolier in the judgment and decree;

(5) reimbursement of property taxes that Baron paid in 2022 and 2023; (6) an award of half

of DeGolier’s retirement account; and (7) an award of spousal maintenance. In a separate

motion filed on the same day, Baron argued that she was entitled to reopen the judgment

and decree under section 518.145, subdivision 2.

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 On January 27, 2025, and after a hearing, the district court filed an order denying

Baron’s motions. In the order, the district court summarized the pending motions. 1 The

district court also identified Baron’s requests as seeking payment of DeGolier’s “past due

child support”; payment of DeGolier’s “past due share of medical and hockey expenses”;

modification of child-support payment amounts “based off” DeGolier’s “bank statements

[and] deposits”; payment for the home security system that was damaged when DeGolier

accessed the Duluth home; reimbursement of property taxes Baron paid in 2022 and 2023;

an award of half of DeGolier’s retirement account; and an award of spousal maintenance

because DeGolier “can afford spousal maintenance.”

The district court determined that Baron’s “various motions effectively ask the

Court to reopen” the parties’ judgment and decree and “reverse its findings on child support

and spousal maintenance.” The district court also stated, quoting section 518.145,

subdivision 2, that “[s]uch motions must be made within a reasonable time and ‘not more

than one year after the judgment and decree . . . was entered or taken.’” The district court

concluded that “the appropriate action for [Baron] to take, based on the contents of her

motions and the time elapsed since entry of the [judgment and decree], would have been

to pursue an appeal.” The district court denied each of Baron’s motions “as time-barred.”

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The district court’s order identified the following relevant motions: motion “to collect
unreimbursed or uninsured health care expenses”; notice “of intent to collect unreimbursed
or uninsured healthcare expenses” and motion for payment of the same; motion “to enforce
payment of child support, including back child support, in addition to determining
[DeGolier’s] income and establishing spousal maintenance”; motion to hold DeGolier “in
contempt of court and order to show cause”; and motion “to modify child support and/or
spousal maintenance.”

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The district court also gave Baron “notice that submission of motions seeking the same

relief (i.e., requesting reversal of the Court’s order as to child support or maintenance) in

the future may be met with sanctions.”

Baron appeals.

DECISION

Baron argues that the district court erred when it “ignored” three of her motions in

its January 27 order. 2 Baron also identifies 14 other issues in her principal brief. 3 Baron’s

briefs are difficult to understand. Still, we keep some principles in mind. A self-represented

litigant is “generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court

rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). “While an

appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court

rules, [she] is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the

court what it is [she] wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc.,

2
Baron’s principal brief identifies these motions: motion “for production of documents”
for DeGolier’s claim related to a “vehicle placed in service” on March 1, 2022, and
expenses on DeGolier’s “2022 taxes Schedule C”; motion for DeGolier’s “real address”;
and motion for reimbursement of “medical and extra-curricular expenses.”
3
Baron’s principal brief identifies these issues: (1) DeGolier’s “added income,” as
documented by “consistent monthly” direct deposits; (2) medical expenses and
extracurricular activity expenses not paid by DeGolier; (3) “The Court has been illuded”;
(4) DeGolier’s “income potential”; (5) daughter’s disabilities; (6) DeGolier “has
abandoned” daughter; (7) the marital home “is to be corrected in division of property”;
(8) “interest of properties”; (9) Baron’s expenses; (10) division of DeGolier’s retirement
account; (11) DeGolier’s “forgotten award of business”; (12) spousal maintenance;
(13) “determination of child support and spousal maintenance”; and (14) arrears on child
support and spousal maintenance. We understand Baron’s argument that “[t]he Court has
been illuded” to refer to her claims that DeGolier defrauded the district court during the
dissolution proceedings.

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400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987); see also Gruenhagen v. Larson, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569

(Minn. 1976) (stating that courts generally will not modify ordinary rules and procedures

because a self-represented party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney).

We understand Baron’s appeal to seek review of the district court’s order denying

her request to reopen the judgment and decree under section 518.145, subdivision 2.

Because Baron’s brief also appears to seek to reopen the amended-findings order, we

assume, without deciding, that section 518.145, subdivision 2, also provides relief from an

amended-findings order.

Appellate courts review the denial of a motion to reopen a judgment and decree for

abuse of discretion. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996). “A district

court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,

misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”

Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We review

de novo whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its decision.

Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. App. 2007).

“The sole relief from [a] judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of

Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997). Under

the statute, a “court may relieve a party from a judgment and decree, order, or proceeding”

for these reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59.03;

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 (3) fraud, whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment and decree or order upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment and decree or order should
have prospective application.

The motion must be made within a reasonable time, and
for a reason under clause (1), (2), or (3), not more than one year
after the judgment and decree, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken.

Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. A party may not reopen a judgment and decree for reasons

other than those five enumerated in section 518.145. See Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522.

We first decide which of the issues identified in Baron’s brief are not properly before

us. Generally, we will not consider issues not previously presented to and considered by

the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). We therefore analyze

which issues Baron raised on appeal, whether she presented those issues to the district

court, and whether the district court considered those issues, keeping in mind that Baron,

as a self-represented litigant, “is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately

communicating to the court what it is [she] wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter,

400 N.W.2d at 729.

Based on our careful review of the record, we identify three issues that are properly

before us: (1) Baron’s request to reopen the judgment and decree and the amended-findings

order to modify child support and award spousal maintenance, among other things;

(2) Baron’s request to enforce payment of child support, medical expenses, and

extracurricular expenses as provided in the judgment and decree; and (3) Baron’s motion

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to hold DeGolier in contempt. 4 We do not consider any issue related to the “forgotten award

of business,” DeGolier’s “income potential,” or whether DeGolier “has abandoned”

daughter because Baron failed to present these issues to the district court.

We also do not review issues that are not adequately briefed on appeal. Broehm v.

Mayo Clinic Rochester, 690 N.W.2d 721, 728 (Minn. 2005). Although Baron claims that

her request for DeGolier’s “real address” was “ignored” by the district court, she does not

include any argument related to this issue in her brief. Similarly, Baron does not make any

argument for reversing the district court’s denial of her request “for production of

documents for [DeGolier’s] claim of [a] vehicle placed in service” on March 1, 2022, and

“expenses on [DeGolier’s] 2022 taxes Schedule C.” Because Baron did not adequately

brief these issues, we do not address them.

We turn to the three issues Baron raises on appeal that Baron presented to and were

considered by the district court. We recognize that the district court denied all of Baron’s

motions as untimely under section 518.145, which provides that motions “must be made

within a reasonable time, and for a reason under clause (1), (2) or (3), not more than one

year after the judgment and decree.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. But the timing

requirement only applies to motions to reopen a judgment and decree or order for the five

reasons enumerated in the statute. And two of Baron’s motions—her motion to enforce

payments under the judgment and decree and her motion to hold DeGolier in contempt—

4
Though Baron does not include “contempt” in her list of issues on appeal, she argues
more than once in her appellate brief that DeGolier is “in contempt,” and therefore, we will
consider her motion to hold him in contempt as properly raised before us.

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did not seek relief for any of the five reasons enumerated under section 518.145. Thus, the

district court erred in denying these motions as untimely under that statute. We therefore

reverse the district court’s denial as to those two motions and remand for a decision by the

district court.

But Baron also filed three motions that asserted reasons enumerated in

section 518.145, subdivision 2: specifically, alleging that DeGolier defrauded the district

court, Baron had a recently diagnosed disability that entitled her to spousal maintenance,

and that her daughter’s disability was recently “certified” by the state, supporting

modification of child support. We conclude that all three of these motions related to

reason (1), (2), or (3) under section 518.145, subdivision 2. We therefore consider whether

the district court erred in denying these motions as untimely.

Section 518.145, subdivision 2, states that motions under this section “must be made

within a reasonable time, and for a reason under clause (1), (2), or (3), not more than one

year after the judgment and decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” 5 Baron

5
We read this language as unambiguously stating that one year is the maximum time in
which motions to reopen under section 518.145, subdivision 2(a)(1)-(3), will be permitted.
A district court may deny a motion to reopen under these provisions as untimely if it is
made within one year but not within a “reasonable time.” We conclude that two
nonprecedential opinions are persuasive on this point because they articulate a plain
reading of unambiguous statutory language. See Maxwell v. Winge Constr. Servs., Inc.,
No. A08-1353, 2009 WL 1751556, at *4 (Minn. App. June 23, 2009) (explaining that
motions filed within one year are not necessarily filed within a “reasonable time”); Stanton
v. Osgood, No. C7-92-2575, 1993 WL 173858, at *2 (Minn. App. May 25, 1993)
(“Motions made within a year are not automatically made within ‘a reasonable time.’”).
Here, while the district court concluded that Baron’s motions were untimely, it did not
specify whether the motions were filed more than one year after the judgment and decree
or outside of a “reasonable time.”

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argues that the motions she filed between November 27, 2024, and January 21, 2025,

challenged “both dates of the [judgment and decree] and the findings order, filed on

Nov. 24th, 2024, which is less than 1 year.” In her reply brief, Baron contends that the

district court erred in denying her motions as untimely because she filed her motions within

one year of the date that the district court filed its amended-findings order.

If Baron’s motions sought to reopen the amended-findings order, then Baron would

be correct that she made her motions “not more than one year” after the amended-findings

order. We are not convinced by Baron’s argument, however, because the substance of

Baron’s motions shows that she sought to reopen the judgment and decree and not the

amended-findings order. Along with Baron’s motion to modify child support and award

spousal maintenance, which she filed on December 9, 2024, Baron attached eight

handwritten pages, each captioned “Decree Flaws,” in which she challenged the district

court’s enumerated findings in the judgment and decree, not the amended-findings order.

The December 9 motions requested essentially the same relief as the motions she filed on

November 27. And the January 21, 2025 motion asked the court to “review and revise the

Divorce decree,” not the amended-findings order. While Baron references the

amended-findings order in her principal and reply briefs, she does not assert any error in

failing to reopen the amended-findings order. Thus, the record does not support Baron’s

claim that her motions sought to reopen the amended-findings order.

Finally, we separately discuss Baron’s motions that appear to describe changed

circumstances as a reason to modify child support and award spousal maintenance. See

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5b (2024) (governing modification of child support and

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spousal maintenance based on changed circumstances). The district court denied these

motions as untimely under section 518.145, subdivision 2, but that timing provision does

not govern motions based on changed circumstances. The district court’s error, however,

was harmless because neither motion stated a basis for modification. See Minn. R. Civ.

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279,

285 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 61 in a family appeal); cf. Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835,

839 (Minn. 1987) (noting appellate courts will not reverse a district court if it reached an

affirmable result for wrong reasons).

As for child support, Baron stated that her daughter’s disability was “certified” by

the state and asserted that this was new evidence, implying that it may also be a changed

circumstance. Baron does not argue that daughter’s disability has changed, however, and

the district court considered daughter’s disability in awarding child support in the judgment

and decree. Under the terms of the judgment and decree, child support to daughter ended

when she became 18 years old.

Baron’s motions also sought an award of spousal maintenance based on her recent

spinal-stenosis diagnosis. But Baron’s condition was diagnosed after the dissolution trial,

and Baron was not awarded spousal maintenance in the judgment and decree. See

McCarthy v. McCarthy, 196 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Minn. 1972) (stating that changed

circumstances will only permit a modification of spousal maintenance if spousal

maintenance is granted in the first place). Baron cannot obtain modification of spousal

maintenance that was never awarded. For that reason, we also reject Baron’s argument that

the judgment and decree should be modified to award her spousal maintenance because

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DeGolier “can afford spousal maintenance.” Thus, Baron’s motions to modify child

support and spousal maintenance did not provide any grounds for modification and the

district court properly rejected the motions, although for different reasons. See Katz,

408 N.W.2d at 839.

In sum, we reverse and remand the district court’s order denying Baron’s motion to

enforce payments under the judgment and decree and her motion to hold DeGolier in

contempt because neither motion was brought under section 518.145, subdivision 2, and

therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying those motions as untimely. But

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely

Baron’s motions to reopen the judgment and decree under section 518.145, subdivision 2.

Those motions raised grounds under clause (1), (2) or (3) but were filed more than one year

after the district court entered the judgment and decree. While the district court filed the

amended-findings order less than one year before these motions, Baron’s motions do not

seek to reopen the amended-findings order. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Baron’s motions to reopen.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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