In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B. Q.-R. H., AKA: B. Q. R. H. AKA: B. Q.-R. H. AKA: B. Q. R. H. and D. M. ...

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1608

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
B. Q.-R. H., AKA: B. Q. R. H. AKA: B. Q.-R. H. AKA: B. Q. R. H.
and D. M. S., AKA: D. M. S., Parents.

Filed April 29, 2024
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-22-8533

Daniel T. Donnelly, Donnelly Law Office, Austin, Minnesota (for appellant B.Q.-R.H.)

Mark Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Deanna Varga, Associate County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and Human
Services)

D.M.S., Rochester, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Jennifer Nguyen, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake,

Judge. ∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

ROSS, Judge

Police arrested appellant mother after she lashed her nine-year-old son’s bare torso,

arms, back, and legs more than 40 times with a belt inside a convenience store. Olmsted

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
County placed the boy in foster care and successfully petitioned the juvenile court to

transfer custody of the mother’s three-year-old daughter to the girl’s father. Mother

appeals, challenging the juvenile court’s bases for determining that the girl is in need of

protection or services, the juvenile court’s ultimate transfer-of-legal-custody conclusion,

and the juvenile court’s credibility findings. Because the mother identifies no error or abuse

of discretion in the juvenile court’s transfer-of-custody order and because we do not

second-guess a fact-finder’s credibility findings, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and Human Services became

involved with mother (B.Q.-R.H.) in January 2022 because of reports that her nine-year-

old son was attending school infrequently and that, when he did attend, he misbehaved,

including by chasing school staff with scissors and throwing chairs and desks in the

classroom. County staff learned that the boy often slept through the school day and

attributed his sleepiness to watching videos all night and caring for his then three-year-old

sister, who is the subject of this appeal, when mother worked overnight shifts. The county

assigned two social workers to assist mother. They helped mother develop a case plan,

which sought to address the following: the use of “physical discipline,” 1 mother’s trauma

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Throughout the record, social workers and the district court negatively refer to “physical
discipline,” which, for clarity, we understand in this case to mean excessive or
inappropriate physical discipline rather than physical discipline categorically. Our child-
protection laws safeguard against “child abuse,” which is defined as “an act that involves
a minor victim that constitutes a violation of” enumerated laws, including the provisions
that prohibit assault. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.007, subd. 5, 299C.61, subd. 4 (2022). But the
assault prohibitions include a corporal-punishment caveat. That is, Minnesota law provides
that “reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other’s

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and mental health, mother’s use of marijuana, and the children’s educational and medical

needs.

Police received a phone call from mother one afternoon in May 2022 exclaiming

that her son had run away and that she was going to hit him. She said that the boy had been

viewing inappropriate online content on mother’s phone and that he slapped her after she

took the phone away. The boy, shirtless, shoeless, and wearing shorts, ran into the

convenience store of a nearby gas station. The surveillance-camera footage from inside the

store captures what happens next from multiple vantage points. The child appears to

nervously wander around the aisles until mother and an acquaintance arrive. Mother,

wielding a belt, chases the boy around until she corners and catches him. She then begins

swinging the belt violently and rapidly at the boy, and he falls to his back in a somewhat

curled position, using his arms and legs to try to defend against the blows. With what

appears to be full force, mother strikes the boy with the belt again and again, more than 40

times, as he flails around in his unsuccessful defense. At one point, the video shows the

boy grabbing the end of the belt, but this only stalls the attack because mother then punches

consent when . . . used by a parent, guardian, teacher, or other lawful custodian of a child
or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to . . . correct such child or pupil.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.06, subd. 1(6) (2022). And applying child-protection laws, the supreme court has
been expressly “unwilling to establish a bright-line rule that the infliction of any pain
constitutes either physical injury or physical abuse, because to do so would effectively
prohibit all corporal punishment of children by their parents.” In re Welfare of Child. of
N.F., 749 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 2008). The N.F. court considered whether two parents’
paddling of their 12-year-old boy “on the back of the upper thighs with moderate force”
constituted either mental or physical injury to warrant adjudicating the child to be in need
of protection. Id. at 804. The court concluded, “[I]t is clear to us that the legislature did not
intend to ban corporal punishment.” Id. at 810.

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the boy until he releases the belt and she continues the thrashing. The beating left the child’s

body covered with marks and caused him to temporarily lose hearing in his right ear. The

video footage and photographs of the boy’s welts reveal that mother lashed his chest, arms,

back, and thighs.

County social workers took the boy to temporarily reside with his grandmother and

his sister to reside with respondent father (D.M.S.). The girl has remained there at least

through the time of this appeal.

The state charged mother with felony malicious punishment of a child and

misdemeanor domestic assault. The district court issued a domestic-abuse no-contact order,

prohibiting mother from any contact with the boy. Mother pleaded guilty to gross-

misdemeanor malicious punishment of a child.

The county petitioned the juvenile court in August 2022 to terminate mother’s

parental rights to the boy and to adjudicate the girl in need of protection or services. Before

a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services determination could be made, the county

petitioned the juvenile court to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of the girl to

father. Mother contested the petitions, and the juvenile court held a joint hearing on the

termination of mother’s parental rights to the boy and on the transfer of custody of the girl.

The proceedings were delayed, however, because midway through the hearing, the juvenile

court learned that mother’s attorney had failed to provide mother significant portions of

discovery. The juvenile court declared a mistrial, discharged mother’s attorney, and

appointed her new counsel.

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 The juvenile court conducted a second hearing in July 2023. The court received

testimony and other evidence from multiple witnesses, including mother, social workers, a

guardian ad litem, a parenting-time specialist, a behavioral coach, mother’s alcohol and

drug counselor, mother’s psychotherapist, mother’s probation officer, the boy’s mental-

health therapist, and three of the children’s relatives. The testimony revealed that, for the

most part, mother had failed to comply with the case plan or meaningfully participate in

any services provided to her in the process. Those services included parenting-time

sessions with the children, parenting coaching, drug counseling, and therapy. Mother’s

parenting visits with the children were “few and far between,” and when she did visit them,

she was often disengaged from the children or angry and hostile towards supervising social

workers. Forensic interviews with the children revealed that mother’s treatment of the boy

captured on video was not unique, as she regularly “whoops” the boy with a shoe or a belt.

The boy said that he prefers some belts more than others and that he hid an especially

painful belt so that mother had to use a less-painful one.

Mother’s testimony tended to blame her parental deficiencies on her mental-heath

struggles, which she said result from traumatic life experiences. The evidence,

corroborated by her own testimony and that of other witnesses, indicated that she smokes

marijuana throughout the day and continually smells of it. Although she claimed that she

smoked marijuana in her bedroom or closet but not in front of the children, multiple

witnesses testified that the children regularly smelled like marijuana. Mother defended her

lack of effort on the case plan by asserting that she had the impression that her children

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would never be returned to her care and that efforts to meet the case plan’s goals would be

futile.

The children’s guardian ad litem testified that, after viewing the girl’s father parent

her, she has no concerns with the girl’s placement with him. The guardian ad litem also

testified that she does not believe mother is presently capable of being a parent, as

evidenced by her failure to comply with the case plan, her constant marijuana use, and her

lack of parenting skills. The case workers opined that it would be unsafe for the children

to return to mother’s care.

The juvenile court determined the girl to need protection or services. It also ordered

custody of the girl permanently transferred to father. Mother appeals those decisions. The

juvenile court also terminated mother’s parental rights to the boy, and that termination is

the subject of a different appeal before this court.

DECISION

Mother raises three arguments on appeal. She first challenges the juvenile court’s

determination that the girl needs protection or services. She next argues that the juvenile

court abused its discretion by permanently transferring custody of the girl to father. And

she argues third that the juvenile court violated her due-process rights by making credibility

findings without sufficient reasoning. None of her arguments persuades us to reverse.

I

Mother contests only one of the various grounds on which the juvenile court

determined that the girl is in need of protection or services. The district court may

adjudicate a child in need of protection or services if it finds by clear and convincing

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evidence that one of several statutory bases exist to support the decision. See Minn. Stat.

§§ 260C.007, subd. 6, 260C.163, subd. 1(a) (2022); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.03. The

county here asserted three statutory grounds for adjudicating the girl in need of protection

or services, specifically, that the girl resided with a victim of child abuse, that she resided

with a perpetrator of child abuse, and that she lacked the necessary parental care due to

mother’s emotional and mental instability, relying on Minnesota Statutes section

260C.007, subdivision 6(2)(ii), (2)(iii), and (8), respectively. The juvenile court found that

the county proved all three bases, and mother now challenges only the third basis, which

required the county to prove that the child “is without proper parental care because of the

emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the child’s parent,

guardian, or other custodian.” Minn. Stat. § 260.007, subd. 6(8). Because mother does not

challenge the juvenile court’s determination as to the other two alternative bases on which

it made its decision, we would have no reason to reverse even if she convinced us that the

juvenile court erroneously relied on the sole challenged ground. We consider her argument

on this point no further.

II

Mother next contends that the juvenile court erroneously transferred custody of the

girl to father. The juvenile court may issue an order permanently transferring custody only

by clear and convincing evidence and on findings addressing four circumstances:

(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;

(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social services
agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the
parent or guardian . . . ;

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 (3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use services to
correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement;
and

(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement
have not been corrected so that the child can safely return
home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2022); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1

(establishing standard of proof). We review a juvenile court’s factual findings for clear

error and its finding of a statutory basis for the order for an abuse of discretion. In re

Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn.

July 20, 2015). When reviewing a juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error, we assess

the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, do not find our own facts, do not

reweigh the evidence, and do not reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of

Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221–22 (Minn. 2021); In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968

N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney to a review of a juvenile-

protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). Mother challenges the juvenile court’s

findings on each factor.

Mother first challenges the juvenile court’s finding that a permanent transfer of legal

and physical custody is in the girl’s best interests. As a threshold matter, mother contends

that the best-interests factors in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b)

(2022), and not section 260C.511, guide the analysis. But section 260C.212 “is limited to

the situation in which a social-services agency is selecting an out-of-home placement,” and

no statutes governing permanency dispositions reference it. In re Welfare of Child. of

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J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. App. 2021) (citing Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b)

(2020)), rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 2021). We are bound by our precedent in J.C.L., State

v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010),

and we therefore apply Minnesota Statutes section 260C.511 (2022) to mother’s best-

interests challenge.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the girl’s best

interests were served by permanently transferring legal and physical custody to father. The

best interests of the child is the paramount consideration in every juvenile-protection

proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2022). In permanency proceedings, “best

interests of the child” includes all relevant factors. Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a). This includes

the relationship between the child and relatives, between the child and other key persons

the child has lived with, and between the child and others with whom she has had

significant contact. Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b). Based on the relevant relationships, mother

argues that the juvenile court failed to recognize that the gas-station beating was a one-

time incident involving only the boy and that the girl has a special bond with mother. The

argument fails.

Mother’s assertions misstate the record and ask us to reweigh the evidence. The trial

evidence included testimony from which the juvenile court could find that the gas-station

incident was not a unique occurrence. Both the children told social workers that the boy

had been “whoop[ed]” on multiple occasions. And the violence of this supposed one-time

incident demonstrated such a shocking and unrestrained disregard for the physical and

emotional wellbeing of one vulnerable child in mother’s care that the juvenile court could

9
not reasonably ignore the risk mother poses to the other vulnerable child in her care. And

although the girl may have a special bond with mother, she was only four years old at the

time of trial, meaning that she had spent nearly half her life with her father. The juvenile

court received abundant evidence that, with father, the girl had been living in a safe and

loving home and that father was appropriately invested in the educational, emotional,

physical, and other needs of the girl. We will not reweigh the evidence. See Kenney, 963

N.W.2d at 221–22. The juvenile court weighed the evidence and based its findings on that

evidence. In doing so it considered the girl’s relationship with both mother and father,

analyzed mother’s harmful conduct, and reasoned that transferring custody met the girl’s

best interests. The finding is amply supported.

Mother questions the juvenile court’s conclusion that the county proved by clear

and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the girl with mother.

Whether the county made reasonable efforts towards reunification “depends on the

problem presented.” In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008).

The juvenile court considered the factors listed by statute as relevant to whether the county

made reasonable efforts, as outlined in Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(h) (2022). It

discussed the eight services the county offered mother and concluded that they were

“appropriate, reasonable, available, and necessary.” The juvenile court also found that

mother’s unwillingness to engage with the county made “reunification difficult at best” but

that the efforts made were nevertheless reasonable.

Mother insists instead that the county’s efforts were a “sham,” in part because the

county failed to offer family reunification therapy. Mother’s contention arises from one of

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the social worker’s testimony at trial. The social worker testified, “[I]t is the agency’s

position that with respect to [the boy] after the assault that we had to file for the

[termination of parental rights]. But, again, we don’t know what the future is, so we always

want to make sure that we’re working towards reunification.” Mother contends that this

testimony proves that she could have followed the case plan perfectly and still never have

been reunified with the girl. Mother’s contention presents only a hypothetical

circumstance, implying that we should reverse based on how the case might have turned

out had she followed the case plan. The county offered mother numerous services that she

mostly rejected. This included assisting her with scheduling and planning, helping her

address her drug abuse, providing her a phone to better communicate with the county,

offering her mental-health therapy, and recommending books and videos on proper

parenting. The county also offered mother parenting time with the girl even after the no-

contact order prohibited her contact with the boy, and mother did little to avail herself of

this opportunity. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the

county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the girl.

Mother relatedly challenges the juvenile court’s finding that she lacked the effort to

correct the conditions leading to the girl’s out-of-home placement. She points to her

positive attendance with her probation officer, but this attendance had no bearing on her

ability to parent or on the conditions requiring county involvement. The evidence supports

the district court’s finding that mother’s routine marijuana impairment would not change

because she exhibited no interest in abstaining. It was her lack of parenting skills that

precipitated the out-of-home placement, and the record has plentiful support for the finding

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that those deficient skills remained unchanged due to her lack of demonstrated interest in

engaging in the services the county offered to counter her parental shortcomings.

It may be, as mother asserts, that she maintained stable housing and employment

throughout the proceedings. But the record does not suggest that the county was concerned

about any lack of housing or employment. The case plan sought to address mother’s

abusive so-called discipline, her trauma, her mental health, her use of marijuana, and the

children’s educational and medical needs. The juvenile court explained why it concluded

that she had not addressed those issues, and its explanation finds support in the record.

III

Mother argues finally that the juvenile court violated her right to due process by

failing to adequately explain why it found some witnesses credible and others not credible.

She nowhere identifies the source of this alleged right. Her argument therefore fails for

lack of legal support. See State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Witntz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558

N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address inadequately briefed question);

Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (noting that inadequately briefed

questions are not properly before an appellate court); In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577,

586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying Wintz in a juvenile-protection appeal), rev. denied

(Minn. Apr. 15, 2003); In re Welfare of Child of L.M.L., 730 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Minn. App.

2007) (applying Melina in a juvenile-protection matter). We add that the juvenile court

clearly summarized the testimony of each witness and expressly indicated whether it found

each witness’s testimony credible. This meets the admonition that a juvenile court’s

findings are lacking when they “merely recite[] or summarize[]” testimony without

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determining the credibility of witnesses. In re Welfare of M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239

(Minn. 1990). We agree that informing the parties why some testimony (or witness) is

credible and others are not would more comprehensively explain a trial court’s fact-finding

rationale. But we are aware of no authority suggesting that findings of fact are subject to

reversal when they lack a credibility explanation. Mother’s credibility-sufficiency

challenge fails.

Affirmed.

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