In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: S. S., Parent

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0841

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: S. S., Parent.

Filed November 10, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-JV-23-471

Amy L. Senn, Amy L. Senn, P.A., Afton, Minnesota (for appellant-father J.A.W.)

Kevin Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Anthony Zdroik, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent Washington County Child Protection)

Katie Mathurin, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota (for child)

John P. Chitwood, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-mother S.S.)

Nancy Cottrell, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and

Cochran, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant-father challenges the order transferring permanent legal and physical

custody of his child to maternal relatives, arguing that the district court clearly erred by

finding that (1) respondent-county made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the child,

and (2) transfer of custody is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
 FACTS

Appellant J.W. (father) and S.S. (mother) are the parents of S.W. (child), born in

2016. Parents separated in December 2016, after which child lived with mother. 1 Child

came to the attention of respondent Washington County Community Services (the county)

in August 2022, upon reports that mother was using methamphetamine in the home.

During its investigation, the county learned that father has anger-related issues and a history

of conflict with mother dating back to 2017, when mother contacted police to report an

altercation in which father yelled at and pushed her. Mother told the first social worker

assigned to the case that in June or July 2022, child returned from spending time with father

and reported that father berated mother in front of child and child’s older brother. When

brother intervened to defend mother, father “became really angry and put him down and

said that no one loves him.” Child stated that “her dad was really scary.” Mother told the

social worker that she was also frightened of father, describing him as mentally unstable

and a “psycho.” She explained that she often “block[ed] [father] from having contact [with

her] because of his behavior.”

In September 2022, the county filed a petition alleging child needed protection or

services (CHIPS) based on mother’s chemical use and resulting inability to pay rent.

Following an emergency protective-care hearing, child was placed with relatives J.G. and

V.G. (former guardians). Two months later, the district court adjudicated child as CHIPS.

1
Between 2017 and 2020, father cared for child approximately 64 days per year. In 2021,
father cared for child for 96 days, and in 2022 father cared for child for 44 days. Father
has not had contact with child outside of visitation since July 2022.

2
 Although father was a noncustodial parent, the county developed case plans and

provided services to him that were primarily aimed at addressing his anger issues and

developing healthier interactions with child and mother. Father’s October 2022 initial case

plan required him to engage with parental education services (for parent-to-parent conflict),

participate in parenting services (to support parent-to-child interactions), undergo a

psychological evaluation, complete a parenting assessment, and follow all

recommendations. His three successive case plans contained the same components, at least

in part because father did not comply with them.

Despite knowing from early in the juvenile-protection proceedings that he needed

to engage in services to address his mental health, father refused to complete the first step

of that process—a psychological evaluation—until April 2023. The psychologist

determined that father exhibited narcissistic and antisocial personality traits. 2 The

psychologist indicated that individuals with antisocial traits show a disregard for others’

rights, problems with impulsivity, deceitfulness, and a lack of remorse or empathy. And

she explained that individuals with narcissistic traits may display harmful parenting

practices, including emotional distancing or neglect and lack of empathy for their child.

The psychologist recommended father pursue individual mental-health therapy and seek

further psychological evaluation.

2
We are mindful that mental-health records are not accessible to the public. Minn. R. Pub.
Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 1(f). We limit our discussion of such records in
this opinion to information disclosed in publicly filed documents.

3
 Father completed a parenting assessment that summer. The assessor recommended

child not be placed with father at that time, opining that father has personality traits that

are not conducive to being a good parent, like narcissistic traits that do not allow him to

understand others’ perspective or display empathy to others. The assessor recommended,

among other things, that father get involved in individual therapy with a trained therapist

working with personality disorders and engage in family therapy when approved by child’s

therapist.

Father obtained his own psychological diagnostic assessment 3 in December. After

meeting with father, the assessor concluded that father could benefit from individual

therapy and psychological testing to explore the presence of a personality disorder.

Father’s second psychological evaluation took place in February 2024 and largely

confirmed what the previous assessor found. The second psychologist opined that father

technically meets the diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder, but the

presence of antisocial traits makes a diagnosis of “Other Specified Personality Disorder”

more appropriate. The psychologist recommended that father complete an anger-

management program, participate in long-term individual therapy with a trauma-focused

provider, and engage in family therapy, in consultation with child’s therapist, to improve

his ability to meet child’s emotional needs.

3
A diagnostic assessment is based only on the interview with the examinee. In contrast, a
psychological evaluation involves psychological testing and consideration of collateral
information, such as reports from social workers.

4
 Father did not begin individual therapy in earnest until late July, when he began

seeing a therapist of his own choosing. 4 But the therapist’s sparse treatment records do not

reflect any sustained effort to address the underlying personality traits that affect father’s

parenting ability.

With respect to permanency planning, the county petitioned the district court in

September 2023 to transfer custody of child to former guardians. Three months later, father

petitioned the district court to transfer custody of child to him. 5 Former guardians took

themselves out of consideration as a permanency option after an incident that occurred

during a November 18 supervised visit at Minnesota Families United. On that occasion,

child refused to leave former guardians’ car. Father “immediately started yelling” at staff

and former guardians, frightening child. In response, the county moved child to the home

of a maternal great aunt, K.W., and great uncle, P.W. (foster parents). In September 2024,

the county amended its permanency petition, asking that legal and physical custody of child

be transferred to foster parents.

The district court held a six-day trial in January and February 2025. At the time of

trial, child had been in out-of-home placement for 29 months. The district court received

123 exhibits and heard testimony from 13 witnesses, including parents, three social

4
Father attended five individual therapy sessions with a county-referred therapist between
March 2024 and June 2024. He terminated the sessions because “his court case is going in
a different direction.”
5
In April 2024, mother filed her own petition seeking transfer of custody to father. But at
trial, she testified in support of child being with foster parents “right now.”

5
workers, the two psychologists who evaluated father, the parenting consultant, foster

parents, the guardian ad litem (GAL), and three of father’s relatives.

In addition to the facts described above, the witnesses testified about father’s refusal

to participate in case planning or engage in services. When the first assigned social worker

met with father in October 2022 to discuss case planning, father refused to participate. At

a later follow-up meeting to discuss a draft case plan, father spent most of the meeting

disputing the plan’s reference to his “tendency to become angry,” rather than talking with

the social worker. Father’s anger and reticence to participate in the case-planning process

continued. Another social worker described a December 2024 meeting in connection with

the fourth case plan during which father became angry, talked over the social worker, and

refused to participate in the planning efforts. Father’s lack of cooperation included

repeated refusals to sign his case plans. Three of his plans were submitted to and approved

by the district court without his signature.

Following the trial, the district court issued a thorough, detailed 70-page order

transferring legal and physical custody of child to foster parents. The district court found

that (1) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify father with child, (2) father’s own

conduct and choices created obstacles to his success, (3) father’s efforts did not correct the

conditions that led to child’s out-of-home placement, and (4) the transfer of custody is in

child’s best interests. And the district court expressly found the testimony of the three

social workers, two psychologists, the parenting consultant, GAL, and foster parents

credible.

Father appeals.

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 DECISION

On appeal from an order permanently transferring custody of a child, we review the

district court’s “factual findings for clear error and its finding of a statutory basis for the

order for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321

(Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). In doing so, we “view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the findings, do not find . . . facts, do not reweigh the

evidence, [and] do not reconcile conflicting evidence.” In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A.,

11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes

findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary

matters in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id.

A district court may “order a transfer of permanent legal and physical custody to . . .

a fit and willing relative.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4(a)(2) (2024). To do so, the

district court must make detailed findings about:

(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social
service agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child
with the parent or guardian where reasonable efforts are
required;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use
services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement; and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely
return home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2024). Each of these findings must be supported by clear and

convincing evidence. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1.

7
 The district court made detailed findings on all four statutory factors. Father

challenges only two of them, arguing that the district court clearly erred by finding that

(1) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify him and child and (2) transfer of custody

is in child’s best interests. 6 We address each argument in turn.

I. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify father and child.

As a general rule, permanent placement of a child outside of a parent’s home may

occur only if the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Minn. Stat.

§ 260.012(a) (2024). Indeed, the district court must make detailed findings on “the nature

and extent” of the county’s reasonable efforts before transferring a child out of a parent’s

custody. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2). “[W]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ depends

on the facts of each case.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Minn.

App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “[R]easonable efforts” generally mean the

case planning and other “services” provided to the family by the county. Minn. Stat.

§ 260.012(f) (2024).

In determining whether a county’s efforts were reasonable, the district court must

consider whether the services provided were:

(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of
the child;

6
Father challenges only the district court’s underlying findings of fact. He does not
contend that the court abused its discretion in determining there is a statutory basis to
transfer custody of child to foster parents.

8
 (4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024).

The district court found that the county’s efforts included case-management

services, parenting classes, psychological evaluations, a parenting assessment, individual

therapy, supervised visits, in-person and remote visits, gas cards, and transportation to and

from visits. Father contends that these efforts were not reasonable because (1) “[the

county] failed to make diligent efforts to assess whether [he] was willing and capable of

providing day-to-day care of the child,” and (2) the county did not continuously provide or

make services available as evidenced by the period of seven months during the middle of

the proceeding when no court-approved case plan was in place. Neither contention

persuades us to reverse.

A. Parenting-Related Services

As noted above, a primary focus of the county’s efforts was father’s anger-related

issues associated with his narcissistic and antisocial personality traits. These concerns were

borne out by the two psychological evaluations and the parenting assessment that prompted

various treatment recommendations. The district court ordered father to follow these

recommendations in November 2023, December 2023, January 2024, and February 2024.

Father attended only five sessions with the county-referred therapist. When he

finally began a regular course of therapy in late July 2024, it was with his chosen therapist.

9
As the district court found, the therapist’s notes include “no specific information or

examples of how [father] has addressed or made sustained behavior change regarding

emotional regulation, communication, empathy, impulse control[,] and self-awareness.”

Importantly, that situation was unchanged at the time of trial. The therapist’s January 28,

2025 letter does not suggest that the therapy sessions led to any behavioral changes that

would improve father’s parenting ability.

The county offered other services directed toward improving father’s ability to

safely care for child. These included a referral to the Circle of Security program, which

helps parents understand their child’s emotional needs and support the child’s “ability to

successfully manage emotions and behaviors.” Father declined to participate. Other

services included supervised in-person and remote visits with child, gas cards, and other

transportation assistance.

In sum, the record supports the district court’s determination that the county made

myriad reasonable efforts to help father improve his ability to safely parent child. The

recommendation to pursue individual therapy—to treat father’s antisocial and narcissistic

personality traits—was particularly tailored to address the mental-health and anger issues

that compromise father’s parenting ability. See In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d

656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (“[T]he nature of the services which constitute ‘reasonable efforts’

depends on the problem presented.” (quotation omitted)).

10
 B. Seven-Month Gap in Court-Approved Case Plans

Father asserts that because there was no court-approved case plan between October

1, 2023, and April 12, 2024, 7 the county’s efforts were not reasonable. He cites In re

Welfare of Child. of A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d 894, 898-99 (Minn. App. 2018), for the proposition

that the absence of a case plan means that the social-services agency failed to make

reasonable efforts at reunification. We are not convinced.

In A.R.B., we reversed the termination of the father’s parental rights where the

county contacted the incarcerated father twice but otherwise “made no effort to assist him

in identifying any potentially suitable programming available to him while he was in prison

that may have facilitated his opportunity to reunify with the child.” 906 N.W.2d at 895.

We reasoned that the case-planning statute mandates a court-approved written case plan,

with rare exceptions that were not present there. Id. at 897-98. In concluding that the

district court abused its discretion, we focused on two key facts: there was no court-

approved case plan at any point during the pendency of the case, and the father was given

no guidance—at all—about “what steps he needed to take to correct the conditions” that

led to the child’s placement. Id. at 899.

The circumstances here are different. First, father had four court-approved case

plans covering about 22 of the 29 months the juvenile-protection proceedings were

pending. Each case plan contained detailed requirements set out in at least a dozen pages.

7
Father contends there was no case plan between October 1, 2023, and July 30, 2024, a
period of nine months. This discrepancy is due to the fact that the county initiated the third
case plan on April 12, 2024, but did not file it with the district court until July 30, 2024.
As explained above, this discrepancy does not affect our analysis.

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Second, the record shows that father received services during the period when there was

no court-approved case plan, including: (1) a December 2023 court order directing father

to comply with the case plan on file, including participating in individual therapy as

recommended by the April 2023 psychological evaluation, (2) a second opinion in the form

of a diagnostic assessment that recommended individual therapy in December 2023, (3) a

second psychological evaluation in February 2024 that recommended he seek individual

therapy, (4) individual therapy with a county-recommended therapist beginning in

mid-March 2024, and (5) supervised visits with child.

Not only did father actually receive services during the gap period, but the record

demonstrates that he knew the “steps he needed to take to correct the conditions in the

absence of a case plan.” Id. Indeed, the requirements were essentially unchanged from

plan to plan. In that regard, this case is like In re Welfare of Child of R.V.M., where we

rejected the parent’s argument that the county’s failure to file a timely written case plan

amounted to a failure of reasonable efforts. 8 N.W.3d 680, 695-96 (Minn. App. 2024), rev.

denied (Minn. July 19, 2024). We reasoned there, as we do here, that the lack of a court-

approved case plan is not, in itself, determinative, so long as the parent is aware of and

understands the steps to take to achieve reunification. Id. at 696.

On this record, we discern no clear error by the district court in finding that the

county made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child.

12
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that placement
with foster parents is in child’s best interests.

A district court’s permanency determination “must be governed by the best interests

of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b) (2024). This requires the court to consider and

evaluate “all relevant factors.” Id. (a) (2024). One factor is “the relationship between the

child and relatives and the child and other important persons with whom the child has

resided or had significant contact.” Id. (b). A district court must “provide insight into

which facts or opinions were most persuasive of the ultimate decision, or . . . demonstrate

the [district] court’s comprehensive consideration of the statutory criteria.” In re Welfare

of M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990). We review a district court’s best-interests

determination for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. A district court abuses

its discretion if, among other things, it misapplies the law or makes factual findings that

lack support in the record. T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 355.

The district court found that transfer of legal and physical custody to foster parents

is in child’s best interests because “it will provide [child] with stable, consistent, and safe

care providers.” The court found that child had thrived during the six months she had been

placed with foster parents and looks to them “as the care-providers who meet her needs

and who she relies on to discuss what is happening in her life.” The court further found

that foster parents have “maintained the important relationships to [child] to her brother

. . . and her grandparents,” and “it would set [child] back to be removed from that home.”

As to father, the district court found that he “refuse[s] to acknowledge . . . that he

struggles with anger,” and “has not progressed in therapy to demonstrate any behavioral

13
change that will make him a consistent and safe legal custodian for [child].” The court also

found father’s “actions have shown he lacks empathy” and that “[t]he delay in accessing

therapy was a choice made by [father].”

The district court also found that child “does not want to live with her father despite

her strong bond with him” and that she “has clearly expressed a desire to live with [foster

parents].”

The record supports these findings. To convince us otherwise, father argues that

(1) the GAL’s testimony was not credible because she did not visit father’s home or

independently investigate his ability to meet child’s needs, (2) the district court clearly

erred by making no findings regarding the suitability of father’s home or the environment

in which child would live, and (3) the district court erred by making no findings regarding

father’s willingness to support child’s desire to maintain contact with child’s relatives. The

record defeats these arguments.

First, the district court expressly found the GAL’s testimony credible. “We defer to

the district court’s determinations of witness credibility and the weight to be given to the

evidence.” In re Welfare of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007); see M.M., 452

N.W.2d at 239 (stating a district court’s witness-credibility findings “provide insight into

which facts or opinions were most persuasive of the ultimate decision”). And the record

amply supports the district court’s credibility determination. The GAL testified that, when

she was assigned to the case, she reviewed the reports from and talked with the previous

GAL, “read psychological assessments,” and met with the then-current social worker. She

met with child and father during supervised visits because she believed “it was more

14
important for [her] to observe [father] with [child],” since the decision was whether father

was “the appropriate person for this child to go back to.” During those visits, the GAL

observed that child “loves [father] and that he loves her,” but she “worr[ies] that [father] is

not able to parent [child] in the way she needs to be parented” because he does not “pick[]

up on her cues.” The GAL also noted that she did not visit father’s home because “[child]

is not in that home.”

The GAL also observed child’s interactions with foster parents, opining that foster

parents are meeting child’s medical and developmental needs, and supporting child’s

interactions with the community, including in school programs and with friends in her

neighborhood. The GAL ultimately supported the permanent transfer of custody to foster

parents because child “needs a home with parents who are consistent, who are stable, who

provide a safe environment, who meet her needs ahead of everybody else’s.”

Second, the district court made numerous supported findings regarding father’s

parenting obstacles—most notably his largely untreated anger and mental-health issues—

that directly impact his ability to provide a safe environment for child. Although we “need

not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness

of the findings of the district court,” T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 355 (quotation omitted), we

observe that the district court, relying on the testimony from two psychologists and the

parenting assessor, found that father’s narcissistic and antisocial personality traits have a

substantial, pervasive, and negative impact on his ability to safely parent child. In other

words, the district court considered the home environment father would provide and found

placing the child there is not in child’s best interests.

15
 Finally, father criticizes the district court for not making detailed findings regarding

“the relationship between the child and relatives and the child and other important persons

with whom the child has resided or had significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b).

Father’s argument is unavailing. The district court did make factual findings regarding

foster parents’ and father’s respective abilities and willingness to maintain contact between

child and her relatives. In one finding, the district court cites father’s statement to the first

psychological examiner about separating child from her older brother out of concern that

father would be blamed for brother’s behaviors and that brother would have a negative

influence on child. In another finding, the district court referenced father telling child

during a supervised visit “that they would move to Florida and [he] was going to get rich

by suing [former guardians] and putting them in jail.”

The record includes father’s testimony that he would allow child to continue having

relationships with her maternal grandparents, foster parents, mother, and brother. Foster

parents likewise testified that contact between child and her relatives would continue. The

district court expressly found foster parents’ testimony credible; it made no such finding as

to father’s testimony.

In sum, our careful review of the record reveals no clear error in the district court’s

findings that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child and no abuse

of discretion in the court’s determination that transfer of custody to foster parents is in

child’s best interests.

Affirmed.

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