In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: T. M. A. and M. J. R., Parents

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0171

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: T. M. A. and M. J. R., Parents.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-JV-23-1873

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant-father
T.M.A.)

Jacob P. Fauchald, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Chief Assistant County
Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent Itasca County Health and Human
Services)

Rachel Hughes, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.

SYLLABUS

An order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a child under

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 (2022) does not violate a parent’s substantive due-

process rights to freedom of contract.

OPINION

EDE, Judge

In this appeal from an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of

appellant’s child, appellant argues (1) that the district court abused its discretion in issuing

the transfer-of-custody order and (2) that the order violates appellant’s procedural and

substantive due-process rights. We affirm.
 FACTS

Prior to January 2024, appellant T.M.A. (father) had sole legal and physical custody

of his son (the child), who was born in 2007 and has type 1 diabetes.

Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) Proceedings

In July 2022, Itasca County Social Services Agency (the agency) filed a CHIPS

petition. A district court ruled that the petition alleged a prima facie case of endangerment

and that there was factual support to order removal of the child from father’s custody on

an ex parte emergency basis. The allegations included information that medical providers

at a hospital found the child to be malnourished and exhibiting symptoms consistent with

high blood sugar levels. Several months later, the district court granted the agency’s motion

to dismiss the petition.

On November 7, 2022, the agency filed another CHIPS petition. The same day, the

district court in that matter held an emergency protective-care hearing. Neither parent

appeared. The district court again ruled that the agency had made a prima facie showing

that the child was in need of protection or services. In addition, the district court determined

that it was contrary to the welfare of the child to be returned home and that placement

outside the home was in the child’s best interests.

The district court held a pretrial conference in December 2022. Again, neither parent

appeared. Through default proceedings held in father’s absence, 1 the district court

adjudicated the child to be in need of protection or services under Minnesota Statutes

1
See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 18.01, .02 (addressing a party’s failure to appear in a juvenile-
protection matter and default orders).

2
section 260C.007, subdivisions 6(3), (8), and (9) (2022). The district court approved an

out-of-home-placement plan (case plan) and directed the agency to implement it. The case

plan set forth several tasks for father to complete. Father was to remain sober, submit to

random drug testing, complete a chemical-health evaluation, permit announced and

unannounced visits, participate in mental-health services, contact his social worker weekly,

and ensure that the child was attending school.

In May 2023, the district court held a permanency progress review hearing.

Following that hearing, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an

order in which it found that father had made no progress on the tasks outlined in the case

plan. Father had failed to submit to random drug tests, complete a chemical-health

evaluation and follow any resulting recommendations, permit visits to his home, and

maintain safe, stable, and chemically free permanent housing for himself and the child. The

district court determined that it was appropriate for the agency to file a permanency

petition.

Permanency Proceedings

In July 2023, the agency petitioned to terminate father’s parental rights. After an

admit/deny hearing, the district court ruled that the agency had made a prima facie showing

that, following the child’s placement outside the home, reasonable efforts, under the

direction of the court, had failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.

In August 2023, the agency filed an amended petition requesting that—rather than

terminate father’s parental rights—the district court transfer permanent legal and physical

custody of the child to proposed custodians, who are the child’s relatives and with whom

3
the child was placed after the child’s court-ordered removal from father’s custody. The

agency also filed a social worker’s affidavit that outlined the factual basis for the agency’s

request, which we summarize as follows.

The social worker asserted that the best interests of the child would be served by a

transfer of custody for these reasons: the child needed a caregiver who could meet his needs

on a consistent basis; the child had medical, chemical-health, and mental-health needs that

required consistent follow-up appointments; and the child needed a caregiver who was able

to demonstrate safe and stable behaviors, as well as provide constant guidance and

oversight for the child’s diabetic care. The social worker detailed concerns that father

lacked knowledge about diabetes and that father did not understand how to ensure that the

child’s diabetic needs were met.

The social worker noted that, after the district court placed the child outside the

home, father was unwilling to engage in reunification planning or compliance with the case

plan to remedy the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. The social worker

also described offering services to father several times, which father declined based on his

belief that he did not need additional support. And the social worker said that father was

unresponsive to calls or text messages throughout the case and was unwilling to work with

the agency to assess what steps he could take to reunify with the child.

In addition, the social worker discussed her meetings with the child throughout

2023. According to the affidavit, the child stated during each meeting that he supported his

placement outside the home and would like to stay with his proposed custodians. The child

also said that he felt well cared for by the custodians and that “his diabetes was managed

4
better than it had ever been[.]” And although the child was hospitalized because of

diabetes-related complications in May 2023, the affidavit asserted that one of the child’s

custodians immediately responded to the child’s needs, attended all doctor appointments,

and participated in diabetic-education meetings.

The permanency matter proceeded to trial in September 2023. On the first day of

trial, father moved the district court for a continuance because he had “insufficient time to

review documents.” The district court denied father’s request.

The agency presented testimony from the prospective custodians, a school-based

therapist, the social worker, and the child’s mother. Father presented testimony from the

child’s step-grandfather, the child’s paternal grandfather, the child’s paternal grandmother,

and father’s lifelong friend. The district court also heard testimony from father, the child,

and the child’s guardian ad litem.

Father testified that, under the Constitution, he has “the right to not contract with an

agency that is in direct violation of [his] rights.” Father claimed that “the agency’s contract

offer”—referring to a chemical-health component of the case plan—“was unreasonable.”

He also admitted that he was unwilling to communicate with the social worker about the

case plan.

In October 2023, the district court filed an order transferring permanent legal and

physical custody of the child to the proposed custodians. But the district court deferred

finalization of the order to determine eligibility of the proposed custodians for Northstar

kinship assistance, which “provides medical coverage and reimbursement of nonrecurring

expenses associated with obtaining permanent legal and physical custody of a child . . . .”

5
In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 2 N.W.3d 328, 329 n.1 (Minn. App. 2024). The district

court explained that it would later hold a hearing to review the status of the Northstar

kinship assistance determinations. Id. at 329.

In the transfer-of-custody order, the district court explained its decision that

transferring custody was in the best interests of the child. The district court made specific

findings supporting its best-interests determination, including that the child’s “current

functioning and behaviors [had] improved since residing in the foster home” and that the

“foster parents [had] worked to gain the specialized knowledge necessary to best support

the child’s ongoing diabetic condition.” The district court also made specific factual

findings about the steps that the agency took to reunify the child with father, determining

that the agency’s “continued efforts to engage [f]ather in working the [case plan]

constituted ‘reasonable efforts’ pursuant to [Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517,

subdivision (a)(2) (2022),] where [f]ather repeatedly refused to participate or offer any

evidence that the allegations raised by the CHIPS petition had been remedied within the

home.” Moreover, the district court found that the agency “continued to try and engage

[f]ather in the [case plan] throughout the life of the case” and that the agency “did all that

it could do to involve [f]ather in reunification efforts.” And the district court determined

that there “was no evidence [that] any of the conditions which led to the out-of-home

placement were corrected . . . so that the child [could] safely return home.”

Before the district court finalized its order, and while its determination of eligibility

for Northstar kinship assistance remained pending, father appealed. Id. at 329-30. We

dismissed that appeal in a special term opinion, concluding that father had appealed from

6
an order that was neither final nor appealable. Id. at 330-31. In January 2024, following

our dismissal of father’s first appeal, the district court vacated the deferment it had ordered

and deemed its October 2023 order final.

Father again appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering the transfer of permanent legal
and physical custody?

II. Did the transfer-of-custody order violate father’s procedural and substantive due-
process rights?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the transfer of
permanent legal and physical custody.

Father contends that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the transfer-

of-custody order. As explained below, father’s arguments do not persuade us to reverse.

On appeal from an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a

child, this court “review[s] the [district] court’s factual findings for clear error and its

finding of a statutory basis for the order for abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of

D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). When

reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the findings, do not find their own facts, do not reweigh the evidence, do

not reconcile conflicting evidence, and “need not go into an extended discussion of the

evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” In

re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted);

7
see also In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021)

(applying Kenney to a review of a juvenile-protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6,

2021). In conducting clear-error review, “an appellate court’s duty is fully performed after

it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably

supports the decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). A district court

abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies

the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on

record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022); see also D.L.D., 865

N.W.2d at 322 (“A district court abuses its discretion if it improperly applies the law.”

(quotation omitted)).

“In a permanency proceeding under sections 260C.503 to 260C.521 of the

Minnesota Statutes, a district court may order any one of six dispositions.” In re Welfare

of Child of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12,

2021). “One of the possible dispositions is a transfer of permanent legal and physical

custody ‘to a fit and willing relative.’” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2020))

(other citation omitted). A transfer-of-custody order must include detailed findings about:

(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social services
agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the
parent . . . where reasonable efforts are required;
(3) the parent’s . . . efforts and ability to use services to correct
the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement; and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement
have not been corrected so that the child can safely return
home.

8
Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) (2022). “Each of these four statutory requirements must

be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 656; see also Minn.

R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1 (providing that “[i]n a permanency matter other than a

termination of parental rights matter, the standard of proof is clear and convincing

evidence”).

Below, we address each of father’s challenges to the district court’s findings about

the above statutory requirements and the court’s determination that clear and convincing

evidence supports its transfer-of-custody order.

A. Best Interests

Father challenges the district court’s determination that placement with the

proposed custodians is in the child’s best interests. He asserts that the district court clearly

erred in finding that “the home of the proposed custodians was a safer, more stable

environment than” his home and that the court abused its discretion by relying on those

facts in support of its best-interests ruling. In particular, father questions the district court’s

determinations because “the child had been in intensive care due to severe symptoms of

his type 1 diabetes . . . while in the care of the proposed custodians” and “the child was

continuing to smoke cannabis, use a vape pen, and drink alcohol while in the home of the

proposed custodians.”

“The paramount consideration in all proceedings for permanent placement of the

child under sections 260C.503 to 260C.521 . . . is the best interests of the child.” Minn.

Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3 (2022). “The ‘best interests of the child’ means all relevant

9
factors to be considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2022). “In making a

permanency disposition order . . . the court must be governed by the best interests of the

child, including a review of the relationship between the child and relatives and the child

and other important persons with whom the child has resided or had significant contact.”

Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b) (2022). Here, the record evidence supports the district court’s

finding that the proposed custodians’ residence was more stable than father’s home and its

resulting ruling that it is in the child’s best interests “to be placed in the permanent care,

custody, and control” of the proposed custodians.

Before filing the underlying transfer-of-custody petition, the agency had filed a

CHIPS petition in July 2022. Although a district court ultimately dismissed that CHIPS

petition, it first ruled that the petition made a prima facie showing that endangerment

existed because the child had presented at a hospital as malnourished and with high blood

sugar levels.

In November 2022, father reported the child as a runaway. After the child was

located, the agency met with the child, and the child reported that he had been out of the

home for about a month and that father did not check on him during that time. The child

also reported that “there [was] not much food in” father’s home. The agency filed the

second CHIPS petition and the district court ultimately determined that the agency had

established that a juvenile-protection matter existed. In later meetings with the agency, the

child consistently expressed a desire to continue to live with the proposed custodians. The

child also reported that his diabetes was being managed and that he felt well cared for by

the custodians.

10
 During the permanency trial, the social worker testified that the child had struggled

with “sporadic use” of marijuana. But the social worker nonetheless stated that the

proposed custodians were “addressing the concerns as they [arose] and as they’re made

aware of it[.]” According to the social worker, the proposed custodians had “stepped up”

and were “willing to do whatever [was] necessary to follow any sort of recommendations

for [the child],” as well as do “whatever it takes to make sure they’re fully educated in [the

child’s] needs.” The social worker said that, since being placed with the custodians, the

child’s school attendance had improved and the child had been working with a recovery

specialist to address his substance use. And the social worker testified that the child’s need

for a safe and stable environment would not be met if the child reunified with father.

Despite the child’s ongoing issues with substance use, father himself testified that

the custodians had the child’s best interests at heart and that they had done a good job in

caring for the child. Father also stated that the child had been doing better recently and that

the custodians properly managed the child’s medical issues. Father’s testimony aligns with

record evidence that, at the time the child was hospitalized in May 2023 because of

diabetes-related complications, one of the proposed custodians had responded immediately

to the child’s needs, brought the child to the emergency room, and notified the social

worker, their supervisor, and the guardian ad litem. The record likewise reflects that the

proposed custodian attended all medical appointments and diabetic-education meetings

during the child’s three-day hospital stay.

Finally, the child testified that, although he would “love” to be reunited with father,

he felt that he would “fall behind again in everything” if he and father were reunified. The

11
child also said that the proposed custodians have done “an awesome job” helping him with

his diabetic condition, that he would like to stay with the proposed custodians, and that he

thinks that remaining with the proposed custodians would be the best thing for him. See

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (2022) (providing that “the factors the agency shall

consider in determining the current and future needs of the child” include “the reasonable

preference of the child, if the court, or the child-placing agency in the case of a voluntary

placement, deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preferences”).

Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did

not clearly err in finding that the proposed custodians’ home provided a more stable

environment for the child. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in ruling—based on its reasonably supported factual findings—that transferring

permanent legal and physical custody from father to the proposed custodians is in the best

interests of the child.

B. Reasonable Efforts

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that the agency

made reasonable efforts to reunify father and the child. Father contends that the social

worker’s efforts were “perfunctory and not aimed toward any true reunification” of father

with the child.

Under Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(a) (2022), reasonable efforts “for

rehabilitation and reunification are always required” except under circumstances not

applicable here. As noted above, in an order permanently placing the child out of the home,

a district court must make “detailed findings” about “the nature and extent of the

12
responsible social services agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the

parent or guardian where reasonable efforts are required[.]” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2).

Here, in determining that the agency’s efforts were reasonable, the district court

found that the agency drafted the case plan, attempted to work with father to implement it,

and continued to engage father in the case plan throughout the length of the case. The

district court also found that, “[u]nder the circumstances, the [a]gency did all that it could

to involve [f]ather in reunification efforts. Unfortunately, [f]ather chose not to cooperate

or comply with those efforts.” The district court’s findings are reasonably supported by the

record.

In the affidavit accompanying the transfer-of-custody petition, the social worker

stated that father was “offered a case plan on multiple occasions and refuse[d] to sign or

follow through with supports or regular communication with the agency.” The social

worker noted that father had been “unreachable,” and she detailed the many occasions in

which she had tried to contact father. And the social worker explained that father was

“unwilling to work with the agency to assess the conditions” of reunification and that he

rejected the agency’s services.

At trial, the social worker testified that the agency sought to engage father in

preparing the case plan, but father was unwilling to discuss the matter. According to the

social worker, father failed to follow through regarding the items outlined in the case plan

after the district court adopted it. To the social worker’s knowledge, father had not followed

through with the court-ordered mental- and chemical-health tasks, chemical testing,

parenting skills, visitation, and maintaining consistent contact with the social worker. The

13
social worker could not determine whether the conditions were corrected because “there

was no level of communication or cooperation” from father.

In his own testimony, father conceded that he was unwilling to communicate with

the social worker despite the worker’s efforts to contact him throughout the case. Father

also expressed his belief that he did not “have to jump through [the agency’s] hoops” or

comply with components of the case plan.

Given this record, we conclude that the district court’s factual findings underlying

its statutory determination that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify father with

the child were reasonably supported by the evidence. And we conclude that the district

court’s reasonable-efforts ruling was not an abuse of discretion.

C. Failure to Correct Conditions that Led to Out-of-Home Placement

Father disputes the district court’s ruling that placement with the proposed

custodians was warranted based on his failure to correct the conditions that led to the

child’s out-of-home placement and his decision not to cooperate with the case plan.

“[A] case plan that has been approved by the district court is presumptively

reasonable.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 388 (Minn. 2008). And

“[a] parent’s failure to comply with a reasonable case plan results in a presumption that the

parent has failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement.” In re Welfare

of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012).

In support of its ruling that father failed to correct the conditions that led to the

child’s out-of-home placement, the district court made the following factual findings: that

“none of the requirements of the [case plan had] been met by [f]ather”; that “[t]here was

14
no evidence [that] any of the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement were

corrected”; that father acknowledged that he made the choice not to follow the case plan;

that father was familiar with mental- and chemical-health assessments but decided not to

participate in either for this case; that father “refused to communicate about his lifestyle,

home environment and relationship with the child”; that there was no way to verify father’s

compliance with the case plan because of his refusal to cooperate; and that the social

worker testified that she had no knowledge whether father completed “any of the items on

the [case plan].” These findings are supported by the record.

At a December 2022 hearing, the district court approved the case plan, thereby

raising the presumption that the case plan was reasonable. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 388.

And father’s undisputed failure to comply with that presumptively reasonable case plan in

turn “results in a presumption that [father] . . . failed to correct the conditions leading to

[the child’s] out-of-home placement.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87.

Presumptions aside, the social worker testified at the permanency trial that father

failed to follow through with the tasks outlined in the case plan. The social worker also

noted that father told her he would not “contract” with her, meaning that father was

“unwilling to sign or participate in any services or supports that” the agency offered him.

Consistent with the social worker’s testimony, father stated that he did not have to

comply with the case plan. Father explained that he did not want to submit to drug testing

because “that would be contracting in a deal that [he did not] want to sign” and it was his

right “to not incriminate [himself].” This did not stem from father’s inability “to use

services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement[.]” Minn. Stat.

15
§ 260C.517(a)(3). Indeed, father admitted that, in a previous CHIPS case, he had submitted

to drug testing to dispel allegations about his failure to maintain sobriety even though the

district court had not ordered that he do so. Father similarly acknowledged that the case

plan required that he participate in mental-health services, but he did not do so despite his

familiarity with the process. Father admitted that he was unwilling to communicate with

the social worker and that he felt that he did not “have to jump through [the agency’s]

hoops[.]” On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in ruling

that father did not correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.

Father also suggests that the district court should not have relied on his lack of

cooperation in deciding to issue the transfer-of-custody order. But the district court did not

transfer custody of the child solely or even primarily based on father’s failure to provide

information to the agency. Instead, the district court transferred custody because the trial

evidence supported its statutory findings: (1) that the child’s best interests are served by

the transfer-of-custody order; (2) that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the

child with father; (3) that—despite his ability to do so—father made no efforts to use

services to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement; and (4) that

the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement had not been corrected so that the

child could safely return home. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4). In addition, the

district court issued the transfer-of-custody order because it found that the proposed

custodians were fit, willing, and suitable to provide for the child’s needs. See Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.515, subd. 4 (2022).

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 In sum, father has not shown that the district court misapplied the law in issuing the

transfer-of-custody order. Additionally, even considering the clear-and-convincing

standard of proof required in juvenile-protection matters, reasonable evidence supports the

district court’s findings of fact, and we are not otherwise left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake occurred. Thus, the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly

erroneous. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 322. Further, because those findings of fact support

the district court’s order transferring of permanent legal and physical custody of the child,

the order is not contrary to logic and the facts on record. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506;

see also J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 656. Thus, we conclude that the district court’s decision to

issue the transfer-of-custody order did not result from an abuse of discretion. See D.L.D.,

865 N.W.2d at 322.

II. The transfer-of-custody order did not violate father’s procedural and
substantive due-process rights. 2

Father asserts that the order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of

the child violated his procedural due-process rights for three reasons: (A) the district court

in the separate CHIPS matter did not provide him with notice of the emergency protective-

care hearing, the 72-hour hold, or the CHIPS petition, as required by Minnesota Rule of

Juvenile Protection Procedure 40.04; (B) the district court in the permanency case

2
“Procedural due process analyzes whether fair procedures were used in depriving an
individual of life, liberty, or property.” In re Welfare of Child of F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d
525, 537 n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 5, 2024). “Substantive due process bars ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful
government actions, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”
Id. (quoting Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999)).

17
underlying this appeal denied father’s motion for a continuance of the trial on the transfer-

of-custody petition; and (C) the delay in the finalization of the permanency order

“substantially affected” father’s “right to bring a timely appeal.” Father also maintains that

the order (D) violates his substantive due-process rights to freedom of contract. Father’s

arguments lack merit.

We begin by addressing the standard of review that applies to father’s procedural

due-process claims, which we discuss below in sections II.A through II.C. 3 “Whether a

parent’s due-process rights have been violated in a [permanency] proceeding is a question

of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” In re Welfare of Child of D.F., 752

N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. 2008). “The parent-child relationship is among the fundamental

rights protected by the constitutional guarantees of due process.” Id. “Due process requires

reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the opportunity

to present evidence, the right to an impartial decision-maker, and the right to a reasonable

decision based solely on the record.” Id. “Although the amount of process due in a

particular case varies with the unique circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of

the alleged violation is an essential component of the due process analysis.” Id. (quotation

omitted).

We analyze each of father’s procedural and substantive due-process arguments in

turn.

3
We set forth the applicable standard of review that governs father’s substantive due-
process claim below, in section II.D.

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 A. Notice in Separate CHIPS Matter

First, father contends that his rights to procedural due process were violated because

he was not given notice of the emergency protective-care hearing, the 72-hour hold, and

the CHIPS petition.

This argument challenges the underlying juvenile-protection proceedings, in which

the district court determined that the child was in need of protection or services. Father

could have appealed that decision. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.N., 523 N.W.2d 11, 12

(Minn. App. 1994) (appeal from default CHIPS adjudication), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 29,

1994). But—as conceded by father’s appellate counsel at oral argument and as shown by

the lack of any appellate proceeding challenging the CHIPS determination—father did not.

Because father did not appeal the district court’s CHIPS adjudication, we decline to

consider his procedural due-process challenge to the district court’s provision of notice in

that case. See Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (“Even though the decision

of the trial court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is

still final after the time for appeal has expired.”); see also In re Welfare of Child of B.G.,

No. A16-1512, 2017 WL 958476, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 13, 2017) (applying this aspect

of Dieseth in a permanency appeal). 4

B. Continuance of Permanency Trial

Second, father maintains that the district court violated his rights to procedural due

process by denying his motion for a continuance of the trial on the agency’s petition to

4
We cite nonprecedential opinions herein as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c).

19
transfer permanent legal and physical custody. Father explains that he moved for a

continuance on the grounds that he had been served with additional disclosures, an

amended permanency petition, and motions in limine, and he asserts that the district court

improperly denied his motion merely because all parties were present and ready to proceed

with trial. Father contends that his continuance motion was reasonable and that the district

court should have granted it based on the close timing of the amended petition and the

exhibit disclosures to the commencement of trial.

Appellate courts “generally review a district court’s refusal to continue or

reschedule a hearing for a future date for abuse of discretion[.]” In re Welfare of Child. of

G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d 222, 236 (Minn. 2023). But there “is a point when a denial of a

continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In assessing

whether that line has been crossed in a particular case, [appellate courts] look at the reasons

offered by the party seeking a continuance when the request for more time [was] made.”

Id.

On September 13, 2023—the first day of the permanency trial—the child’s attorney

explained that he had intended to file six motions in limine on September 6, all relating to

how the child would testify, but he did not file them until the day before trial or the day of

trial. The child’s attorney had, however, discussed the motions with the district court at the

pretrial hearing and had provided father with copies of the motions a few minutes before

trial commenced. Father requested a continuance, claiming that he had “insufficient time

to review the documents” and explaining that he had been served with papers both the day

before trial and on the day of trial. The district court clarified that father was provided the

20
child’s motions the first morning of trial and that father was served with the court’s pretrial

order the day before trial. Father also alleged that he received exhibits the day before trial.

But the agency’s counsel informed the district court that those exhibits had been served on

father by mail on August 29.

The district court denied father’s continuance request, reasoning that father had been

upset that the trial could not be held sooner at almost all previous hearings. The September

permanency trial date was the first and only time that the district court had available, and

that date fell within the required timelines set forth in the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile

Protection Procedure. Although the agency had filed an amended petition at a previous

hearing, the district court had asked father if he still wished to proceed with the trial date,

and father confirmed that he did. At that hearing, the agency had maintained that the same

factual basis and the same exhibits would be offered at trial. The district court therefore

determined that its decision to deny father’s requested continuance would not prejudice

father. The district court denied father’s continuance request for those same reasons and

because the parties were ready to proceed.

Based on this record, we conclude that the district court did not violate father’s

procedural due-process rights. See G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d at 236. Although father argued that

he received paperwork the day before trial, the agency’s counsel told the district court that

it had sent those documents to father two weeks before trial. And although father did not

receive the child’s motions relating to testimony until the day of trial, the child’s attorney

had discussed those motions at a previous hearing, such that father was aware of them. The

district court also made sure to issue its pretrial order on a date that would allow father

21
sufficient time to review it before the commencement of trial. In addition, on multiple

occasions, father requested that the district court set trial for an earlier date.

Even if we were to assume that the district court’s decision to deny the continuance

violated father’s procedural due-process rights, father has not shown prejudice. The

Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “a party challenging on constitutional or other

grounds a district court’s refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing must establish that the

party was prejudiced in the preparation or presentation of their case so as to materially

affect the outcome of the trial.” G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d at 238 (quotation omitted). Denial of

a continuance amounts to a procedural due-process violation when “the [party] has been in

some manner embarrassed or prejudiced in preparing his defense so as to materially affect

the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 238-39 (quoting State v. Huber, 148 N.W.2d 137, 142

(Minn. 1967)). Because father has not shown that he has been embarrassed or prejudiced

in preparing his defense before the district court, we conclude that his procedural due-

process challenge to the district court’s decision denying his continuance request fails.

C. Delay in Finalization of Order Transferring Permanent Legal and
Physical Custody

Third, father insists that the district court’s delay in determining eligibility for

Northstar funding after it deferred finalization of the transfer-of-custody order

“substantially affected [his] right to bring a timely appeal and his potential for restoring

custody of his child.”

Father, however, timely filed the appeal now before us. Moreover, Minnesota

Statutes section 260C.515, subdivision 4(8), authorizes district courts to “defer finalization

22
of an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody to a relative when deferring

finalization is necessary to determine eligibility for Northstar kinship assistance under

chapter 256N.” T.M.A., 2 N.W.3d at 330 (quotation omitted). The statute does not require

that finalization after such deferment occur within a specific timeframe. But see id. at 331

(“caution[ing] . . . that the district court should proceed with all deliberate speed to reach a

final determination”).

Given the specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court

proceeded with all deliberate speed and that the less-than-three-month delay between the

October 2023 transfer-of-custody order and the January 2024 order vacating the deferment

and deeming the October order final did not amount to a prejudicial violation of father’s

procedural due-process rights. See D.F., 752 N.W.2d at 97. We therefore reject father’s

argument that the district court’s decision to defer finalization of the transfer-of-custody

order violated his rights to procedural due process.

D. Freedom of Contract

Fourth, father maintains that “the management of his child’s education and medical

needs between himself and certain providers constitutes a contract, and that the agency’s

interference with that contract is a violation of his constitutional rights as a parent.”

According to father, “overreaching child protection involvement . . . violates a parent’s

well-established right to direct the upbringing of children—unless the parent has a truly

enforceable right to decline the offered ‘services’ by invoking freedom of contract.”

Whether an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a child under

23
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 violates a parent’s substantive due-process rights to

freedom of contract presents a novel constitutional issue of first impression.

Father first cites the contract clause of the United States Constitution, which

provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts[.]” 5 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. While father suggests that the contract clause

could have established a general right to freedom of contract, the Minnesota Supreme Court

has explained that “[t]he concept of freedom of contract, which has been dealt with by the

courts as an aspect of due process, is to be distinguished from the contract clause, U.S.

Const. art. I, § 10, which prohibits the impairment of the obligation of contract.” State v.

Int’l Harvester Co., 63 N.W.2d 547, 551-52 (Minn. 1954). Because the balance of father’s

argument appears grounded in his rights to freedom of contract as protected by the state

and federal due-process clauses, we turn to an analysis of his contentions under that

framework. 6

5
Although father does not cite it, the Minnesota Constitution similarly provides that “[n]o
. . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 11.
6
Even if we were to consider father’s freedom-of-contract claim as arising from the federal
and state contract clauses, we would still reject his argument. “The contracts clauses [of
the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution] prevent retroactive
impairment of contracts[,]” but “[w]hen the statute was in force and effect at the time the
contract was made, there is no impairment, because existing statutes are read into future
contracts and enter into the contract terms by implication.” Gretsch v. Vantium Cap., Inc.,
846 N.W.2d 424, 435 (Minn. 2014). Both before the district court and on appeal, father has
failed to identify legislation that retroactively impairs any specific and existing contracts
relating to his management of the child’s educational and medical needs. But even
assuming father had done so, “the federal constitutional prohibition against contract
impairment, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1, has been construed to mean that the state reserves
some power to modify contract terms when the public interest requires.” Hertz Corp. v.
State Farm Mut. Ins., 573 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). Thus, “[t]he

24
 “[T]he principle of freedom of contract” is “considered implicit in the guaranty of

due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal, and art. 1, § 7, of the state,

constitution.” McElhone v. Geror, 292 N.W. 414, 416 (Minn. 1940). But “[n]either under

the due process guaranty nor otherwise is the right to freedom of contract absolute.” Id.

Instead, “[a]s with most other individual rights, it is qualified and limited by similar rights

of others and those of government.” Id. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained

that “[i]ndividual liberty must yield to the conflicting interest of society, acting through

sovereign government[,]” and “[i]ndividual will must give way to that of government when

the latter is expressed in declared policy, enforced by constitutional means.” Id.

“To challenge successfully an interference with the liberty of contract protected by

the state and federal due process clauses, one must demonstrate that the action is not

rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose.” Metro. Sports

Facilities Comm’n v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Minn. 1991); see also State

by Humphrey v. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Minn. App. 1987) (observing that, “in

Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 1983)[,] the supreme court explained that

freedom of contract has not been recognized as a fundamental right sufficient to invoke

strict judicial scrutiny, and thus minimum judicial scrutiny is appropriate”), rev. denied

legislature . . . can alter contract terms by enacting statutes as long as the legislation is
necessary to meet a broad and pressing social or economic need, if the legislation is
reasonably adopted for the solution of the problem involved, and if it is not over broad or
over harsh.” Id. (quotation omitted). We note that “[t]he government . . . has a compelling
interest in identifying and protecting abused children . . . and in safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of children . . . .” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853
N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).

25
(Minn. Feb. 17, 1988). “Under the ‘rational[] basis’ test an Act should be upheld as

constitutional if the record shows the Act is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate

government purpose.” Ri-Mel, 417 N.W.2d at 106 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf

Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Guilliams v. Comm’r of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d

138, 142 (Minn. 1980)). “There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of

legislation and a party challenging constitutionality has the burden of demonstrating

beyond a reasonable doubt a statute violates a provision of the constitution.” Id. (citing

McGuire v. C & L Rest., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Minn. 1984)).

The purpose of the laws relating to permanency . . . is to ensure
that:

(1) when required and appropriate, reasonable efforts
have been made by the social services agency to reunite the
child with the child’s parents in a home that is safe and
permanent; [and]

(2) if placement with the parents is not reasonably
foreseeable, to secure for the child a safe and permanent
placement according to the requirements of section 260C.212,
subdivision 2, preferably with a relative through . . . a transfer
of permanent legal and physical custody . . . [.]

....

The paramount consideration in all proceedings for
permanent placement of the child under sections 260C.503 to
260C.521 . . . is the best interests of the child. . . .

Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3; see also R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 134 (explaining the state’s

compelling interest in protecting children).

We conclude that the district court did not violate father’s substantive due-process

rights to freedom of contract by issuing the transfer-of-custody order under the juvenile-

26
protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, which include the laws relating to

permanency. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subds. 1(a), 3 (2022). The statutory prerequisites

for the order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of the child under

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 are rationally related to achievement of a legitimate

governmental purpose—the protection of a child adjudicated to be in need of protection or

services, and the safeguarding of that child’s physical and psychological well-being. See

R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 134; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3.

Section 260C.517 requires that the agency prove the following by clear and

convincing evidence: (1) that the transfer-of-custody order serves the child’s best interests;

(2) that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father; (3) that father

failed to make efforts to use services to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home

placement despite his ability to do so; and (4) that the conditions that led to the out-of-

home placement had not been corrected so that the child could safely return home. See

J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 655-56. We are therefore satisfied that the statute is rationally related

to a legitimate state purpose. See Essling, 335 N.W.2d at 239.

Strict scrutiny is a higher, more exacting standard of review than the rational-basis

test that applies to father’s freedom-of-contract argument. See Ri-Mel, 417 N.W.2d at 106;

see also Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 10 n.5 (Minn. 2020)

(discussing the application of the “higher hurdle” of strict scrutiny “[w]hen fundamental

rights are at stake” and explaining that, if “no fundamental rights are at stake[,] . . . the less

demanding rational basis standard applies”). We consider it persuasive that the Minnesota

Supreme Court has held that other provisions of the Juvenile Court Act survive the more

27
restrictive strict-scrutiny test. See, e.g., R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 133-38 (holding that

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) (2012), which provides that

parents who previously have had their parental rights to children involuntarily terminated

are presumed to be palpably unfit to parent other children, is narrowly tailored to serve the

state’s compelling interest in protecting children and therefore survives strict scrutiny);

SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821-24 (Minn. 2007) (holding that Minnesota

Statutes section 257C.08, subdivision 4 (2006), which allowed district courts to grant

reasonable visitation to a person with whom the child has resided for at least two years,

survives strict scrutiny because it is narrowly drawn to the state’s compelling interest in

protecting the general welfare of children by preserving the relationships of recognized

family units).

Lastly, although father seems to argue that his due-process rights to freedom of

contract entitle him to decline to participate in the court-ordered case plan altogether, the

Minnesota Supreme Court has held that, “once a case plan has been approved by the court,

the appropriate action for a parent who believes some aspect of the case plan to be

unreasonable is to ask the court to change it, rather than to simply ignore it.” S.E.P., 744

N.W.2d at 388.

We therefore hold that an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody

of a child under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 does not violate a parent’s

substantive due-process rights to freedom of contract. 7

7
We acknowledge that “‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and

28
 DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in its transfer-of-custody order. The

order did not violate father’s procedural due-process rights, and an order transferring

permanent legal and physical custody of a child under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517

does not violate a parent’s substantive due-process rights to freedom of contract.

Affirmed.

control of their children.’” In re Child of M.E.P., 4 N.W.3d 152, 162 (Minn. App. 2024)
(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2024);
see also SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 820 (“A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of his or her children is a protected fundamental right.”).
Although father alludes to his fundamental right as a parent by asserting that “the public
safety and police powers of the government have no place interfering in a parent’s
reasonable and prudent choices in raising his child,” he cites no authority in support of this
contention. When an appellant “fails to provide legal argument or to cite legal authority in
support of [a] proposition[,] . . . [t]he issue is not adequately briefed, and we therefore deem
it waived.” In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 n.2 (Minn. App.
2009). Although we do not reach the issue, we are mindful that the Minnesota Supreme
Court has explained that the fundamental right of parents “is not absolute[,]” observing that
“[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that states may intrude on parental rights in order
to protect the ‘general interest in the youth’s well being.’” SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 822
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Indeed, in construing Troxel,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has said that the Supreme Court “recognized that there may
be instances when the state may constitutionally intrude upon a fit parent’s right to the care,
custody, and control of the parent’s child . . . .” Id. at 821.

29