Cited by

See Frankson v. Design Space Int’l, (stating that this court defers to the jury’s ability to “assess the weight and credibility” of testimony supporting an award for a defamation per se claim), rev’d on other grounds, Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., d 252, 259 (Minn. 1980) (stating that “appellate courts tend to leave the amount to be awarded [on a defamation per se claim] to the jury’s discretion”).

DHS] did not investigate.” Goddard specifically “ denies that there were ‘other incidents’ of child abuse beyond what was investigated by the DHS.” “We have held on numerous occasions that truth is a complete defense to defamation and ‘true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.’” (quoting Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980)).

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., (“[O]nce the defendant has demonstrated the existence of a conditional privilege, the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that the privilege has been abused, which is generally a question for the jury.”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has concluded that qualified privilege protects statements made in a variety of circumstances, including statements made during an employer’s investigation into employee misconduct, Bahr, d at 923; an employer’s good-faith statement about the character of a former employee when called for a reference, Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., and statements about the reasons for an employee’s discharge.

Co., (citing Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., ).

To qualify for the privilege, a statement “must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., -57 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously recognized a qualified privilege for statements made in the following relevant contexts: an employer’s good-faith statements about a former employee in a requested character reference, Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., statements made in relation to an employer’s investigation into employee misconduct, an employer’s communication to a former employee of the reasons for 7 the employee’s discharge, Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

based upon reasonable or probable cause.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., -57 (Minn. 1980) (citation omitted).

” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , -57 (Minn. 1980).

Id.; see also Stuempges v. Parke , Davis & Co. , (“ In the context of employment recommendations, the courts generally recognize a qualified privilege .

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

“Minnesota was in the forefront for protection of public debate” by recognizing a qualified privilege for “[f]air comment on the conduct of public officials”); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., (recognizing a qualified privilege for “an employer’s communication to an employee of the reason for discharge”); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , (extending a qualified privilege to an employer’s statements about a past employee’s qualifications and work record).

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , , 257 (Minn. 1980) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A claim of defamation requires the plaintiff to prov e three elements: “(1) the defamatory statement is communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, (2) the statement is false, and (3) the statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the community.” Bahr, d at 919-20 (quotations omitted); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Park, Davis & Co.

5 I. Defamation “In order for a statement to be considered defamatory it must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, it must be fa lse, and it must tend to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower him in th e estimation of the community.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , , 257 (Minn. 1980).

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558 -59 (1977)).

v. Cold Spring Granite Co., (noting a common-law claim of fraud requires proof of a false representation); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., (noting true statements are not actionable in a defamation action).

3 For a defamatory statement to be protected by a qualified privilege, the statement must be made in good faith and “‘must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.’” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., -57 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W.

tation and to lower [the plaintiff] in the estimation of the community.” If the defamation “affect[s] the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, office or calling,” it is defamation per se and “thus actionable without any proof of actual damages.” Bahr, d at 919-20 (quoting Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., ).

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

Statements 1, 2, & ⅛ Truth is a complete defense to a defamation action and “true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.

(citing Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., ).

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.