Cited by

d 284, 287- 88 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to infer that the defendant jointly possessed drugs found in the defendant’s bedroom with the homeowner); -76 (Minn. 1973) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed drugs that were found next to items belonging to defendant in a house where “defendant lived or, at the very least, spent much time in”).

-76 (Minn. 1973) (affirming conviction of constructive possession of contraband where contraband was found next to items belonging to defendant in a house where “defendant lived or, at the very least, spent much time in”).

at 622– 23 (footnote omitted) (citing Harris, d at 790–91; d 667, 673 (Minn. 1973)).

familiar facts of normal life.”

In State v. Wiley , 295 Minn. 411 , the supreme court rejected an argument that the district court erred by not ordering the disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant whose information provided probable cause for a search warrant based on "all of the circumstances of this case."

State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422-23, (noting there is no “fixed rule” for disclosure).

1979) (concluding that defendant constructively possessed drugs when papers identifying the 18 defendant and the defendant’s checkbook were found near the drugs); State v. Carr, 311 Minn. 161, 163, (concluding that defendant constructively possessed drugs whe n information identifying him was found in the same drawer as the drug paraphernalia); State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422, (concluding that defendant constructively possessed drugs when drawer where the drugs were found contained items disp

See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421, (allowing evidence of quantity of seized marijuana even where defendant offere d to stipulate to the quantity element) .

v. Lorenz, -88 (Minn. 1985) (finding drugs in the defendant’s apartment); (finding drugs in the defendant’s home); (finding drugs in bedroom of defendant’s home); State v. Carr, 311 Minn. 161, 163, (finding drugs in the defendant’s home); State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422, -76 (1973) (finding drugs in the place where the defendant either lived or spent a lot of time); (finding drugs in the defendant’s apartment); (finding drugs in the defendant’s bedroom

at 790- *623 91; see also State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 417

(citing State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421 , ).

There is “[n]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure.” State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422-23

(citing State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422 , -76 (1973)).

See State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 417 , (“In passing on an application for a warrant, the magistrate is not required to ignore such familiar facts of normal life as the habit of most people to have items of identification at their residence.”).

State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421

See, State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422 , -76 (1973); State v. LaBarre, 292 Minn. 228, 237

State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421

We have since referred to the Matousek dicta in State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411 , stressing the concern for the trustworthiness of hearsay when the confrontation clause is implicated.

In State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411 , decided prior to the enactment of Minn.Stat.

We stated: In State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421 , we stated the general rule that a criminal defendant’s judicial admission or offer to stipulate did not necessarily take away the state’s right to offer evidence on a point but that “[cjases may arise where unduly prejudicial evidence, which is without relevance beyond the defendant’

In State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421 , we stated the general rule that a criminal defendant’s judicial admission or offer to stipulate did not necessarily take away the state’s right to offer evidence on a point but that “[c]ases may arise where unduly prejudicial evidence, which is without relevance beyond the defendant’

Rule 803(6) was not intended to change the decisions of this court in State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411 , State v. Matousek, 287 Minn. 344 , and City of Fairmont v. Sjostrom, 280 Minn. 87 , cases which support defendant’s contention that evidence of this sort cannot be admitted under the business-records exception to prove an element of a crime.

See, also, State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 417 , where in upholding a warranted search for identification items we stated that ‘[i]n passing on an application for a warrant, the magistrate is not required to ignore such familiar facts of normal life as the habit of most people to have items of identification at their residence.’ “I

See, also, State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 417 , where in upholding a warranted search for identification items we stated that “[i]n passing on an application for a warrant, the magistrate is not required to ignore such familiar facts of normal life as the habit of most people to have items of identification at their residence.” In

2 The general rule is that a defendant’s judicial admission or offer to stipulate that certain facts are true does not necessarily take away the state’s right to offer evidence on a point, but that “[cjases may arise where unduly prejudicial evidence, which is without relevance beyond the defendant’s judicial admissions, should not be received.” State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421

2 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 108 , 85 S. Ct 741, 746 , 13 L. ed. 2d 684, 689 (1965); State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 417

See, State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411 , State v. LaBarre, 292 Minn. 228 , State v. Resnick, 287 Minn. 168 , ” In this case the police found the heroin in a cabinet in the living room of a house which defendant shared with a woman and two children.