Cited by

12 Neumann, –33 (Minn. 1978), (factual basis established by testimony from partial trial); Lussier, d at 589 (factual basis established by grand jury transcript).

“‘It is well established that befo re a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.’” ().

Nelson, d at 861 (“Our standa rd is clear: ‘It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the trial judge must make certain that facts exist from whic h the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.’” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Neumann , )).

’” Nelson, d at 861 (quoting State v. Neumann , ).

As the supreme court has explained, “‘It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the trial judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.’” Nelson, d at 861 (emphasis added) ().

(“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”), Smith v. St

In order for there to be an adequate factual basis for a plea, there need be only sufficient facts from which the defendant’s guilt can be “reasonably inferred.” d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978)

Our standard is clear: “It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the trial judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.” abrogated on other grounds by Moore, d at 360-61.

tim’s injuries,” “sworn statements and testimony of the victims introduced at earlier hearings,” “[t]he state’s evidence, as summarized by the prosecutor” at the plea hearing, 686 (Minn. 1979); evidence introduced during partial trial, – 33 (Minn. 1978), and a detective’s sworn complaint, a presentence-investigation report (PSI), and the defendant’s Department of Corrections file, State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 326–27 & n.9, & n.9 (1976).

(“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”), Smith v. S

(“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”), Smith v. S

(factual basis consisted of prosecutor’s summarization of state’s evidence, which was unchallenged by defendant); -33 (Minn.1978) (factual basis supplied by testimony from partial trial); Goulette, d at 761 (defendant denied he was guilty, factual support for plea based on defense counsel’s summarization of state’s proposed evidence); State v. Hague, 304 Minn. 139, 142 , (factual basis esta

at 716 (holding trial court need not personally interrogate defendant prior to accepting guilty plea if adequate factual basis is established); (noting court must establish that facts exist from which defendant’s guilt may be reasonably inferred).

See, -31 (Minn.1978); -57 (Minn.1988).

To say, that premeditation may occur “virtually instantaneously” with the formation of the intent to kill blurs the line between first and second degree murder when it is evident that the legislature in *361 tended the line to be sufficiently distinct to justify punishing persons convicted of the different c

The requisite “plan” to commit first degree murder “can be formulated virtually instantaneously by a killer.”

We have stated, however, that extensive planning and deliberation are not required; premeditation and intent may be formed “virtually instantaneously.”