Cited by

In the alternative, (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

Knaffla is a procedural rule that “bars all claims that the appellant should have known at the time of direct appeal.” (quotations omitted); d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) .

Procedural-bar When direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

and by concluding that his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel lack merit.

26, 2019) (); WL 2408443, at *2-3 (Minn. App. June 14, 2021) (holding Corrigan’s claim that stalking statute was unconstitutionally 3 overbroad was Knaffla -barred because it was known at the time of direct appeal and did not satisfy the novel-legal-issue exception); Corriga

In doing so, we review the district court’s “legal 1 The district court also concluded that Evans’s

A district court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious 3

stating that all claims known but not raised on direct appeal are barred in a 5 subsequent petition for postconviction relief.

The district court denied his petition

Claims that were raised on direct appeal or were known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred.” ().

Asempa then petitioned the district court for postconviction relief, arguing that (1) the district court’s denial of her presentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea violated her Sixth Amendment rights and, (2) by taking her plea under advisement pending receipt of the presentence investigation, the district court violated her constitutional rights, Minn. 1

If a “direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

The district court summarily denied Tichich’s petition

and this court affirmed in an order opinion.

The State countered that Greer’s petition is time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2022), 5 and meritless.

40 witness.”); (“It is well established that proper impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent statements.”).

as a defense to a petition for postconviction relief, a district court abuses its discretion by granting the petition 1 without explicitly determining whether the claim is procedurally barred and offering a sufficient explanation to support a determin

1 (2022) (“A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.”)

the district court determined that the facts of Thompson’s case satisfied the two exceptions for claims that should have been known, but were not raised, in an earlier proceeding.4 More specifically, the court determined that Thompson’s postconviction petition raised a claim that presented a n

If a “direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

5 Had Johnson challenged the validity of his conviction for first- degree murder, the procedural limitations set forth in Minnesota’s post-conviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2022), would apply.

After considering Auginaush’s request, the postconviction court construed it as a petition for postconviction relief and filed an order denying it on the grounds that his May 2021 and that the petition filed on April 14, 2022, was time-barred by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

1 (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

- 26 (Minn. 2015) (citing State v. Knaffla , ).

5 Because the petition is time- barred, we do not address the issues of whether Blanche’s claim is procedurally barred by State v. Knaffla , 10 Accordingly, Blanche’s claims do not satisfy the newly discovered evidence or the interests-of-justice exceptions, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Blanche’s second postconviction petition as untimely under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4.