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“But crimes that have some bearing on dishonesty have more impeachment value than other crimes.” Zornes, d at 627 ().

(“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.”).

See, d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (analyzing the Jones credibility factor when testimony to refute another witness is at issue).

(affirming admissibility of two p rior rape convictions for impe a c h m e n t i n a t r i a l f o r criminal sexual conduct); State v. Bettin , (affirming admissibility of prior aggravated rape conviction although “bas ically the same” as the charged offense).

(holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to bar the use of two prior ra pe convictions for impeachment purposes when defendant was on trial for criminal sexual conduct); (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to bar the use of prior conviction even though “prior crime was basically the same crime with which defendant was charged”).

“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.” d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980).

“Crimes directly involving dishonesty or false statement are automatically admissible without regard to the seriousness of the punishment and without any balancing of probative value against prejudice being required.”

“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.”

See Swanson, d at 656 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under rule 609(a) because only the third Jones factor weighed against admitting the prior convictions); (concluding that it was not a clear abuse of discretion to allow evidence of defendant’s prior rape for impeachment in a sexual-assault trial even though the third Jones factor weighed against admitting it); (concluding that the third Jones facto

“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.” d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980).

545 (Minn. 1980) (“Crimes directly involving dishonesty or false statement are automatically admissible without regard to the seriousness of the punishment and without any balancing of probative value against prejudice being required.”); d

“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.”

“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.”

“[I]f the issue for the jury narrows to a choice between defendant’s credibility and that of one other person then a greater case can be made for admitting the impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is greater.”

a greater case can be made for admitting the impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is greater.”

then a greater case can be made for admitting the impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is greater.”

“[A] judge might exclude even a relevant prior conviction if he determines that its admission for impeachment purposes will cause [a] defendant not to testify and if it is more important in the case to have the jury hear the defendant’s version of the case.”

(“The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.”).

*743 Similarity of fast crime and charged crime Under the third Jones factor, the district court must consider the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime in light of the increased probability that when the past crime is similar to the charged crime, “the jury will use the evidence substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.”

(although defendant decided not to testify because the district court refused to prohibit use of a prior conviction for impeach *330 ment purposes, reviewing court refused to reverse because “defendant’s version of what happened did get before the jury” by way of defendant’s statement being admitted).

The second Jones factor is also satisfied because while Ihnot’s 1984 conviction is fairly old, Ihnot’s subsequent convictions for second-degree burglary and fifth-degree controlled-substance crime shows a pattern of lawlessness that indicates that “the [prior] offense had not lost any relevance by the passage of time.”