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The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that when a “direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, or all claims known but not raised will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” .

“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

The state argued that Knowles’s motion was an untimely postconviction petition and , alternatively

∗ SYLLABUS I. If the state asserts that a the postconviction court abuses its discretion by granting relief without either explicitly determining that the claim is not procedurally barred or explaining an implied determination to that effect.

2 As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether Flantz has forfeited his arguments , d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).

(stating that when a direct 7 appeal has been taken all claims raised in that appeal and all claims known at the time of that appeal “will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

The court concluded that Burdunice’s claims were known, or should have been known

Because the district court properly construed the motion as a we affirm.

(stating that petitioner is not entitled to relief for claims raised on direct appeal or for claims not raised on direct appeal, but that could have been raised on direct appeal).

Separate from the time-bar at issue in this appeal, we established a procedural rule barring postconviction claims that were (a) raised or (b) were known but not raised on direct appeal in a subsequent postconviction appeal.

9.” Treat ing the claims as requests for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2020), because Greer knew or should have known about the claims when he filed his earlier postconviction petitions.

The state did not raise and the district court did not address whether Burdunice’s

Where, as here, a defendant has already taken a direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be c onsidered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

“Claims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred.” Sontoya v. State , ( (holding that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”)); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

Appellant also argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by determining that his petition is procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla , d 737, 741 ( Minn. 1976), asserting that the Knaffla interests-of-justice exception applies.

The State asserts that Mart in’s claim is time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a)

“[P]ost-conviction remedies exist to try fundamental issues that have not been tried before.”

And the district court denied relief, determining that Kingbird’s second petition for postconviction relief was untimely and that all claims were procedurally barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2020) lacked merit, or both.

Appellant argues further that, because his claim has not previously been raised in either a direct appeal or a postconviction petition, (holding that neither claims raised in a direct appeal from a conviction nor claims known but not raised will be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief).

The statute reflects the rule established in State v. Knaffla, which states that after a direct app eal has been taken, all claims raised in that appeal and all claims known at the time of that appeal “will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

1 (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s

Procedural Bar “[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

We affirmed and held that Woodward’s (holding that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

The district court denied the petition

B. Procedural Bar Under the Knaffla rule, if a “ direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” .

These convictions may occur during the same hearing, 1 Respondent argues that appellant ’s claims are barred pursuant to State v. Knaffla

(“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

at 535; (holding 17 that any claim raised, or known but not ra ised, on direct appeal is forfeited during postconviction review).

Once a direct appeal has been filed, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent pe tition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla

The state argues that Davies’ s

1 Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition on the merits, we do not reach appellant’s

The postconviction court determined that appellant ’s and summarily denied an evidentiary hearing .

See State v. Knaffla , (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief .”).

Accordingly, a district court may summarily deny a

al transcript, Hartley’s counsel had “lost potentially a lot of blood” and that an ulcer that caused five days of hospitalization “would likely have a signifi cantly adverse effect on a person’s cognition and ability to perform mentally demanding tasks.” The pos tconviction court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, denied Hartley’s